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


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FROM

Prof. E. W. Gurney

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.....
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RBLUNT

STRATEGEMICON,

OR

Greek and Roman Anecdotes,

CONCERNING

MILITARY POLICY, AND THE SCIENCE OF WAR:

ALSO

STRATEGECON,

OR

CHARACTERISTICS OF ILLUSTRIOS GENERALS:

TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN

OF

SEXTUS JULIUS FRONTINUS,

PROCONSUL IN BRITAIN, A.D. 75—8.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

SOME ACCOUNT OF THE AUTHOR.

BY ROBERT B. SCOTT, *Lieut. &c.*

AUTHOR OF A COLLECTIVE ARRANGEMENT OF THE MILITARY LAW OF
ENGLAND.

Impensa Monumenti supervacua est; memoria nostri durabit, si vita meruimus.

FRONTIN. in *Plin. Ep.* L. ix. 19.

Quum Cerealis quidem alterius successoris curam famamque obruisset: sustinuit
quoque molem JULIUS FRONTINUS, vir *magnus*, quantum licebat, validam-
que et pugnacem Silurum gentem armis subegit, super virtutem hostium,
locorum quoque difficultates eluctatus. TACIT. in *Vit. Agricola*, C. 17.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR THOMAS GODDARD, MILITARY
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1811.

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22 May, 1890.
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Galpin and Merchant, Printers,
Ingram-Court, London.

TO
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
FRANCIS RAWDON HASTINGS,
EARL OF MOIRA,

Lord Hastings, Baron Rawdon,
Constable and Chief Governor of the Tower of London,
Lord-Lieutenant and Custos Rotulorum of the Tower Division,

A GENERAL OF HIS MAJESTY'S FORCES,

F.R.S. F.S.A. M.R.A.

ſc. ſc. ſc.

THIS WORK,

Of an Eminent, Philosophical, and Successful, Roman General,

WRITTEN DURING HIS RETIREMENT FROM THE

TYRANNY OF DOMITIAN,

AND DEEMED WORTHY OF BEING

DEDICATED BY FRONTINUS TO THE ADMIRABLE TRAJAN;

NOW FIRST TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH,

IS,

WITH THE MOST PERFECT DEFERENCE,

INSCRIBED,

BY HIS LORDSHIP'S

GRATEFUL

HUMBLE SERVANT,

ROBERT B. SCOTT,

London,
Stafford-Place,
May 1, 1811.

Lieut.

ESTATE PLANNING

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ANSWER TO THE CHIEF QUESTIONS

ANSWERING THE CALL: THE CHURCH AND THE CHINESE COMMUNITY

Collaborative Learning: A Test of the Social Capital Hypothesis

CHAPTER 12: THE FUTURE OF THE STATE

J. S. T. LEE, S. P. T. YU

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227-170-1-2

Section 7.0: Summary of the Results

¹ For a detailed history of the development of the concept of the "right to development," see the special issue of the *Journal of World History* (Vol. 17, No. 3, 2006).

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600 J. M. HARRIS

1. *What is the name of the author of the book?*

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THE BOSTONIAN

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INTRODUCTORY ADVERTISEMENT.

THE work, which is now first presented in English, has been long since a subject of disquisition among the learned, and known to the military reader under the more restricted title of Stratagems of War, and *Ruses de Guerre*; either of them but little competent, as a slight examination will shew, to express the intention of the author. Though, if they had been nothing more than, as these terms import, a collection of tricks and artifices to be used in deceiving the enemy, the admirable arrangement of FRONTINUS would have rendered the collection a work of no ordinary utility.

But the STATEGEMATICON is infinitely more extensive in its plan and in its operation; for, according to the definition of FRONTINUS himself, all that a general can effect *providently, usefully, magnifi-*

cently, perseveringly, is included in the term *Strategematics*; which may therefore be rendered into exemplifications of the *policy*, or, perhaps, of the philosophy, of war. It is a *study* adapted to every occasion of the soldier, from the silent transactions of the smallest body in cantonments to the extended intercourse of military diplomacy between contending armies.

Of the talents of FRONTINUS for such a work, exclusive of the evidence of his peculiar services and his writings, there is the testimony of *Aelian*, among the antients, who describes himself in the Preface to one of his works (*de instruendis æcibus*) as encouraged to prosecute his subject by the knowledge to be derived from this illustrious man in Grecian tactics, while *Vegetius* acknowledges the fame of his writings on the Roman art of war; and, what may be deemed no less important *in our times*, he has received the approbation of the chiefs of the present French armies, so eminent for their skill in his art; for, in a *military essay* on the principal historians, for the better instruction of officers, published under the sanction of the *Dépôt de la Guerre* at Paris, he is introduced as one of the “didactic authors among the antients, who have,

" in treating of various systems, so multiplied the quotation of facts that their works become histories;" which in this instance is peculiarly the case: and the *Strategemata* are afterwards characterized in the following manner: "The four books of FRONTINUS are written on an excellent plan. They are divided into heads, in which he treats of the principal branches of war, in such a manner as to compose *a system of military science, founded solely on the experience of the greatest generals.*"

To this eulogy little need be added in the introduction of FRONTINUS to the British army, where, notwithstanding the difference between antient and modern tactics, he will not long remain a stranger: for the minute operations of war may change, but human nature is always the same; and, whether the open or close order of battle be preferred, providence, magnanimity, constancy, will continue sound principles for a well-disciplined force, and a shrewd, active, and inventive, policy guard the safety and welfare of armies.

Of the general utility of the form chosen by FRONTINUS, sufficient proof may be seen in the

most elegant of modern *dissertations*, that *On Anecdotes*, by Mr. d'Israeli; it is also a remark of the British Socrates, *Johnson*, that all may in time write in this way: how much more applicable, then, are these sentiments to the present occasion, when, as observed by *FRONTINUS*, military persons are too much occupied to explore immense volumes for a solitary fact? and those who abridge histories, or make collections of this sort, without knowledge of the subject, destroy their use, by confusing the reader, without informing him.

Notwithstanding these circumstances in its favour, the lucid arrangement, and the excellent selection of facts, which have been made in this work, consecrated also by the Greek and Roman name, the *translator* has not been without his fears that it would not, at first, strike the mere English reader as yielding so much honour to its author, as his great name must confer credit even upon the admirable principle it contains.* If, however, it be regarded but as an outline to be filled up by the experience of every commanding officer,—a sort of

* Yet *Brutus* spent the eve of *Pharsalia* in writing an epitome of *Polybius*.—Vide *Plutarch* in *Brut*.

text-book for generals, on which every one may be
be a commentator, by any intelligent addition to
which FRONTINUS has declared he will consider
himself gratified rather than censured,—it will be
sufficient to warrant the attention which *Strate-
gematica* has already received in Europe, and, after
such a reception, to merit its translation into
English. The character of the book is, indeed,
entirely new; it may form the spirit of volumes,
and has, no doubt, afforded great assistance to
modern publications; it is, however, still distinct
from any other; it contains the simple useful facts,
without the details of history, or the ornaments of
eloquence.

In respect to the *translation*, much shall not be
said. The latinity of FRONTINUS is, in this work,
not excellent; nor is there, indeed, reason to sus-
pect that, in his compositions at the time, he much
studied the graces of style, whatever attention to
these particulars are to be found in his subsequent
works. It has been endeavoured to give the author's
method unaffectedly, and perhaps, in those respects,
the reader may think too closely; for the “inex-
“orable deities” of Gesner permit not the elegant
frauds of translation.

In the account of the author, which is appended to the present volume, the writer was impressed with the idea, that, in addition to the interest which FRONTINUS must naturally excite in that character, the history of a *Roman general*, deriving his experience from the plains of *England* and the mountains of *Wales*, subjugating, not more by arms than civility, an enemy, of whom it had been acknowledged by a predecessor (*Ostorius Scapula*) that they had "broken his heart" by their determined and protracted resistance, would form an additional subject to the series of military events comprised in the work.* Nor, perhaps, may it be

* It cannot surely be impertinent, on any occasion, to urge the practise of this excellent principle, (*suaviter in modo, fortiter in re*), which can never, but in the most depraved circumstances and times, be unsuccessful. At present, however, it is mentioned, not more for the production of an additional argument than the insertion in these accessible pages of a fact, which ought to operate as a high stimulus to the youth who compose the British armies; and which, though it would have obtruded too much on his life, is not irrelevant to JULIUS FRONTINUS; for his great *contemporary* Tacitus is the first who noticed it, in his observation, that the *STRENGTH* of the *Roman army* consisted of *foreign troops*: and, of these foreign troops, such were the effects of the *clement* and judicious measures, which were certainly commenced

deemed too presuming to consider such an attempt as tending, in some degree, to supply a small chasm in British history.

in the government of **FRONTINUS**, that no small part was *raised and recruited in Britain*. According to antient inscriptions, and the *Notitia Provinciarum*, as quoted by **Camden**, the following were among the corps in the pay of Rome, serving in the various provinces; Britons then as now distinguishing themselves in *France, Spain, Germany, and Egypt*:

Battalion (or wing) of a thousand in Britain (*ala Britannica milliara*).

4th battalion, or wing, (*ala*) of Britons in **Egypt**.

1st **Aelian** cohort of Britons.

3d cohort of Britons.

7th cohort of Britons.

26th cohort of Britons in **Armenia**.

British under the Master of the Infantry } Among the Palatine
Invincible Younger British } auxiliaries.

Younger British Slingers (*excubatores*); light, irregular, skirmishing troops.

Britons with the Master of the Horse, in **GAUL**.

Invincible Younger Britons, in **SPAIN**.

Elder Britons, in **Illyricum**, (*Croatia, Dalmatia, Salmatia, &c.*)

The *ala* was a term applied to *foreign* troops, of the same import to that of the Roman *Legion*.

The *cokort* consisted of about 600 men.

8. INTRODUCTORY ADVERTISEMENT.

With this view, having considered FRONTINUS, from his birth to the history of his first public employment, in Tacitus, and thence to the account by the same author of his command in Britain, it was desirable to trace him through his conduct in that appointment, in the historians of that country as well as his own ; but, unfortunately, in this interesting research, there was much disappointment, for the former had often contented themselves, in regard to him, in quoting the latter ; and the latter only consisted of an incidental notice in the life of his successor, Agricola, to whose fame every thing must, of course, be subservient. How much is it to be regretted, particularly in this stage, that FRONTINUS, whose reserve did not permit him, like a Cicero, a Pliny, or a Rufus, to solicit, or even instruct, a biographer, should not at least have admitted to his confidence an intelligent secretary, by whose pious and judicious care some satisfactory *data* might have been delicately preserved for posterity. One should not then be compelled to rest so much on a doubtful passage of *Tacitus*, acknowledging FRONTINUS to be a great man, but in such a way as to admit of the qualification by others, “as far as he had opportunity.”

Indeed, it is singular how generally this spirit, or rather accident, has pervaded the whole of the English writers that relate to this subject. Gibbon quotes the learned treatise on Aqueducts of Fabretti, without mentioning his original, FRONTINUS. The author already alluded to (*Horsley, Britannia Romana,*) ascribes even the very way that bears his name, among the others in Britain, to Agricola; and, though he is acknowledged as the vanquisher of the Silures, and the settler of the stations in that province, of which the 2nd legion necessarily bore a part, yet, from a single inscription, its being placed there is hastily ascribed to Severus. The intelligent historian of Monmouth, (*Williams,*) who traces the remains of this Roman settlement in a very able manner, and does justice otherwise to the Roman general, considers him as serving against the Silures, while Cerealis was employed by the Brigantes, and, of course, only second in command. And, what is no less remarkable in this way, even Addison, in translating a verse of Martial, descriptive of the residence and character of FRONTINUS, omits the very mention of his name!

From the whole, however, something, it is hoped,

not quite unsatisfactory, has been obtained ; nor has the labour of comparison been entirely in vain. And, while one regrets that others should not have treated the memory of this Roman governor of Britain with the same regard, it is very agreeable to contemplate that of the excellent *Camden*, who, in his *Britannia*, never fails to mention him, where necessary, and never but with kindness.

But, of all the mortifications which the writer experienced, none was equal to that of finding, in *The Tour in Monmouthshire*, no trait of JULIUS FRONTINUS. His works, in the road that bears his name from Bath hither, and the remains of Roman stations marked by his hand, are indeed traced in the masterly manner that might be expected from such a tourist ; but the present writer, while his faculties were suspended over the eloquent picture of Pierce-field, and the hapless fate of him by whose taste its beauties were guided and improved, could not fail to regret that the governor of Britain was not immortalized by some memorial of *Caer* on the ruins of Caerleon.

Returning to Italy, no better success is offered to the biographer of FRONTINUS. *Martial* records,

in a faithful *epigram*, such events as fell in his way, or in which only, perhaps, he was permitted to indulge his gratitude. But *Pliny*, while he commemorates, in his delightful *Epistles*, the transactions of other eminent contemporaries, mentions **FRONTINUS** never that he can help it,—once invidiously,—and almost always with the chilling coldness of unwilling respect. From the conduct of his friends and coadjutors, however, as recorded by that writer, something may be gathered, on the principle of the old adage, from the society in which he lived.

From the reasonings of the intelligent French *Researches* on the subject of **FRONTINUS**, and the ordinary bibliographical sources, the list and chief dates of his works are adopted; for, notwithstanding the discussions of the learned* on this subject, and the writer's unfeigned respect for their labours, he deems it now settled with an accuracy so equal to its importance as to supersede the necessity of disturbing it farther.

* Pighius, Volterre, Keuchenius, Kenkenius, Stewechius, Poleni, Vossius, Robertellus, Gronovius, Scriverius, Tenmulius, Caspinian, Cataneo, Geronimo Magi, Goesius, &c.

Such is all that it is considered necessary to promise to the reader respecting FRONTINUS, his work, and the present translation; unless, indeed, in support of the *Biographical Sketch*, it be added, that it has the honour of having been within the contemplation of *Ausonius*, many centuries since, who projected something of the kind in an account of all who

*Aut Italum populos Aquilonigenasque Britannos
Prefecturarum titulo tenuere secundo.**

To honour'd rank of governors advanced
Th' Italians, or, far north, the *Britons* ruled.

* Mosella, § 407. This association should seem to attach importance to the state of Britain at the time.

SOME ACCOUNT
OF
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF
FRONTINUS.

OF the character and circumstances of a Roman author, employed with credit in high offices of state, the colleague of Nerva and Trajan, the patron and adviser of Pliny, the protector of Martial, and the teacher of Vegetius; who derived his chief experience as a general from Britain; and who, in addition to the exertion of talents importantly successful in the service of his country, offered, in his own person, an exemplar of the most eminent qualities of a commander,—who would be ignorant?

Although his writings have been the subject of much discussion among the learned, FRONTINUS seems,—like him, the discovery of whose unobtrusive

learning roused Pliny to the correction of his works, to have been reserved in his temper, and to have shunned, rather than elicited, applause; and, generally preferring occupations which acquire importance from their elevation and utility rather than their splendour, to have therefore obtained only incidental notice in the works of his contemporaries, either as he served them by good offices or occasionally excited their surprise.

One is, therefore, in the present instance, deprived of those delightful illustrations of character which have arisen even from the judgement in oratory of Cerealis, who preceded, and the relation of Tacitus to Agricola, who succeeded, FRONTINUS in the command of Britain; and compelled to a tedious comparison of dates, facts, and allusions, for the most prominent circumstances of his life.

The birth of **SEXTUS JULIUS FRONTINUS** is thus placed at the close of the eighth century of the Roman era, and about the thirty-second after the birth of Christ; his place of nativity probably Sicily, as that of Agricola was Frejus;* and his

* In France, 40 miles N. E. of Toulon, on the banks of the Argeus. It was called by the Romans *Forum Iulii*, and had then a port in the Mediterranean. Some fine remains of antiquity are still visible in it.

rank, perhaps, similarly to that of this eminent contemporary, neither of the first nor second patrician families.* The date is computed from the period of his first consulate; and the locality from the surname of *Siculus*, attached to the treatise ascribed to him concerning the colonies of Italy.

Whatever the precise descent of FRONTINUS, it is evident, from the offices to which he was subsequently found competent by *birth*, that it was respectable, if not noble;† it is therefore unnecessary

* Some confusion has arisen on account of two families, one patrician the other plebeian, of the same name, and doubtless the same origin, which were seated at Rome. Several illustrious branches, distinguished by different surnames, sprang from both; of those of the former was Julius Cæsar, &c.—Rosin. *Antiquit. Rom.* 687—*Recherches sur Frontin.* tit. 1.

Of the first and second patrician houses, the descendants of those of whom Romulus composed the senate, (*majorum gentium*,) and of those admitted subsequently, to whom Brutus gave the patrician rank, (*minorum gentium*,) there remained but few in the time of Claudian, who therefore formed a third, and perhaps most honourable, series of that dignity, from those illustrious, either from their own personal merit or the actions of their families. The example was followed by succeeding emperors; and Agricola, according to Tacitus, was thus ennobled by Vespasian.—*Annal.* l. 2, c. 25; *Vit. Agricol.* c. 9; *Plut. in Romulo,* &c.; *Liv.* l. 1, &c.

† His consulship, the dignity of augur, his charge as curator of the aquæducts, &c. See also *Frontinus de Aquæd. Urb. Rom.* art. 1.

to urge, in such a case, the vague claims of very high antiquity, or a doubtful nobility.

Though, in these times, the system of Roman education had nearly lost the character which it sustained under the influence of **Cornelia**, **Aurelia**; and **Attia**,* when a mother could send her son to the Forum all-accomplished, without the aid either of science or its masters, a sufficient degree of polished severity was yet maintained to preserve the Roman character.

SEXTUS JULIUS may, therefore, be traced through the maternal care and the hands of his first masters, (*litteratores*, or *Γραμματίσαι*,) to the scholastic tuition, either private or public, of modern times, and, though perhaps the laws of the twelve tables were no longer to be learned by heart,† quite sufficient remained to occupy the attention of youth in the delightful studies of rhetoric and philosophy, to which he would be allure^d by the most amiable as well as best-informed masters.‡

* These ladies, besides the education of their own children, (the Gracchi, Julius Cæsar, and Augustus,) who reflected so much honour on it, are said to have superintended also that of the principal nobility.

† *Cic. de Legibus.*

‡ *Jur. Sat. 7; Pers. Sat. 5.*

Having acquired the only learned language and learning of his day, as well as a full instruction in the manly exercises, at the age of seventeen, when the extreme dangers of youth were passed, the young warrior is invested with the gown (*toga virilis*) that is to announce his manhood, and brought to the Forum, that he may employ in the study of eloquence those years in which he is yet but weak in arms. Perhaps a few campaigns might variegate his labours, and inure him to the practice of war. Whatever the plan of his education however, it seems probable, from the whole tenor of his subsequent pursuits, that no part of useful knowledge was omitted, and that all the other arts were courted, though not with an equal passion; that FRONTINUS fulfilled the character designated by the historian, of incredible industry and singular diligence, (*incredibili industria, diligentia singulari*), and occupied himself in the completion of his education by the ordinary exercises of translating, declaiming, and reciting. For these are enjoined by Quintilian and Pliny, the best judges of his own time, as well as Cicero; and the latter declaimed in Greek till he was elected prætor.

Be this as it may, when the general system of education among the Romans is considered, and the period at which the most extraordinary men

made their first entry on the theatre of the world,* it cannot excite wonder that the first mention of **FRONTINUS** in history, as far as it has descended to the present times, is in the thirty-eighth year of his age; and still less, since it is probable that he met with many obstacles to fame and public employment; for his merit was considerable enough afterwards to excite the envy of Domitian, whom he had favoured; and the only disinterested mention of him by Pliny, notwithstanding his obligations, is an invidious parallel with Rufus. And, if it could be endured to contemplate a **FRONTINUS** yielding his first offerings to fame in obscurity, even in the worst times of Rome, it might easily be conceived how his unobtrusive claims would vanish before those of the clamorous vulgar.

He had now, however, made more than the acquisitions necessary, in that bright twilight of the Roman learning, had come into public employment, and was in a state to render courtesy to no less a person than the son of the Emperor Vespasian. For, says Tacitus, “ on the first of “January, (A. U. C. 823,—A. D. 70,) **Julius Frontinus**, then *prætor* of the city, assembled the senate

* Cicero pleaded his first cause, for Roscius, at twenty-seven years of age, and then retired, for the prosecution of his studies, till thirty-one.—*Cicero in Brut.*; Middleton, *Life of Cicero*.

" For the transaction of public business, and shortly after resigned that office; to which Domitian immediately succeeded;"* being, by these means, enabled to " fill the office of *praetor* with the *consular* dignity,"† in the absence of both *consuls*, his father and brother,—Vespasian for the second time, and for the first Titus Cæsar, his son. What outset in life can be conceived more delightful than this, under the influence of virtuous power?

It were an idle exercise of curiosity to inquire the cause of this resignation in favour of Domitian; or that prince might easily be regarded as impatient to attain the power he afterwards so weakly abused.

In or about the year 827 of the Roman era, (A. D. 74,) FRONTINUS became *consul* extraordinary, or substitute (*suffectus*); ‡ perhaps honorarily,§ as a necessary step in his promotion to the

* *Tacit. l. Hist. l. iv. c. 32.* † *Suet. in Vit. Domitian. c. 1.*

‡ The period of the *consular* government, before Julius Cæsar, was always a complete year; but he brought in a custom of substituting *consuls*, at any time, for a month or more. The *consuls* who were admitted on the 1st of January nevertheless denominated the year, and were styled *ordinarii*, the others *suffecti*.—*Dion. l. 43, Sueton. in Jolio, c. 76, &c.*

§ See *Liv. l. viii. c. 26, &c.*

command of a province, which was rarely governed by any below the consular dignity. This is the more probable, as he is described by *Ælian* as being, when he wrote his *Art of War*, “a man of consular dignity;”* and no other colleague is named to Domitian, who enjoyed the same honour that year. *Vespasian* and *Titus* were consuls in ordinary, (*ordinarii*,) one for the fifth the other for the third time. *FRONTINUS* must now, according to *Cicero*’s remark on the death of *Alexander*, be in the forty-second year of his age.†

In this or the following year, he was appointed, with the proconsular authority, to succeed *Cerealis* in the government of Britain.‡ Nothing can more

* *De Instruend. Acieb. Prefat.*

† *Cic. Philipp.* 5. (“*Actus Consularit.*”)

‡ The intelligent French author of *Researches on Frontinus* already quoted, and with him the learned continuator of *Camden*, *Mr. Gough*, have derived, from this doubtful paragraph of *Tacitus*, an opinion that *Cerealis* had another successor, whose government continued but a short intermediate time. To these, however, in addition to the mention which might naturally be expected of so extraordinary a circumstance, may, it is conceived, not unsuccessfully be opposed *Mr. Hume*, *M. Rapin*, and the early translator of *Camden*, (*Dr. Philemon Holland*). “*JULIUS FRONTINUS*,” says *Hume*, (*Hist. of Eng.* c. 1.) “*SUCCEEDED* *Cerealis* both “in authority and reputation.”—*Rapin* the same. “And where as,” observes *Holland*, “*Cerealis* *would* doubtless have dimmed “the diligence and fame of another successor, *JULIUS FRON-*

powerfully evince the high estimation which was entertained of his character than this appointment.

Britain, after many arduous struggles for its native freedom against successive armies, composed of the flower of the Roman force, during a long space of time, had recently experienced a degree of comparative repose. This was the result of its own energies, aided by the internal convulsions of the Roman state; and the altered character of the war, from that severity which threatens the extermination of a people, to the opposite extreme of an imbecile amenity. The Roman legions, which, like all other troops, formed a pretty exact mirror of their officers, had also, after long service at a distance from the empire, shewn a disposition unfavourable to discipline. The quiescence of the Britons was, at the same time, not permanent; and this country,—the country which was to form the ultimatum of every war of aggrandisement, in which it was glory for a Roman to die, was even yet to be gained or lost to Rome for ever.

“ *TINUS*, a great man, sustained also, as he might, after such a “ predecessor, that weighty charge with reputation and credit.” —*Britain, or a Chorographical Description, &c. by W. Camden, translated by Holland, Lond. 1610.* See also *Eachard, &c.*

Vespasian, therefore, after due provision for the conduct of domestic affairs, and some preparatory steps, sent Cerealis, an able general, with power to restore the British affairs to their wonted vigour. This new governor, according to Tacitus, "struck a terror into Britain, by at once invading "the most populous states of the country and con- "quering or wasting the chief of the Brigantes," a powerful people, possessing Yorkshire, Lancashire, Durham, Westmoreland, and Cumberland.

Notwithstanding this invasion, however, the most important part of the British force, that which retained, more than any other, the native character, with a determination not to submit to conquest, retired to the country of the *Ordovices* and *Silures*, the one inhabiting North the other South Wales;* a position indisputably well chosen for a people determined upon a final struggle against a foreign conqueror. Nor was this all; for, on falling back on the latter, they covered a retreat, sacred to objects of the highest consideration in man, his religious prejudices; where, amid umbrageous

* South Wales included, at that time, the counties of Hereford, Radnor, Brecknock, Monmouth, and Glamorgah. The other considerable tribes of Britons were the *Belges* in the west, and the *Iceni* in Norfolk and Suffolk.

groves, the Druids had probably enjoyed ages of leisure.

Such, with a doubtful tranquillity of the other tribes, and also the people inhabiting the banks of the Thames, (*Tribantes et Cantii,*) were the circumstances under which FRONTINUS was appointed to the chief command in Britain. To its immediate result, the testimony of Tacitus again occurs, who, after observing that "the conduct of Cerealis was "sufficient to obscure the fame of his successor," adds, "that JULIUS FRONTINUS, a great man, "sustained the full glory of Cerealis, at every "opportunity, and subdued the powerful and "warlike people of the *Silures*, in whom he had "to surmount not only a determined courage, "but also the disadvantages of their country;" a proud eulogium even this, when the conciseness of Tacitus and the circumstances of his book are considered.

It will easily be conceived how many eminent qualities were required in a military governor of the British people at such a period:—an enemy experienced in their own warfare, invincible in their hearts, with the enthusiasm of Caractacus and Boadicea in their ears, (a king great in defeat, and a queen preferring death to slavery,) to oppose with troops to which he was a stranger, whose licen-

tiousness and insubordination had rendered the service obnoxious, and under orders to conciliate rather than destroy; to conquer only to civilize; to pursue, amidst a vast complication of difficulties, the great end of attaching to Rome a splendid province in Britain.

The information to be derived from the Roman historian ceasing, for the present, here, curiosity is naturally alive to trace **FRONTINUS** in the prosecution of his campaign and his government; and this, unhappily, is now to be done only in the frail monuments of his genius and power, amidst the wrecks even of British antiquity.

A historian of Monmouth,* who has no doubt examined the ground inch by inch, thus follows the army of **FRONTINUS** with a military eye:

“ The Roman general,” says he, “ made a feint “ on that point called Aust, (*Trajectus Augustæ*) “ and drew the Silures into the forest of Dean, near “ the conflux of the Wye and the Severn, while “ his transports moved diagonally, and disembarked “ the army near the Charlston Rock, one of the “ landing-places of the present new passage, (1796). “ Half a mile from this rock remains of a fortress, or

* Williams’s History of Monmouthshire, § II. 38, &c.

" square camp, may be found, of which a considerable part has been washed away by the Severn. And here," continues the same author, " probably commenced the *Julia Strata*, vestiges of a Roman causeway having been discovered at the neighbouring village of Creek, in the road to Caerwent. At the distance of five miles from Chepstow, and three from Sudbrook, in nearly a western direction, the road made on the *Via Julia* crosses a considerable station, or camp, longitudinally and at right angles. This camp holds a little village called Caerwent. The choice of Caerwent as a camp by the Roman general was judicious, either for the attack of Caer-osc, the capital of Siluria, or to cover it when in his possession. The camp was formed on an eminence greatly elevated, with a small river at its base, commanding views of great extent and the principal communications of the country. The foundations of the Roman wall are discernible at this time (1796). To reduce the Silures, the Romans formed two chains of garrisons; one of these drawn through Glamorgan near the shores of Ptolemy's Aestuary of Sabrina, the other on the banks of the Usk, the first link of which was Burrium, (Usk,) of which there are no remains."

After the subjugation of the Silures, upon whom probably, for the time, the hopes of every other

state depended, no better object remained than to create in it a frontier against the mountaineer *Ordevices*, and to establish, in a country so delightful and appropriate, an example of Roman civilization. In pursuance of this idea, the whole county of Monmouth is fruitful of positive evidence, in remains of a magnificence and luxury superior to those of any other Roman station in Britain.

Camden * describes Caerwent, or Venta, (*Venta Silurum*.) as the capital of the Silures, and observes that it contained (1586, &c.) to exhibit its ruined walls and bulwarks, and to disclose tessellated pavements and Roman coins.† The sea had also recently

* *Britannia, Tit. Silures.*

† The British soldier, whom duty may call to these detached quarters of the brave and accomplished Second Legion, will not deem it impertinent that the following antiquarian notices are added, to facilitate his examination of a spot which he can never contemplate without advantage. They are from the *additions* of Mr. Gough to *Camden*, (1789), v. ii, 47, &c.

“ Near Venta Silurum, Caergwent, there are large remains, “ and sure evidences of a Roman station, the distance very exact “ 9 miles in the Itinerary and 6 computed in Monmouthshire, “ the usual ratio here, and the military way eastward from hence, “ very remarkable.” — *Horsley.*

“ The Roman station of Caerwent is situated on the highest “ parts of the ridge which rises gradually at Chepstow, and “ continues nearly west toward Newport (*Caerleon*). It is five “ miles from Chepstow, in the road to Newport and Caerleon, “ which, especially near the station, is the old Roman one

despoiled a Roman fortification, at two miles distance, near Portskeweth.—It was, says he, inclosed by a triple ditch and three ramparts, as high as an

“ crossing the middle of the camp at right angles, and parts of it
“ remain beyond Caerwent, near Creek. The camp is on a small
“ eminence, not precisely on the banks of the Throggy, as Dr.
“ Gale imagined. The foundations of the wall are easily traced
“ on every side, and describe a parallelogram of 450 yards by
“ 350, the longest sides pointing east and west. Great part of
“ the Saxon walls, especially to the south, have Roman bricks
“ interspersed, and are in some places of considerable height.
“ The most considerable part of the wall remains, on the west,
“ 15 or 16 feet high, with the facing entire, rising from the
“ bottom and inner side of the foss, which is very deep on the
“ north and west. Some part of the facing of the south wall
“ of the three octangular bastions or towers are entire, each
“ side measuring about 8 feet. The stones placed in the rubble
“ of the wall are in a zig-zag, or herring-bone, position. Remains
“ are found,” &c.—*Additions*, 484.

“ At Caerwent, the first Roman station among the Silures,
“ began the *Julia Strata* mentioned by Necham, as quoted by Mr.
“ Camden, pointing to Caerleon, not in a straight line, like the
“ Roman roads in England, but following the nature of the soil;
“ not distinguished by a ridge or causeway, but by the camps on
“ or near it.”—*Harris, in Archaeologia*.

It were impertinent to describe to the mere military tyro the peculiarly excellent discipline of the Roman armies about this period, or their wonderful system of encampment, after the beautiful account so accessible in the first chapter of the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, by Gibbon; who has there, among other important principles, shewn what the energies of the mind may produce from the command even of a company of militia.

ordinary house, and cast in form of a bow, the string whereof is the sea-cliffe. It seems to have been the port and landing place for *Venta Silurum* from the Severn sea. Abergavenny, the antient *Gobannium*, was strongly fortified; and, twelve miles distant, at the conflux of the Birthin and the Usk, stood the second station in this direction, as mentioned by Antonius, named *Burrium*, presenting a very strong port, called by Giraldus *Castrum Osca*, the Castle of Usk.

But these formed only part of a chain of posts:—the position occupied by *FRONTINUS* with the faithful and brave *Second Legion* was *Isca*, on the other side of the river from which it took a name, in common with that of *Legio Secunda*, and twelve miles again from *Burrium*. The British name is still retained on its site,—*Caer Leon ar Uske*, “the City of the Second Legion, on Usk.” This Legion, called also *Augusta*, and *Britannica Secunda*, being ordained by the Emperor *Augustus*, and translated by *Claudius* out of Germany into *Britain*, under the command of *Vespasian*, always faithful, and impressing the other legions by its example, after many arduous services, according to *Camden*, “was here at last placed in garrison by *Julius Frontinus*.”

Britannia Secunda, says the intelligent histo-

rian already quoted,* had *fifteen* important stations in Siluria, which soon became considerable towns, of which Caerleon was the capital; there the *prætor* (*proconsul*, as sometimes confounded,) resided, and had his *palatium*, or *domus*; there the eagle was deposited; there were holden the principal courts of justice, and the imperial edicts promulgated; in the other towns the deputies of the *prætors* had their courts; but the dernier resort in all cases was at Caerleon. In this district was also a public market.

With more than the ordinary spirit of a Roman army, the general and his troops appear to have immediately set about restoring and adorning the place, which had probably before been rendered very strong, but had gone into decay: and such was the success of their labours as to attract even in after times the constant residence of religious and courtly splendour. “It was, says Giraldus Cambrensis,† who described it from the ruins, “a “perfect city, excellently well built by the Ro-“mans, with brick walls (*cortilibus muris*).‡ Here “may be seen (1186, &c.) many marks of the “antient nobility and dignity it possessed; mighty

* Williams, *ubi sup.*—Some say 20.

† *Itinerarium Cambriæ.*

‡ The moderns say lime and grit-stone.

“ palaces with golden pinnacles, resembling the
“ proud stateliness of the Romans ; for it had
“ been founded by Roman princes, and beautified
“ with excellent buildings. There you may be-
“ hold a gigantic tower ; exquisite baths ; the re-
“ mains of temples and theatres, whose orna-
“ mented walls are partly yet standing. One may
“ find in every place, as well within the wall as
“ without, houses under ground ; water-pipes and
“ vaults within the earth ; and, what you will
“ consider most admirable, every where hot-houses,
“ curiously formed, breathing forth heat very
“ closely at certain narrow tunnels in the sides.”*

* It would have been agreeable to quote this eloquent work of Giraldus, as well as some others, with more advantage, and the present age has not been deficient in attention to their accessibility by a multiplicity of copies ; but the insatiate rage of the present times for the *splendour* of typography seems to excite an emulation between editors and the public which shall effect most towards creating a sort of *monkish* prohibition of literature, and retroversion of the utility of printing ; the one by rendering the price of such books as inaccessible to ordinary purchasers as the manuscripts of former times ; the other by enclosing them in gilded cabinets, which are only to be explored by enchantment. Yet this is called, perhaps, doing honour to letters. If Grævius, or Gronovius, or many others of the indefatigable and spirited preservers of literature had lived in these days, their labours had been in vain ; and a poor soldier is now often tempted by these *prohibitors* to exclaim with the same Giraldus, “ *A monachorum militia libera nos, Domine!*”

And by a transition, not more abrupt than that from the times of FRONTINUS to those of Geraldus, from the 12th to the 19th century, the following satisfactory account may be yet obtained of the city raised under his government.* “A “Roman bagnio, or sudatory, was opened in 1755 “on the West bank of the river below the bridge, “and leaden pipes for the conveyance of water “from the Northern hill were discovered. On a “hill, half a mile from the town, also (1796) are “some remains of a Roman camp with double “ramparts, probably the summer quarters (*aestivus*) “of the Second Legion.” And just without the S.W. wall of Caerleon is yet to be seen (1811) a Roman amphitheatre of the Castrense kind, six yards deep, called by a modern error Arthur’s round table. Nor is it doubted that even a perfect view of the grandeur, and perhaps extent, of the station might be obtained, were it not that utility will always prevail over pleasure, and “*Grass now grows where Troy town stood!*”

That FRONTINUS had warmly and scientifically interested himself in the improvement of the chief station (head quarters) of Caerleon, is evident from his having given name to a Roman way, adapted, probably in this part, by his skill, to the protection of the city from the sudden floods of

† Williams, *ubi sup.* &c.

the Severn on the influx of the Usk, and other causes. It is recorded in the verse of the old rhymester, Alexander Necham, quoted by Camden:

*Intrat et augēt aquas Sabrini fluminis Osca
Præceps, testis èrit JULIA STRATA mihi.*

Swift plunges Osca in Sabrina's stream,
High swells the wave,—be witness *Julius' Street*.

And, what is also no less striking on this subject, **JULIUS FRONTINUS** is among the authors quoted by Camden on the subject of Roman roads *in Britain*, possibly from his *Treatise de Limitibus*, though the work is not mentioned.

That the *troops* of **FRONTINUS**, as became the active industry of a Roman legion, were equally enthusiastic in the subject which occupied their commander, is pretty evident from the inscription quoted by Camden from a tablet dug up by accident, (1602) of an old soldier who had *restored* the temple of Diana, erected by Haterius, an officer under Augustus, who had previously served as *pro-prætor* in Cilicia. The statue of the goddess, "short trussed, bearing a quiver," was imperfect, as also the altar. The inscription of the restorer, *Titus Flavius Posthumius Varus, of the Veteran Cohort of the Legion*, was as follows:

T. F L POSTHVMIVS VARVS
V. C. LEG. TEMPL. DIANÆ
RESTITVIT.

This also corroborates the idea that Caerleon had fallen into decay from previous grandeur.

Nor, supposing the agreeable idea of an “old soldier” to be taken *literally* in this instance, is there wanting among these fragments, one bearing the name of a captain (*Centurion*) as

7. VECILIANA.

As to the civil government of FRONTINUS, it may be learned from the eloquent history of that of Agricola, his successor, whose knowledge Tacitus candidly relates, in more than one respect, to have been acquired from the experience of others; —that arms avail little to settle newly-conquered states if injuries and wrongs be permitted. *He* therefore commenced with establishing strict justice about his own person, making no appointments from recommendation but as they were consistent with justice. *He* was exact in his inspection into all things, but not always rigorous in his exactions. *He* divided more equally the tributes, and the charge and burden of the supply of corn, distributing granaries throughout the country, and establishing roads from the principal

camps to the distant stations;* nor in the discipline of his army did he fail to encourage propriety of conduct in the private soldiery, while he repressed loose and dissolute stragglers. His camps he designed himself. The firths he sounded; and the thickets he tried the first in his own person. Nor did he suffer the enemy to rest till they were completely quelled, when he immediately forebore from any farther injury, conciliating them by every means, so that states the most violent submitted themselves, and receiving garrisons remained in quiet. Then were they induced *and assisted* to build temples, houses, and places of public resort; and their emulation excited by encouragement proportioned to their exertions. The youth of the principal families were instructed in the liberal sciences, and found more apt than those of Gaul, and more ready in acquiring the Roman language. Even the attire of the conquerors soon came into use, and at length their galleries, baths, and exquisite banquets, and all the luxuries of Rome: and, what is still more, the natives became induced

* On the vast labour and extraordinary art employed in the formation of these roads, many of which have continued with undiminished durability to this time, a period of seventeen hundred years! the military reader will be particularly gratified, by consulting *Bergier, Hist. des Chemins*, or the Latin translation of it, (*de Publicis et Militaribus Imperii Romani Viis, &c.*) by Heminius, in *Grævius, Thesaur.* tom. x. art. i.

to enlist themselves under the Roman banners in corps (*cohors*) distinguished by their name, in such numbers, that they formed at length a considerable part of the strength of the Roman armies.* They were, says Tacitus, seduced into obedience, but not slavery.†

Such, from the scanty materials and still more confined means afforded to the present occasion, is perhaps the only account that can be obtained of the command of FRONTINUS in Britain; for his *reports*, those delightful memorials, which would so much have gratified and informed posterity, are lost, with the exception only of such as may have been blended in the work of Vegetius. That he left behind him, however, the best memorials of an intelligent and vigilant governor, as well as

* Tacit. in *Vit. Agric.*—*Annales*.—Camden Brit.—See also Prefatory *Advertisement* to this work.—Hume Hist. c. i.

† Of the high consideration in which the Britons were held at Rome, and which the conduct of their king (*Caractacus*) and the useful arts derived from the people, certainly did not tend to diminish, there are many proofs in history. Mæcenas wanted to give them the privileges of Roman citizens; and Antoninus is particularly recorded as EXEMPTING THEM FROM DISGRACEFUL PUNISHMENTS; and conferring the Roman rights (*jus Latii*) on some of them. In Siluria the country was nominally restored to the successor of Caractacus; and the Britons always traded considerably from the estuary of Sabrina.

an enlightened general, is evident from the following prominent circumstances.

His successor, *Agricola*, found the government in a state which permitted him on the foundation of *FRONTINUS* to proceed at once against the *Or-dovices*; and, having defeated them, to prosecute with success his expeditions to the northern parts of Britain.

And the city of Isca, (*Caer Leon*,) the seat of his command, continued in such estimation, that, as *Camden* mentions, from *Alexander Elsebiensis*, "a rare author," a little before the coming in of the Saxons, there was a school here of two hundred philosophers, who, being skilful in astronomy and all other arts, diligently observed the course and motion of the stars. Here it was that, afterwards, *Arthur*, prince of the *Silures*, so much and justly celebrated in the songs of *Thaliessin* and the other British bards, whose heroic valour sustained the declining fate of his country, held, according to *Giraldus*, a splendid court. And, when catholicism had assumed the place and emulated the attractions of *Ethnic* grandeur, *Caerleon*, according to the third British division, was the *second* archiepiscopal see; no less than three monastic institutions were established here, and it became the burying place of two noble proto-mar-

tyrs of Britain: one of these also bore the name of JULIUS; and it might surely be permitted to indulge the pleasing idea that it had been adopted from the eminence of FRONTINUS. Nor is it less agreeable or innocent to extend the hypothesis of his local influence down to the present times (1811), when the town of Newport, (*Novus Burgus,*) which arose out of a part of the ruins of Caerleon, has become famous for the beauty and *advantage* of a public way.*

In the summer of 831 (A. D. 78) Agricola having succeeded to the government of Britain, FRONTINUS returned to Rome.† He was not of

• The road alluded to, of which an excellent print has been published, is for the purpose of a better conveyance to and from the iron-founderies. That the Romans introduced iron-founderies in Siluria, exclusive of other evidence, is proved by the discoveries of Roman coins in masses of iron cinders.

Saint JULIAN'S, a residence of the celebrated Lord Herbert of Cherbury, also is believed to have been within the circumference of the Roman station.

† The intelligent French author of *Researches on Frontinus* has taken a trouble to reconcile the command of FRONTINUS with the *triennial* period of proconsular power; which, with deference, is conceived not altogether necessary. Since the duration of command in a province, particularly the distant and important one of Britain, appears to have been not unfrequently governed by circumstances; and Agricola, his successor, evidently remained there longer, before he was recalled by the jealousy of Domitian.

a character likely to seek a triumph, any more than his predecessor. This may be deemed, however, as certain, that he experienced the negative honour of having no charge either of peculation, of treason, or extortion, preferred against him, notwithstanding the corruptions of the age, and that love of oratory which in those times, as well as some other, created a fondness for public accusation.

It is not remarkable that FRONTINUS does not again appear in an active public employment for a considerable time, after having filled with success at least one of the most important which Rome had it in her power to bestow. For Vespasian, under whose countenance he has hitherto been seen, died on the 24th of June in the following year, and the short remainder of his life that intervened was spent in triumphs, earned by the celebrated siege of Jerusalem, conducted by his favourite son. The benevolent reign of Titus continued only two years, two months, and twenty days; for he died on the 13th September, 834, (A. D. 81). And Domitian, notwithstanding a dissimulation at least equal to his other vices, soon convinced his implacable enmity against those whom he either feared, hated, or esteemed.

About this time, however, it is not improbable

that FRONTINUS was admitted into the sacred college of augurs, a dignity to which, as it seems to have required chiefly good sense and an acute knowledge of public affairs, it cannot but be conceived that he was every way competent: the characteristic of it, as given by Pliny, who succeeded him, though technical rather than politic or intelligent, certainly amplifies the honour intended to be conferred on FRONTINUS. "It is an antient "institution," says he, "which has this high and "peculiar privilege annexed to it,—that it is for "life. Other sacerdotal offices, though they may "perhaps be equal to this in dignity,* yet as they "are given so they may be taken away; but fortune "has no farther power over it than to bestow it."† In addition to these *excellencies* it may with pleasure be added, that the post made FRONTINUS a colleague of the Emperor, as well as persons of the first distinction in Rome; and gave him a very considerable authority in the commonwealth, from the power of the college of augurs to obstruct the most important affairs of the state, by declaring that they were unwarranted by the auspices. It was of a character indelible, which no *crime* or *forfeiture* could efface; and every candidate was

* Pliny, having long applied by every interest for ANY of the numerous sacerdotal offices in the Roman state, thus preserves his consistency!

† Plin. Epist. i. IV. Ep. 6.

obliged to be nominated to the people by two augurs, who gave a solemn testimony, on oath, of his *dignity* and *fitness* for the office.*

During the leisure which ensued after his return from Britain, only agreeably interrupted by his duties as a senator and those of the sacred office, there is reason to believe that **FRONTINUS** com-

* **FRONTINUS** and *Virginius Rufus* were repeatedly nominators of *Pliny*. See Epist. l. ii. Epist. 1.—l. iv. Ep. 8. See also Middleton's *Life of Cicero*, vi. 529.

As to the date of this appointment of **FRONTINUS**, on the accuracy of which there is no intention to insist, and the ordinary period of which, from its being a *life* appointment, must be subject to some variation; it may be permitted to observe, that it could not well be afterward, since the only vacancy mentioned by *Pliny*, (who was an active observer in this respect,) before that of **FRONTINUS**, is *Virginius Rufus*, his contemporary, to whom *Pliny*, in all probability, could not succeed, on account of age, being not much above *forty-three* at the death of **FRONTINUS**. *Cicero*, of whom it is the boast of *Pliny*, that he had the advantage of being elected earlier to the sacred college and consular office, (for which certainly no exertion on his own part was wanting,) was not elected till within ten years of his death and as many beyond the age of **FRONTINUS**: and though *Crassus*, whom he succeeded, be termed the young, yet his father was ten years older than *Cicero*.

It may also be mentioned politically in support of the character of this office that, in the only prominent instance of corruption, that of *Memmius*, it required for a trifling service in *three* augurs a bribe equal to £3000!—Cic. Epist. l. iii. Ep. 27. (*ad Memm.*)

posed his *Treatise on the Art of War*; for he elsewhere describes it as resulting from his own experience as a general, which could only relate to his expedition against, and subjugation of, the *Silures*. This, as he says himself, and there is no reason to doubt him, was the first attempt to reduce the art of war to a science; for, from this treatise, and the reports of his command in Britain, with the memoirs of Cato the censor, of Celsus, Trajan, and Adrian, *all now lost*, Vegetius formed his treatise of military affairs (*de re militari*); and, being himself no soldier, is considered as having made by no means a lucid arrangement. Of this celebrated work, than which, perhaps, few have enjoyed more commentators, FRONTINUS may, therefore, claim the merit of having furnished the basis, and a very interesting part.

The Emperor Domitian, however, had by this time thrown off the mask which he adopted on the commencement of his reign, in the expulsion of the philosophers; and literature, the bane of all vulgar tyrants, was beginning to suffer the reverse of that cultivation which it had experienced in the two last reigns. The court, from which afterwards Agricola also was cautioned to retire, notwithstanding the semblance of imperial favour,

and subsequently even the mild *Nerva* banished to Sarentum, became now no scene for **FRONTINUS**, who, therefore, without any manifestation of his intentions, withdrew to a country villa, where he might enjoy the exquisite pleasures of a lettered ease, in an elegant and philosophical retirement.

Allowing a sufficient time from the publication of his first work for a reperusal of the Greek and Latin authors, it is probable that, in 837, (A. D. 84,) the year in which Domitian returned from Germany, he published the addition which he deemed necessary to the plan and subject of the *Art of War* in the present **STRATEGEMATICS**. For in this work he mentions Domitian five times, but only as relates to his German expedition, and he gives him the title of *Germanicus*. There is nothing concerning any succeeding war, not even that against the Dacians, where Domitian appeared in person; and the learned are agreed in the return of Domitian this year, when the senate and people confirmed the title he had received from the army. Of this work the necessary account will be found in the original *Preface* of **FRONTINUS** and in the introductory *Advertisement* to the present volume. It has been supposed by several commentators, who would not have adopted the

opinion without some plausible evidence,* that he dedicated this work to Trajan. This might be while he filled that *private station* which was then *of post of honour*; though, in such times, he did not dare even to praise, however deservedly, the man he loved; for there certainly remains no internal evidence of it in the copy which has served for the present translation.

FRONTINUS chose for the scene of his retirement, in the Campania *Felice*, a villa at Anxur, (whose ruins still mark its site near the modern Terracina,) in the vicinity of Baiae; not chusing, any more than Seneca, to trust himself long amidst the exquisite luxuries and licentious refinements of that celebrated winter-retreat,† yet willing to be near enough to partake of its pleasures, and mingle in its polished society.‡

* Volterre, Kenkenius, &c. The *Recherches sur Frontin* differ from them; but other parts of the above reasoning are derived from that work, in which those who incline to examine the subject will find considerable satisfaction.

† Seneca, Epist. 61.

‡ Baiae, the “ Bath ” of the Romans, though infinitely surpassing every thing that can be boasted by the English Bathonia, seems to have acquired the utmost reach of luxury, magnificence, and licentiousness. There was something even in the natural as well as artificial turn of the scene which seemed formed to dissolve the mind into a state of softness and dissipation. One of the principal amusements of the place consisted in sailing on the

Anxur,

With ragged rocks and stony quarries white,
Seated on hills,*

has been described by many poets; but by none has the splendid scene been so sweetly apostrophised as in the verse of Martial:

*O nemus, O fortes! solidumque madentis arenæ
Littus, et æquoreis splendidus ANXUR aquis.†*

Ye warbling fountains and ye shady trees,
Where *Anxur* feels the cool refreshing breeze
Blown off the sea, and all the dewy strand
Lies covered with a smooth unsinking sand, &c.

Gulph of Naples, in gaily-painted barks, accompanied with all the melting softness that exquisite wines, fine women, and rapturous music, could inspire. The villas were absolutely extended into the sea, upon vast piles, secured by an earth which became hardened by remaining in the water; and in them every thing that could breathe voluptuousness prevailed. Virgil and Horace have several allusions to it; and Propertius tenderly advises Cynthia to quit, rather than oppose, its seductions.—*Tu modo, &c.*

Fly, fly, my love, soft Baiae's tainted coast,
Where many a pair connubial peace have lost;)
Where many a maid shall guilty joys deplore;
Ah fly, my fair, detested Baiae's shore. MELMOTH.

The scene is, however, long since changed. These magnificent villas derived from their extent the advantage of being first overwhelmed by the sea, where their ruins may now be seen, and the once-delightful Campagna is an *unhealthy* region, filled with piles of ruins.

* Sil. Ital. l. iv. 11, &c.

† L. x. Epi. 51.

The very road from Anxur to Rome, and from Rome to Anxur, on the Appian way, have been described by Lucan and Horace, and fiction seems to have been strained to account for the delights which surrounded “ the gentle seat ” of FRONTINUS.

*Has ego, &c.**

The mild *Parthenope's* delightful shore;
Where hush'd in calms the bordering ocean laves
Her silent coasts, and rolls in languid waves;
Refreshing winds the summer's heats assuage,
And kindly warmth disarms the winter's rage;
Remov'd from noise and the tumultuous war,
Soft sleep and downy ease inhabit there,
And dreams unbroken with intruding care.

ADDISON.

The well-known pictures of Pliny and others of the villas of the Romans, and particularly that of the former of two on the Larian Lake, (which emulated those of Baiæ,) “ hanging over it, with a “ view of the fishing-vessels below,” &c. with every convenience for study, exercise, conversation, the indulgences of the table, or refreshment and repose, may convey an idea of this Anxurian villa, worthy of the taste of FRONTINUS.

It is delightful, however, to find, that, in this retreat, sacred to the repose of arms and the philosophy of war, polite literature, and in particular

* Stat. *Sylv.* v. l. iii. v. 81. See also Addison's *Travels*.

poetry, was not neglected by FRONTINUS; for the poet of human nature, Martial,—the unhappy Martial, who knew how to trace every character of the mind, from the elegant ambition of Pliny to the grovelling sensuality of Sabellus or Elephantis, has borne testimony to the taste of this patron, has shewn that he was entertained here, and, on quitting Anxur to pursue independence in the capital, has affectionately recorded the Roman general, the conqueror of South Wales, among the great who regarded and protected him.—

Anxuris æquorei placidos, FRONTINE recessus,
Et proprius Baias, litoreamque domum,
Et quod inhumano cancro fervente cicadæ
Non novere, nemus, flumineosque lacus,
Dum colui, doctas tecum celebrare vacabat
*Pieridas: nunc nos maxima Roma terit, &c.**

O, my FRONTINUS, when, with sweet delight,
 On the cool shore near Baiæ's gentle seats,
 I lay retir'd in *Anxur's* soft retreats :
 —Where silver lakes, with verdant shadows crown'd,
 Disperse a grateful chilness all around :
 The grasshopper avoids th' untainted air,
 Nor in the midst of summer ventures there.—
 With thee what bliss to court the learned muse !
 Proud Rome shall ev'ry joy like these refuse :
 No day of charming indolence I boast ;
 In barren toil my lavish'd life is lost.
 O, my FRONTINUS, though from thee I part,
 By every fane I swear, thou hast my heart.†

* L. x. Epig. 58.

† Addison, Elphinstone, &c.

It being intended to rest the claims of FRONTINUS to the patronage of poetry on the testimony of *Martial*, ("whose lays even Britain sung, though "his purse felt it not,")* it may not be impertinent, in opposition to those who have described him as an itinerant rhymester, scrawling his verses in low public-houses, to shew the validity of his evidence, from the testimony even of the fastidious Pliny.

" He was," says that excellent judge, on his death, " a man of an acute and lively genius, and " his writings abound with much satirical wit, con-
" ducted at the same time by equal candour. When
" he left Rome, I made him a present, to defray the
" charges of his journey; and I gave it to him,
" not only as a testimony of my friendship, but in
" return for the verses with which he had com-
" plimented me. It was the custom of the antients
" to distinguish those poets with honourable and
" pecuniary rewards who had celebrated particular
" persons or cities in their verses; but this good
" custom, with every other that is generous and
" noble, is now grown out of fashion; and, in
" consequence of having ceased to act laudably,
" we consider praise as an impertinent and worthless
" tribute." After reciting the verses to which he

* *Martial*, Ep. I. viii. Ep. 11.

alludes, he continues, “ Do you not think that the
“ poet who addressed these lines to me deserved
“ some marks of my bounty *then*, and my sorrow
“ *now*? for he gave me the best that he had to
“ bestow, and it was want of power only that
“ his present was not more valuable. But indeed
“ what can be conferred more valuable than never-
“ fading praise? *

The judicious retirement of FRONTINUS, however, was not such as to prevent him from occasionally observing the progress of political affairs in the capital, or paying his court at proper times to the Emperor; still less from appearing in his place in the senate on any public exigency. Nor did he refuse his counsel, when solicited, according to the custom of the sensible Romans, who always advised on any matter of moment; nor the aid which his personal character afforded to any friend, who, in such difficult times, was likely to fall into some of the snares constantly laid by the espionage of Domitian.

A better instance of the exercise of his friendship in this way cannot occur than in the case of

* Plin. Epist. l. iii. Ep. 21.—The passage is quoted from Melmoth's translation; and, though it is an *English* Pliny, as Pope's is an English Homer, yet who would not, on such an occasion, quote an Addison, a Middleton, a Melmoth, or a Pope?

Pliny, whose testimony in favour of FRONTINUS never appears but unwillingly, and when his gratitude, that noble principle of the soul, must otherwise be called in question.

Pomponia Gratilla, the wife of *Rusticus* who was put to death, and who was herself banished, had disinherited her son, *Assidius Curianus*, and appointed as her co-heirs the younger *Pliny*, *Sertorius Severus*, and several eminent Roman knights.

In the reign of that execrable prince, says the historian, it was a sufficient *crime to be even a friend of those who were obnoxious to him*; while to shew any dislike to those who were his favourites was construed into an act of treason against himself.

Actuated possibly by this circumstance of the times in his favour, *Curianus*, who was already rich, applied to *Pliny* to make him a *pretended gift* of his share, to induce the other co-heirs to present him with their several shares in reality. This, of course, *Pliny* refused; but added, that he was ready *really* to relinquish his own share, if *Curianus* could prove that he had been unjustly disinherited. The latter instantly made the awkward request, that *Pliny* would become arbitrator *himself* between them! which *Pliny*, with true

Roman spirit, agreed to do ; and, it is needless to say, determined according to the evidence.

To assist him in the difficulty, and, no doubt, to sanction the decision, he called in his friends, **CORELLIUS** and **FRONTINUS**, two persons, says he, the best acquainted with the laws of any which Rome at that time afforded. The case was pleaded by *Curianus* for himself, and *Pliny* for *Gratilla*, in *Pliny's* chamber ; and the decision was, “ That “ *Curianus* had justly drawn upon him his mother’s “ displeasure.”

Still, however, prompted by the hope of aid to be derived from the temper of the Emperor, *Curianus* commenced a suit in the Centumviral Court against all the *co-heirs*, except *Pliny*, of which they, from the same motives that guided the complainant, had every cause to fear that, from a civil suit, it might end in a criminal one. *Pliny*, therefore, on behalf of the *co-heirs*, ended the affair, by a compromise with *Curianus*, in the Temple of Concord, in which *he* received a fourth share, being probably as much *he* would at any rate have received, after the payment of legacies, even if his mother had not disinherited him. To this *Pliny* added the free gift of his own proportion. The parties were mutually satisfied ; the threatened evil of confiscation, of which Domitian was so fond,

avoided; and *Pliny* derived afterwards the honour and advantage of a legacy from *Curianus*.*

The conduct of this affair of *Pliny* reflects not more credit on *FRONTINUS* (whose advice was, no doubt, continued throughout) than his association in the inquiry with *Corellius Rufus*, a man of consummate wisdom, on whose character *Pliny* delights to dwell with the utmost force of his enthusiasm: and, indeed, it is elsewhere mentioned by *Pliny*, in recommending *Claudius Pollio* to the friendship of *Cornutus*, as a circumstance exceedingly to his honour, that he was singled out by *Corellius* to assist him in a public employment.† *FRONTINUS* was doubtless well acquainted with the Roman jurisprudence, and experience had taught him the *patient* deliberation with which a wise man counteracts the designs of an artful enemy, his superior in power. *Corellius* was more *violent* in his measures, as will appear from the following characteristic anecdote:

“ I remember,” says *Pliny*, “ in the reign of “ *Domitian*, to have made him a visit at his villa “ near Rome, where I found him under the most “ incredible and undeserved tortures.”—“ Casting

* See *Pliny's* account, *Epist.* l. v. chap 1. —— l. ix. *Ep.* 13.

† L. l. *Epist.* 31.

“ his eyes round the room, ‘ Do you know,’ says
“ he, ‘ why I endure life under these cruel ago-
‘ nies? *It is with the hope that I may outlive at*
‘ *least for one day that villain* :—and oh! ye gods,
‘ had you given me strength, as you have given
‘ me resolution, I would infallibly have that plea-
‘ sure!”

The loss of this coadjutor of Frontinus, who, after fulfilling his hope, rid himself of his pains by refusing subsistence, is thus, in the same epistle, pathetically lamented by Pliny: “ I have lost, oh
“ my friend! I have lost the witness, the guide,
“ and the governor, of my life! Speak comfort to
“ me, therefore, I entreat you, not by telling me
“ that he was old, that he was infirm; all this I
“ know; but by supplying me with some reflec-
“ tions that are uncommon and resistless, that
“ neither the commerce of the world nor the pre-
“ cepts of the philosophers can teach me. For all
“ that I have heard and all that I have read occur
“ to me of themselves; but all these are by far
“ too weak to support me under so severe an
“ affliction.”

About this period, (to which there is no particular opposition in the commentators,) FRONTINUS might publish the treatise attributed to him *De Re Agraria*; a subject of an innocence at least com-

porting with the temper of the times, and which he was by no means unfitted to illustrate usefully. It is now known chiefly in the discussions of the learned respecting its author and date. It was dedicated to his military contemporary Celsus, as his first-fruits in that line, and confessed, what probably his leisure had taught him, that his studies in war had superseded those of composition.

The hour, however, at length arrived, though slow, still-sure, when the tyrant was to fall by the hands of his own creatures, to whom he had taught cruelty and dissimulation. Domitian was assassinated on the 18th of September, 849, (A. D. 96); and Nerva, who was elected in Gaul, was recognized at Rome, by the senate and people, on the 17th of December following. Justice once more resumed her seat, with, perhaps, too mild an aspect. The despicable reign of terror was, however, reversed, and to possess merit was no longer the signal for being proscribed.

FRONTINUS was immediately called into full employment. He was by Nerva appointed to the office of curator of the aqueducts; a charge which, as he observes, (*De Aquæductibus Urbis Romæ*, art. 67,) had always been confided to the first persons of the city of Rome. The aqueducts were, he affirms,

the clearest token of the grandeur of the empire ; and are generally agreed to be some of the noblest designs of the old Romans.* That FRONTINUS entered upon this employment with his wonted spirit will be found from the able treatise to which it gave rise. Nor is it the least respectable principle of the political economy of the Romans that places under the state, requiring the active application of scientific talents, should be reputed among the most honourable. Pliny enjoyed, with great satisfaction, the office of surveyor of the river Tiber and its banks ; and he considers as a great honour the appointment of C. Tertullus to the surveyorship of the *Æ*milian Way, as that of Cæsar to the *Via Appia* is mentioned by Plutarch. They were all offices that required the consular dignity to have been enjoyed.

* Of the importance of the aqueducts, even in the provinces, an instance occurs in Pliny, who, while proconsul in Bithynia, thus writes to the Emperor Trajan : “ The city of Nicomedia, &c. have expended three millions three hundred and twenty-nine sesterces (about £24,000) in building an aqueduct ; which not answering the intent, the works are entirely fallen into ruin. They made a second attempt in another place, where they expended two millions (about £16,000) ; but in this likewise they were disappointed. So that, after having been at an immense charge to no purpose, they must still be at a farther expense in order to be accommodated with water.”—*Plin. Epist.*, l. x. Ep. 46.

In the same year, (A. U. C. 850,—A. D. 97,) the Emperor made him his colleague in the consulate, on the death of L. Virginius Rufus, with whom FRONTINUS had acted living, and with whom he was worthy to be compared when dead. This is that Rufus who, with FRONTINUS, had constantly nominated Pliny as fitting to be received, at a proper time, into the sacred college of augurs, and the same whose modest ambition, in ordering to be inscribed on his tomb a verse in allusion to the expedition in which he had refused to be emperor, was paralleled by Pliny with that of FRONTINUS in refusing any monument to be erected to his own memory, conceiving that he should not fail to be remembered, if the actions of his life had deserved it.* The death of Rufus was singularly unhappy, after a long life of virtue, passing occasionally through the worst of times. As he was preparing to return his public acknowledgements to the emperor, who had raised him to the consulate, a large volume, which he accidentally received at that time, too weighty for a feeble old man, slipped out of his hands. In hastily endeavouring to remove it, the pavement being extremely slippery, he fell down, and broke his thigh-bone; from which accident, the fracture being unskilfully set, he never recovered. His funeral obsequies were

* *Lib. ii. Ep. 1. —— l. iv. Ep. 8. —— l. ix. 12.*

the charge of the Emperor: Tacitus pronounced his funeral oration, and Pliny finally says of him, possibly with an eye toward **FRONTINUS**, “ We have “ still, perhaps, some citizens amongst us who may “ rival him in virtue, and some may hereafter rise; “ but not one, I am persuaded, that will ever equal “ him in glory.”

Martial, faithful to the honour of his patron, records, at this time, the second consulate of **FRONTINUS**, in a jovial invitation to LUPUS.—

*De Nomentana vinum sine facere lagena,
Qua, bis FRONTINO consule, plena fuit.**

Of pure Nomentan wine full be the flask,
For *twice* **FRONTINUS** consul marks its date.

The Emperor Nerva, having restored to the Romans all the plunder of the vile tyranny of Domitian, and given a very large sum of money to be laid out in lands for the support of decayed families, Corellius, the friend and coadjutor of **FRONTINUS** in the conduct of Pliny's case with Curianus, and apparently of the same family with Virginius Rufus, was employed in purchasing and dividing these lands, in which he obtained the assistance of Claudius Pollio. Nothing, therefore,

* *Lib. x. Ep. 48.*

is more probable than that, in the service of his friend, FRONTINUS composed his treatise *De Limitibus* among the labours of this busy year. Of this work two manuscripts bear the names—*JULII FRONTINI Siculi*; which, if their authenticity be admitted, must, as before observed, mark the birth-place of the author.

The short reign of Nerva, thirteen months and ten days, which was, however, long enough to obtain for him the title of *Friend of Mankind*, so much good may be performed in a short time, concluded by his death on the 27th January, 851, (A. D. 98). Trajan, the admirable Trajan, whom he had adopted, as capable of holding the reins of empire with a firmer hand, was immediately recognized as Emperor. He entered upon the functions of his sole government in a manner for which history has sufficiently honoured him; but was not long permitted to pursue a peaceful career.

In the succeeding year, (852,—99,) Italy became alarmed by the inroads of the Dacians, a warlike people, inhabiting Transilvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia, under a king (Decembalis) whom no treaties could bind to peace, no misfortunes subdue, and whose descendants perhaps ultimately assisted

in the subversion of that empire which they now regarded with so much envy.

Domitian had made several campaigns against them between 839 and 843, and had even triumphed on their account; but the triumphs of the tyrant were cheap: he was contented to repel their irruption, and to preserve his own frontier.

It was not so with Trajan: he promptly put himself at the head of a numerous army, in which he appointed to a chief command FRONTINUS; who, according to Vegetius, was particularly esteemed by him for his writings on the Art of War, and who was also considered the greatest tactician of his age. That FRONTINUS was particularly necessary to Trajan at this juncture seems indubitable, both as an able general and an useful coadjutor in the re-establishment of that good order which the Emperor meditated throughout the armies, and which rendered them the most perfect model of military discipline; nor was it the least of the advantages resulting from his assistance that he had before been victorious in a warfare entirely similar with the Silures of Britain.

The Dacians had recruited themselves, and met the Romans with advantage. After a few skirmishes,

however, Trajan offered battle, which Decembalus accepted. The victory was disputed, and the slaughter on both sides immense. At length the Dacians were routed; and Trajan, allowing them no time to rally, pursued the flying bodies to their native mountains, and dismantled every strong place in his way. Secure in his rear, he penetrated to the very capital of Dacia, which he took by assault, and, pursuing his victory, either by himself or generals, took possession of almost every strong place in the country. Decembalus was compelled to receive peace on any terms; which Trajan then readily granted him, and after a few months returned to Rome.

If history permitted, and very possibly it may, though beyond the immediate power of research of the present writer, it would be highly satisfactory, among other things, to know the distinct command of FRONTINUS during this campaign against the Dacians. Nothing is more likely, however, than that he was attached to the person of the Emperor, and that the history of their services was intermingled: and it is sufficient for the fame of FRONTINUS to be known, that, on the 1st of January following, (A. U. C. 853, A. D. 100,) Trajan appointed him, as his own colleague, consul in ordinary, which, completing his third consulate, raised him, according to the idea of Pliny, to the highest rank of a subject. As the nomination took

place in autumn, also, FRONTINUS had been named in the field by his imperial colleague to this splendid office, on account of his important service at the close of the campaign.

Elevated in rank, and occupied in employments as he was, FRONTINUS appears to have returned impatiently to his studies; for in the same year was published his treatise *De Aquæductibus Urbis Romæ*, which he had begun on his appointment to the superintendence of the aqueducts by the Emperor Nerva. In this work he is considered by the learned as evincing great skill in his application of the mathematics to water; and it is deemed quite worthy of a supplement in the treatise of a learned modern antiquary, Raphael Fabretti, (*De Aquæ et Aquæductibus Veteris Romæ*,) which claims as its merit chiefly the power of usefully illustrating FRONTINUS. In his treatise on the aqueducts, FRONTINUS shews great acquaintance with the public acts of the government. His language is more correct than in his former productions, and his style considerably improved: and it is also remarked by his commentators, that he has here evinced a kind of literary justice; for, after duly pronouncing the praise of Nerva, under whom he had commenced the work, he takes every proper occasion to speak of Trajan: but of Domitian he says nothing; he does not even indicate his con-

salships: * he consigns him, no longer dangerous, to a deserved oblivion.

In whatever office he was employed, FRONTINUS, like Lord Bacon, seems to have considered himself a debtor to his profession. No object of his employment did he leave unexplored; nor was there any which he examined without useful illustration.

In 854 (A. D. 101) he was again called to attend the emperor against the Dacians, † who, mistaking the clemency of Trajan, and making an ill use of the forbearance which he had formerly shewn them, had recovered themselves sufficiently to appear in arms, and commit some outrages in the Roman territory. The consequence, as might have been expected, was that they were entirely subjugated; and Dacia, where liberty is said to have made her last stand, became a province of the Roman empire.

FRONTINUS now returned to enjoy the result of all his former labours in that dignified retirement which was suitable to his age and character. He had been actively employed in the military ser-

* Poleni, &c. Not. 27, art. 102.

† Résérches sur la Personne et les Ouvrages de Frontinus. Tit. viii. p. 37.

vice of his country at an age much beyond that at which the laws permitted even senators to retire; and enjoyed the highest offices civil and military with the greatest distinction and success. Still, however, the love of letters and his country prevailed, and he occupied himself in composing a treatise *on the Colonies of Italy*, which he did not live to finish. He died as he had lived, full of noble sentiments, in the 859th year of the Roman æra, A. D. 106, and, according to the calculation already followed, in the seventy-fourth year of his age.

He forbade any memorial to be erected for him after death, saying "The expense of a monument is superfluous; the remembrance of me will remain if my actions deserve it:" thus even by his death instructing posterity.

He was succeeded, as augur, by Pliny, whom it appears he had with Rufus constantly nominated to that sacred office, "as if," says Pliny, "he had a view to my being his successor, and since it has actually proved so in the event, I am willing to look upon it as something more than accident." After describing the attractions of his office, from its peculiar dignity and permanence, and the character of the sovereign (Trajan) who conferred it,

* *Plin. Epist. l. ix. 19.*

Pliny adds, "What recommends this dignity to
 " me *still more* is, that I have *the honour to suc-*
 " *ceed so illustrious a person* as JULIUS FRON-
 " TINUS."

In a parallel between the testamentary directions* of FRONTINUS and Virginius Rufus, already

* It may be permitted in this place to shew, from Pliny himself, the superior wisdom of FRONTINUS, even in this last act of his life: the terms upon which only he desired to be remembered, and which confer on his memory more honour than the proudest cenotaph, will exist for ever. Virginius Rufus, whose modest epitaph Pliny preferred, ordered only the following lines to be inserted on his tomb:

"Here Rufus lies, who Vindex' arms withstood,
 " Not for himself but for his country's good;"

Commemorative of his glorious moderation in resisting, at the hazard of his life, repeated applications of the army to accept the imperial dignity, and applying his victory over 100,000 Gauls at the same time only to the service of his country. Yet even this small memorial, notwithstanding the magnificent and solemn spectacle of his public funeral, remained at the end of ten years, and perhaps for ever, uninscribed! Pliny thus describes the affecting fact in a letter to Albinus from Alsium;—"The place renewed in my mind the sorrowful remembrance of that great and excellent man. He was extremely fond of this retirement and used to call it the *nest of his old age*. Wherever I turned my eyes I missed my worthy friend. I felt an inclination to see his monument, but I repented of my curiosity, for I had the mortification to find it still remained unfinished, not from any difficulty of the work itself, which is very plain,

mentioned with so much honour, Pliny tempers the cold compliments he had formerly paid him with something of the generous warmth of a posthumous affection:—" *I loved them both*," says he; and, again,—" They were both animated by the " same ardent passion for glory."

It only remains to recapitulate the literary works of FRONTINUS, in the order in which they are most generally admitted.

1. An Essay on the Tactics used in the times of Homer.
Lost.
2. Art of War. *Lost*, unless as incorporated with *Vegetius de Re Militari*.
3. Strategemata (Στρατηγηματά), Greek and Roman Anecdotes concerning Military Science.
4. Treatise of Rural Concerns (*De Re Agraria*).
5. Treatise of Boundaries, Roads, &c. (*De Limitibus*).
6. Treatise of the Aqueducts of the City of Rome, (*De Aqueductibus Urbis Romæ*).

" or rather, indeed mean, but through the neglect of him to " whose care the erection was intrusted." He afterwards concludes, and who does not feel with him?—" that what has hap- " pened to Virginius may be his own case, since a faithful " friend is so rarely to be found, and the dead are so soon for- " gotten."—*Epist. l. vi. Ep. 10.*

7. Treatise on the Colonies of Italy, (*De Coloniis Italæ*) *unfinished*, and published by some other hand near a century after the time of Frontinus, with several errors.

Of these works there have been the following editions :

The whole of the latter five, 4, 5, and 7, being merely *fragments*, by Robertus Keuchenius, *Amsterdam*, 1661.

The same by Scrivenerius.

Strategematicon, inserted in the collection in *two volumes*, 8vo. of authors who have treated of the Military Art, *Wesel*, 1670.

De Aquæductibus Urbis Romæ, in the collection of Grævius, (*Thesauri Antiquitatum*) tom. 4, Art. 10.

Strategematicon, *one volume* 8vo. *Leyden*, 1731.


The same, 12mo. *Paris*, 1763.

The same, with Polyænus, *three volumes*, 12mo. *Paris*, 1770.

The same, with an Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Frontinus, *one volume*, 8vo. *Paris*, 1772.



STRATEGEMATICON.



ORIGINAL
PREFATORY INTRODUCTION
TO THE
THREE FIRST BOOKS.

I. Of those who have attached themselves to military science, I alone have ventured to reduce its rules to system; and it has been admitted that I have not failed in that object as far as it was within any ordinary power. I deem it, however, necessary to the completion of my plan, to form a small collection of those shrewd, inventive, and ever active, principles of military policy, which the Greeks express by the single but comprehensive term *Strategematicon*, (Στρατηγηματικών): commanders, thus supplied with examples of resources and of foresight, may be more strongly excited to emulation; and, comparing their own ideas with those which have been confirmed by success, be rendered more certain of their experiment.

II. I do not suppose, nor is it necessary to pretend, that the objects of my collection have escaped the careful vigilance of historians, whose works contain the most striking examples of every kind; but the researches of the busy, particularly the military, cannot be too much abridged; how tedious it is to explore immense bodies of history; and yet those who have made selections, important in themselves, by their want of arrangement only confuse the reader.

III. The care of the present work has been to provide expedients for every probable occasion, ready at the call of the inquirer; arranged so that every fact should appear in its proper place, prepared to be assembled, as it were, in a council of war.

And, that they may be found in an order best calculated to distinguish such a variety of matters, I have divided them into three books, each of which forms a genus.

In the *first* are examples that relate to the affairs of an army previous to battle.

In the *second* those which regard the battle and its consequences.

The *third* contains stratagems used in the attack and the defence of places.

To each *genus* I have attributed certain *species*.

IV. This work may not without reason solicit indulgence, lest I should be accused of negligence by those who discover examples of which I have not spoken. What would it not require to examine every monument of either language! Many things I have necessarily passed, and the cause will not escape those who are conversant with works undertaken under similar promise; for these it will not be difficult to supply facts in each species. And, as it is less the desire of glory than that of being useful that has dictated both this and my other works, I shall consider myself rather assisted than depreciated by any additions that may be made to it.

V. That those who chuse may be enabled to establish in their minds the division, or classification, in this volume, of things of a similar nature, into *Strategematics* and *Stratagem* ($\Sigmaτρατηγηματικῶν$ and $\Sigmaτρατηγημάτων$), it may be observed,—all that a general can conceive providently, usefully, magnificently, perseveringly, is included in some genus under the term *Strategematics*, of which a species is *Stratagem*. The whole consists in pro-

ficiency in that prompt sagacious skill which constitutes first principles in the science of war, whether employed to overwhelm or avoid an enemy. Sometimes in this genus a magnanimous expression alone has produced important effects; and, in consequence, some remarkable instances will follow the three principal books of the present work.

VI. Proceed we to the species of facts with which a general may provide himself, in the circumstances which occur before a battle.

STRATEGEMATICS,

BOOK I.

heads
or
THE FIRST BOOK.

—♦♦♦—

- CHAP. I. The Concealment of Designs.
- II. Discovery of the Designs of an Enemy.
- III. Adapting the Plan of a Campaign, &c.
- IV. On the March in a Country occupied by the Enemy.
- V. The Extrication of Troops from a disadvantageous Situation.
- VI. Forming or encountering Ambuscades on a March.
- VII. To maintain the Appearance of Plenty whilst suffering Scarcity, and the Means of supplying Wants.
- VIII. The Creation of Divisions among the Enemy.
- IX. Suppression of Sedition amongst a Soldiery.
- X. Resistance to the Clamour of Troops for an untimely Battle.
- XI. Excitement of a discontented Army to fight.
- XII. To dispel Fears created by ill Presages of an Army.

THE
STRATEGEMATICS
OF
SEXTUS JULIUS FRONTINUS.
IN THREE BOOKS.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

The Concealment of Designs.

1. MARCUS Portius Cato,* finding that the people who had submitted to him in Spain only

* It may be necessary to mention here that it has not been out of the contemplation of the translator to add to such articles as seemed to require them *explanatory notes*, historical, geographical, biographical, and military; but, when it is considered how much the size of the book would be increased by it, without proportional advantage to the great majority of readers,

waited for an opportunity to present itself for revolt, in confidence of the strength of their walls, wrote to each separate body that it was indispensably necessary the fortifications of that town should be demolished; and that, if it was not done, he should instantly proceed against it. He took care that these letters should all be delivered on the same day, so that each community conceived itself the only one which had received the order: if they had known that it was general they might in concert have ventured to disobey it.

2. Himilco, the Carthaginian General, desirous of landing in Sicily unexpectedly, would make no communication whatever of his design, but gave to the several pilots of his fleet sealed orders, with a prohibition against their being opened, unless they should be parted from the admiral's ship in a storm.

3. C. Lælius, being sent on a mission to Syphax, placed in his suite several tribunes and centurions, in the character of slaves, who were to employ themselves as spies. Of these L. Statorius became recognised by some of the enemy, from having

and that those who require them will receive much greater advantage from applying to the accessible sources from which all the requisite information may be derived, it is conceived that the omission will merit, and obtain, approbation. The same remark will in a great degree apply to the translation of any commentary of this work.

before been in the camp ; upon which, in order to conceal his condition, he caused himself to be beaten as a slave is punished.

4. Tarquin the proud deemed it necessary to the safe possession of Gabio that the principal persons of that town should die. He would not, however, confide this secret, and was therefore silent to the person who had been sent to him even by his son. Being, however, in his garden, as they walked together he struck off with his stick the heads of all the highest poppies. The messenger returned to the prince without an answer, stating only what he had seen of the manner in which his father had employed himself ; this was readily comprehended, and the most eminent persons of the place suffered the same.

5. Cæsar, who suspected the fidelity of the Egyptians, appeared, nevertheless, to consider himself in perfect security among them. He just inspected the city and fortifications of Alexandria, but chiefly dedicated himself to the most licentious banquets, and seemed delighted with the charms of his situation, so that it was perfectly believed that he had yielded himself entirely to their habits. In the mean time his troops were enabled to assemble in the force which was requisite to occupy Egypt.

6. P. Ventidius, when opposed to the Parthians, under their king, Pacorus, being not ignorant that

one Channæus, a native of Cyrræ, among the allies of the Romans, discovered to the enemy all that passed in their camp, converted the perfidy of this barbarian to an advantage. Whatever he wished most, he pretended to fear; and, on the contrary, to express a wish for what he feared:—Having some legions in Cappadocia, on the other side of Mount Taurus, and fearing the enemy would pass the Euphrates before their arrival, Ventidius so completely deceived the traitor as that, by an astonishing effort of perfidiousness, he engaged the Parthians to pass the Euphrates at Zeugma, as the shortest way, and where the river was most passable. If the enemy crossed at once to the side on which the Romans were encamped, they would have such an advantage in the heights as to render his archers useless, instead of having every thing to fear as if *they* were compelled to throw themselves into the plain. The barbarians, in consequence of their private intelligence, commenced their march through the low country, and, after a tedious and circuitous route, arrived at Zeugma: they then set about constructing bridges, by various means and with immense labour, which the bed of the river, deeper in this than any other place, rendered extremely difficult. This occupied them more than six weeks, during which time Ventidius collected his whole force, the junction of his legions being effected three days

before the Parthians appeared on their ground. A battle immediately took place, which was lost by Pacorus with his life.

7. Mithridates, surrounded by Pompey, and desirous of escaping on the following day, for the better concealment of his design, sent out foraging parties to a considerable distance, and even to the vallies in the vicinity of the Roman camp. Farther to preclude any suspicion, he engaged for the Morrow several conferences, and afterwards had more fires lighted in his camp than ordinary. At the second watch he withdrew his army even along the very entrenchments of the enemy.

8. The Emperor Domitian, (Cæsar Augustus *Germanicus*,) proceeding against the Germans who had taken arms, determined to surprise them; and, not ignorant that, if they had the least idea of so great a general advancing against them, they would commence the campaign with a much greater force, he quitted Rome under the pretext of an enumeration of the Gauls. Thus unexpected, he fell upon the Germans, repressed the ferocity of these barbarians, and preserved the provinces from farther insult.

9. Claudio Nero, desirous of fighting Hasdrubal, and destroying his army before he should form a junction with his brother Hannibal, hastened to join his colleague, Livius Salinator, charged with this command, on whose troops he did not much

depend. He selected for this service ten thousand of his bravest soldiers. Fearing, therefore, that Hannibal, to whom he was himself opposed, should discover his departure, and profit by his absence to attack the weak remains of his army, he enjoined the officers whom he left in command to continue the same guards, the same patroles, and the same fires, to which they had been accustomed, and in no respect to change the order of the camp. By forced marches and bye-roads he then hastened to his colleague in Umbria; and, that he might not excite any suspicion of his arrival in Hasdrubal, who would have refused battle if he had perceived the junction of the consuls, he ordered that the camp should not be extended. He then attacked Hasdrubal with the army so reinforced, vanquished him; and, quicker than any courier, returned to his camp in front of Hannibal. Thus did he outwit by the same effort the two most subtle generals of Carthage: he stole a march on one, and beat the other.

10. Themistocles, after having exhorted his countrymen to rebuild their walls as quickly as possible, returned, in answer to the Lacedemonian deputies who were sent to oppose his design, that he should even present himself at Lacedemonia for the purpose of shewing the small foundation for the report which they had made.—He went thither, and gained a little time for his procedure.

by pretending indisposition. When he perceived that he was suspected in this measure, he submitted to the Lacedemonians, that it was a false report which had obtained amongst them, and begged that they would send some of their principal citizens, on whom they could depend, to ascertain the state of the walls of Athens. He then secretly apprized his countrymen to detain these persons till such time as, their works being completed, they might avow that Athéns was fortified, and then not to deliver them up till he was restored. The Lacedemonians easily consented, lest this single man should cost the lives of many.

11. L. Furius Camillus having led his army into a disadvantageous situation, and, being desirous of concealing his solicitude that he might not alarm the troops, he gradually changed his course, as if with a view to attack the enemy on a larger scale. The army, thus retrieving itself, was unconsciously withdrawn from its danger.

12. Metellus Macedonicus, when in Spain, being asked what he meant to do on the next day, answered,—If my coat knew, and could speak, I would burn it.

13. M. Licinius Crassus, to an inquiry as to the time when he should march, answered,—Do you fear not hearing the trumpet?

CHAP. II.

Discovery of the Designs of an Enemy.

1. Scipio Africanus, taking occasion of the mission of Lælius to the camp of Syphax, selected the most intelligent of his tribunes and centurions, and sent them, disguised as slaves, in his suite, with orders to acquaint themselves of the condition of that monarch's forces. To examine the camp with greater ease they suffered a horse to get loose, and, under pretence of retaking him, ran through every part of it. From the report made in consequence, the burning of this camp terminated the campaign.

2. Q. Fabius Maximus, consul during the Hernesian war, before the Roman generals had acquired much sagacity in discovering the designs of an enemy, caused his brother Fabius Cæson, who understood the language of the country, to adopt its habit, and traverse the forest of Ciminia, hitherto unknown to our soldiery; he exerted so

much prudence and industry that, arriving on the other side of the forest, he engaged the Umbrian Camertes, whom he found not hostile to the Roman name, into an alliance.

3. The Carthaginians, considering the greatness of Alexander, and fearing his enterprizes in Africa, charged Hamilcar Rhodinus, the most adroit among them, to retire to the residence of that prince, under pretence of exile, and to insinuate himself by every means into his confidence. He succeeded so well as to be able to communicate whatever was doing to his countrymen.

4. The same Carthaginians sent to Rome on certain missions such persons as, during the period of their necessarily-long stay, should catch every object of our councils.

5. M. Cato, in Spain, having no other means whatever of discovering the designs of the enemy, detached three hundred men, with orders to fall upon a Spanish guard, to seize one, and bring him unhurt to the camp; being put to the torture he revealed every secret required.

6. Caius Marius, consul, in the Cimbric and Teutonic war, desirous of trying the fidelity of the Gauls and Ligurians, sent to them letters which the envelope directed should not be opened till a certain day, and on the day previous demanded them back: finding they had been already opened

he perceived they were hostile to him, and disposed to join in the war.

7. There is another method of penetrating the designs of an enemy, of which generals may avail themselves without any other assistance: such was that of *Æ*Emilius Paulus, consul, in the Hetruscan war; who, having descended with his army into the plain near Poplonia, and observing at a great distance a rapid flight of birds from the neighbouring forest, immediately judged, from their number and terror, an enemy to be in ambuscade there. The scouts whom he sent out for intelligence soon reported that ten thousand Boians were then ready to fall on the Roman army. He marched on the contrary side to that on which he was expected, surrounded and put them to the rout.

8. So, also, Tisamenus, the son of Orestus, when informed that the enemy was posted on an eminence naturally strong, sent to reconnoitre, and was informed that there was nothing in it. He then commenced his march, but soon perceived that a quantity of birds flew off from the top of the height, and that none of them returned to it: he had then no doubt that the enemy was concealed there. He changed his route, and by that means avoided an ambuscade.

9. Hasdrubal, the brother of Hannibal, likewise, when the consuls Livius and Nero, desirous

of concealing their junction, would not extend their camp, was not long kept in ignorance of it when he perceived the fatigued horses, and tanned complexions of the men, such as it is after a march.

CHAP. III.

Adapting the Plan of a Campaign, &c.

1. Alexander Macedo (the Great,) with troops full of courage, always lost himself by his manner of carrying on war in fighting general battles.
2. C. Cæsar, in the civil war, having an army composed of old soldiers, and that of his enemies consisting of new levies, always gave battle, and with success.
3. Fabius Maximus, opposed to Hannibal, rendered insolent by repeated success, resolved not to run any risk, and only to cover Italy. He was named the *Temporiser*, and by this merited the reputation of a consummate general.
4. The Byzantines, opposed to Philip, not choosing to risk an unequal conflict, abandoned the defence of their frontier, and covered their city by fortifications. The result was, that Philip, impatient of a long siege, withdrew his army.

5. Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgon, during the second Punic war, being closely followed, after a defeat, by P. Scipio, distributed his troops in different places, so that Scipio, not choosing to divide his army, and incur several sieges at the same time, returned to winter-quarters.

6. Themistocles, on the arrival of Xerxes, conceiving that the Athenians were unable either to give battle, to defend their frontiers, or maintain a siege, advised them to send their wives and children to Trazena and other towns, to abandon Athens, and transfer the war to the sea.

7. Scipio, upon Hannibal remaining in Italy, transported his army to Africa, and, by this mean compelling the Carthaginians to recal Hannibal, transferred the war from his own country to that of the enemy.

8. The Athenians, annoyed by the frequent inroads of the Lacedemonians, who had fortified themselves in the castle of Decelia, which they had taken from them, despatched a fleet to ravage the coasts of Peloponnesus, which not only succeeded, but compelled the Lacedemonians to withdraw their troops from Decelia.

9. The same was effected in this city by Pericles against the Lacedemonians.

10. The Emperor Domitian, finding that the Germans, frequently emerging from the forests in

which they concealed themselves, fell on our troops unawares, and immediately returned thither in safety, caused the boundaries of the empire to be extended a hundred and twenty miles farther into the country, and thus not only changed the face of the war, but subdued the enemy, whose retreat he had exposed.

CHAP. IV.

On the March in a Country occupied by the Enemy.

1. Æmilius Papus, consul, when in Lucania, having occasion to march his army through a narrow defile, the insidious Tarentines, who had placed themselves in ambuscade, attacked them with poisoned arrows, upon which he placed his prisoners of war on that flank, which compelled them to cease, lest they killed their own men.

2. Agesilaus, of Lacedemonia, returning from Phrygia with considerable plunder, was pursued by the enemy, and harrassed whenever the ground permitted. He therefore marched his army between two files of prisoners of war, and, while these were spared, obtained time to defile the whole.

3. The same king, when the Thebans occupied a defile through which he must necessarily pass, changed his route, with the appearance of an intention to march to Thebes. The Thebans, asto-

nished, immediately quitted their post, and hurried to the defence of their walls, when he was enabled to pass without obstacle.

4. Nicostratus, general of the Ætolians, when opposed to the Epirotes, being unable to penetrate their country by two narrow passes, feigned an intention to force one, till he drew the attention of the Epirotian army to it; then, leaving some battalions at its head to continue the feint, he withdrew the rest of his army, and seized the other passage without opposition.

5. Autophradates, the Persian, leading his troops into Pisidia, where those of the country were placed in a narrow defile, made a shew of not daring to attempt so difficult a passage, and seemed to retire. The Pisidians were deceived by it, and retired in earnest. On the following night he sent some troops to take possession of it, and on the succeeding day passed with the whole of his army.

6. Philip, king of Macedon, marching against Greece, learned that the pass of Thermopylæ was guarded; on which he detained those who had been sent to him on a mission respecting a treaty of peace, and, continuing his progress by forced marches, found the troops who guarded it unsus- piciously waiting the return of their ambassadors, and passed Thermopylæ at pleasure.

7. Iphicrates, the Athenian general, opposed to Anaxibius, the Lacedemonian, had, on the border

of the Hellespont, to pass opposite to Abydos through a place occupied by the enemy's troops. The passage was bounded on one side by steep mountains, and on the other washed by the sea. Iphicrates halted for a time; but, on a day when it was more severely cold than ordinary, and therefore less likely to be suspected, he selected a detachment of the most robust of his soldiers, and, having given them whatever could render them comfortable, and had them anointed with oil, to preserve their warmth, he sent them to coast, as it were, along the edge of the water, beneath the road, with orders, where it should be found impracticable, to swim. This was executed in a manner of which the enemy was so little aware that the troops which guarded the defile were surprized in their rear.

8. Pompey, unable to pass a river, of which the opposite bank was occupied by the enemy, ordered his troops to quit and return to their camp continually, till their opponents, weary of preparing to meet them, conceived it no longer necessary. At this moment the Romans threw themselves briskly into the water, and made good their passage.

9. Alexander the Great, being hindered by Porus, one of the Indian kings, from passing the Hydaspes with his army, ordered a strong party to run without stopping along its side, and, when Porus be-

came occupied in the defence of that part of the opposite bank which faced the running party, he passed higher up with the rest of the army.

10. The same had to dispute also the passage of the Indus. He caused his cavalry to enter the water at different places, and appeared as if he would force the passage. While he thus occupied the attention of the barbarians, he sent first a small detachment and afterwards a larger to possess themselves of an island at a small distance, and pass to the other side. The Indians immediately threw themselves into disorder, running into the water to oppose them, and, in the mean time, Alexander passed the river at the fords which they had left open, and reunited his several forces.

11. Xenophon, keeping in view the Armenians, encamped on the bank of a river which he must necessarily pass, caused two fords to be found, so situated that, when repulsed from the one, he ran to the other below it. The enemy was as quickly there, and repulsed him again. He then left in this place a part of his troops, that they might effect a passage when the enemy was returned to the defence of the ford below, to which he returned himself. The Armenians, believing that the whole army returned, paid little attention to the troops which remained, who, in consequence, succeeded with little resistance, and secured the passage of the rest.

12. P. Cladius, consul, during the first Punic war, being prevented transporting his army from Rhegia to Messina, by the Carthaginians cruising in the Straits of Sicily, caused a report to be circulated that he could not continue a war commenced without the order of the people, and feigned to reconduct his fleets to Italy. The Carthaginians, who believed his return real, having retired, he changed his course immediately for Sicily.

13. The Lacedemonian generals, wishing to land in Syracuse, and fearing the Carthaginian fleet, which possessed the road near that city, advanced at the head of their fleet six vessels which they had taken from the Carthaginians, and, to give them the air of a victorious squadron, they attached each to their proper vessels, either alongside or to the poop. The Carthaginians, deceived by this appearance of triumph, suffered them to pass.

14. Philip, unable to pass the strait of Abydos, occupied by the Athenian fleet, wrote a letter, addressed to Antipater, in which he ordered him, in consequence of Thrace having revolted, after putting to the sword all the garrisons he had left in the country, to quit every thing to pursue it. He took care that his letter should be intercepted by the Athenians, who, believing that they had thus informed themselves of the Macedonian secrets, withdrew their fleet, and Philip set sail

across the strait, without any thing to oppose his passage.

15. The same, unable to take possession of Chersonesus, an island, which had been brought under the Athenian power, on account of the armed vessels, not only of Byzantium but also of Rhodes and Chios, which closed the passage of the sea, conciliated the goodwill of the latter by delivering up their vessels which he had taken, and pretending to choose them as mediators in a peace which he desired to conclude with the Byzantines, who were the sole cause of the war. While he drew out this negotiation to a great length, and, by design, changed something in the conditions from time to time, his fleet got ready, suddenly evaded the enemy, and passed the strait.

16. Chabrias, the Athenian general, unable to enter the port of Samos, occupied by the enemy's fleet, sent some of his vessels to pass within sight of it, not doubting but that those who guarded it would give them chase. They were obliged to do so; and, without any obstacle, he entered that port with the remainder.

CHAP. V.

The Extrication of Troops from a disadvantageous Situation.

1. Q. Sertorius, in Spain, having to pass a river, when closely followed by the enemy, caused an entrenchment to be dug on its bank in the form of a crescent, and filled with wood. Being set on fire, it prevented the enemy from advancing, and he crossed the river without interruption.

2. So also Pelopidas, the Theban general, during the war in Thessaly, encamped on the bank of a river, occupied a larger space than was necessary for the scite of his camp, and made a fire in the entrenchments of branches of the trees laid across other wood. While the flames kept the enemy at a distance, he passed the river.

3. Q. Luctatius Catullus, when beaten by the Cimbrians, had no other means of safety than to pass a river, of which they occupied the bank. To this end he shewed them his troops on a neigh-

bouring height, as if they had been designed to encamp there. At the same time, he prohibited the soldiers from taking off their appointments, touching their baggage, or even quitting their ranks for any time, much less their colours. The better to deceive the enemy, he erected tents, lighted fires, and raised palisadoes: he even sent some men to cut wood within view of the enemy. The Cimbrians, conceiving all this to be real, chose a proper place to encamp also; and, spreading themselves in the country, to collect necessaries for their stay, furnished an opportunity to Catullus not only to pass the river, but also to annoy them in their own camp.

4. Crœsus, encamped on one bank of the Hali, which was not fordable, and deficient of materials to construct a bridge or boats, had a large canal made to surround the highest part of his camp, and thus placed the bed of the river in the rear of his army.

5. Cn. Pompey, closely followed by Cæsar, and about to embark for Brundusium, to transfer the war from Italy to Greece, stopped up some of the public ways, enclosed some within walls, and cut ditches in others, in which were placed stakes, covered with hurdles, and filled up with earth. He blocked up some avenues which conducted to the port with piles of timber driven into the earth quite close to each other. He then left on the

ramparts a body of archers, and silently withdrew the remainder of his army; the archers, retiring also as soon as it was expedient, by safe passes known to themselves, and taking to their boats, soon regained the army at sea.

6. C. Duilius, consul, having imprudently entered the port of Segesta, and soon after finding himself blocked up by a chain drawn across the mouth of it, caused the whole of his troops to assemble on the poop, so as to force it down into the water, and proportionally to raise the prow, which, by an impulse from the oars, advanced upon the chain. He then passed his soldiers rapidly to the prow, and their weight impelling the vessel, caused it to glide gradually over the chain, and out of port.

7. Lysander, the Lacedemonian, detained in the port of Athens with his fleet, and harrassed by that of the enemy, which blockaded the narrow entrance to that port, secretly disembarked his troops, and marched them by land to the neighbouring port of Monychia.

8. Hirtuleius, commanding under Sertorius, when in Spain, finding himself in a long and narrow defile, which divided two hills, with only a few corps, and followed by a body of the enemy, he caused a fosse to be dug from one hill to the other, and filled with combustible materials. Being set on fire, the enemy was checked and evaded.

9. Cæsar, in the civil war, when opposed to Africanus, perceiving that he had no means of retreat without danger, ordered his first and second lines to rest upon their arms, while the third unperceived dug a fosse in their rear, fifteen feet broad, by which, before sun-set, they were covered.

10. Pericles, the Athenian, urged by the Peloponnesian troops into a defile, which, entirely surrounded by steep rocks, had only two avenues, enclosed the one with a broad ditch, apparently to prevent any attack of the enemy by it, and drew up his army against the other, as if with the design to force a passage. Neither the enemy who surrounded him nor even his own troops ever suspected an intention to pass by a fosse which himself had made. The opposing army, therefore, was occupied in preparation to meet him on the probable point of his sortie, while Pericles threw the bridges he had prepared over his fosse, and, without any resistance, marched out.

11. Lysimachus, the comrade of Alexander, designing to encamp upon a high hill, but placed by the ignorance of his guides upon a lower, feared that the enemy, more elevated, might fall upon his army, he therefore entrenched himself in rear of his palissades, and caused three ditches to be dug on the side of his entrenchment. He had the same done around every tent, so that his whole camp was

intersected with fosses, and rendered impervious to the enemy. He then, after covering some part of these ditches with boughs and earth, hastily obtained a more elevated position.

12. J. Fonteius Crassus, in Spain, with a party of three thousand men, was enclosed by Hasdrubal in a dangerous post. As soon as night commenced, however, without communicating his design to any but a few of the very first ability among his officers, he forced a guard of the enemy, without the smallest expectation.

13. L. Furius, having led his army into a disadvantageous situation, and desirous of concealing from his soldiers the inquietude it occasioned him, changed his route by imperceptible degrees, as if with a view of attacking the enemy on a larger scale. His army rejoiced in safety, and was thus withdrawn from its danger, without knowing it.

14. P. Decius, military tribune in the war against the Samnites, on the surprise of Cornelius Cassus in a situation from which he could not, without great difficulty, withdraw himself, proposed that he should himself lead a detachment to a neighbouring hill. The enemy, attracted on this side, left a free passage to the consul, surrounded Decius and prepared to attack him; but Decius deceived him. During the night he passed suddenly through his posts, and, without the loss of a single man, rejoined the consul.

15. The same was effected under Attilius Cataillus, consul, by one whom tradition has variously named, some denominating him Laberius, others Quintus Ceditius, and the greatest number Calpurnius Flamma. This officer, perceiving the army engaged in a valley, while the enemy commanded all the heights, demanded and obtained from the consul three hundred men. After having exhorted them to save the army by their courage, he advanced with them into the middle of the valley. The enemy descended from every part to cut him in pieces; and while he was occupied by a long and vigorous resistance, the consul retired with his army.

16. L. Minutius, consul, in Liguria, finding himself with his troops in a defile, the aspect of which reminded them of the misfortunes of Caudium, he caused them shortly to approach the avenue occupied by the enemy. His auxiliary Numidian cavalry were equally contemptible from the shocking mien of the men as well as the total want of appearance in the horses. The enemy, fearful of an attack, immediately sent out an advanced guard. The Numidians, to render themselves still more contumacious by the enemy, dismounted, and affected to amuse themselves with idle sports. The enemy, struck with the novelty of the thing, quitting their ranks to become spectators, threw themselves in all parts into disorder. When the Numidians per-

ceived this, they remounted their horses unnoticed, and, suddenly pushing them to speed, passed through the ill-guarded posts of the enemy, and set fire to the neighbouring country. The Ligurians, in the necessity of flying to the defence of their property, left a free passage to the Roman army.

17. L. Sylla, during the war of the allies, near Æsernia, finding himself shut up in a defile, demanded a conference with the hostile general Mutilus for the purpose of discussing conditions for a peace. Perceiving, however, that, during the suspension of arms, the enemy became negligent, he marched during the night, leaving a trumpet to announce the different watches, with orders, after the fourth to follow him; and thus conducted his army, with all its baggage and implements, to a place of safety.

18. The same, when opposed to Archelaus, prefect of Mithridates in Cappadocia, being closely pressed by a numerous army in a disadvantageous situation, caused mention to be made of peace, even invited a truce, and, by these means having relaxed the attention of the enemy, escaped.

19. Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal, shut up in a wood, the passes of which were occupied by Claudio Nero, engaged himself by a treaty to quit Spain, provided his retreat was not molested. Cavilling, however, as to the execution of some articles, he gained a few days, during which he

ordered a considerable number of his troops, by small detachments, to make their escape through several extremely narrow and difficult passes, which, on these accounts, were not regarded by the enemy; himself afterwards, with his remaining troops, escaped in the same manner.

20. Spartacus, enclosed in his camp by a fosse, with which M. Crassus had surrounded it, filled up during the night, with the dead bodies of captives and of beasts, a passage over which he passed.

21. The same, besieged on Vesuvius, caused to be made with branches of wild shrubbery a sort of chain, by which he descended one side of the mountain, which was not guarded, on account of its steepness; and not only did he escape, but he came on the other side, and excited such an alarm in the army of Clodius that some corps took to their heels before seventy-four gladiators.

22. The same, when L. Varinius, proconsul, kept him shut up in his camp, caused to be planted in front of it, at a proper distance from each other, a number of piles, to which he attached the forms* of men clad and armed, so as to be taken at a distance for a guard; he caused fires to be lighted up throughout his camp; and thus amused the

* In the original it is "*erecta cadavera*," which is thus rendered, from obvious reasons, more particularly arising from the nature of the twentieth section.

enemy, while he led off his forces in the silence of night.

23. Brasidas, the Lacedemonian general, surprised in the vicinity of Amphipolis by the Athenian army, of superior numbers, suffered himself to be surrounded, that, by the extension of the enemy's force, its ranks should be weakened; he then found the weakest part, and broke through it.

24. Iphicrates, when in Thracia, being encamped in a valley, and perceiving the enemy occupy a neighbouring hill, which had only a single declivity by which they could surprise him, caused some of his troops to be actively employed in lighting an abundance of fires, while he marched the rest secretly to the sides of the road which lay through it. The barbarians passed, and were nearly destroyed by one part of his troops, while the other took possession of their camp.

25. Darius, to deceive the Scythians as to his retreat, left dogs and asses in his camp, the barking of one and braying of the other being heard by the enemy, they believed that Darius remained.

26. Against ourselves the same trick was practised by the Ligurians, by fastening together and to trees a number of oxen, whose impatient bellows made it appear that the enemy remained.

27. Hanno, surrounded by an enemy, caused, in a proper place, a quantity of light materials to be set on fire. The enemy was immediately in motion.

to secure every other pass. He then passed through the flames, after having admonished his soldiers to guard their heads with their shields, and to cover their limbs.

28. Hannibal, in a disadvantageous situation, with Fabius Maximus at his heels, ordered, during the night, to be set wild upon the neighbouring heights a number of oxen, to the horns of which were attached bunches of vine branches on fire, which illuminated every part to which the bewildered animals ran. The Romans sent upon observation conceiving it a prodigy, and reporting it to Fabius as such, he, fearing an ambuscade, recalled his troops to the camp, while the barbarians uninterruptedly withdrew themselves.

CHAP. VI.

Forming or encountering Ambuscades on a March.

1. Fulvius Nobilior, when marching from Samnium into Lucania, learning from deserters that the enemy intended to hang upon his rear, placed the strongest of his legions in advance and all his baggage in the rear. The tempting occasion soon occupied the enemy in its pillage: Fulvius then caused the legions I mentioned to open to the right and left in divisions of five cohorts, which, deploying on each flank, unexpectedly surrounded the busy enemy and cut them to pieces.

2. The same, pressed by an enemy in his rear, and interrupted by a river, not so deep as to prevent, but so rapid as to retard, his march, left a legion concealed on the nether bank, that the apparent weakness of his force might attract the pursuit of the enemy; this was the case, on which the legion left in ambuscade threw itself into the water and destroyed them.

3. Iphicrates, in Thracia, obliged by the narrowness of the roads to extend the line of his army, and informed that the enemy were about to attack his rear guard, concealed some battalions on each side of the road, and marched the remainder with a precipitation resembling flight. As they defiled he kept with him some of the bravest of his soldiery, and, as soon as it was perceived that the enemy, fatigued, had resigned themselves to pillage, he fell upon them with fresh troops, put them to the rout, and retook their booty.

4. The Boii, in the Forest of Litana, when our troops were about to pass through it, cut down trees in such a manner that a small part of the trunk sustained them in the air as long as they remained without any force, and then retired to the skirts. When the enemy entered, while yet scarcely engaged, they then pushed against the nearest trees, which impelling the next, and those falling upon others, absolutely crushed a part of the Roman army with their fall.

CHAP. VII.

To maintain the Appearance of Plenty, while suffering Scarcity; and the Means of supplying Wants.

1. L. Cæcilius Metellus, in want of vessels to convey his elephants, caused a number of barrels to be attached together and covered with planks, on which he passed them across the Sicilian strait.
2. Hannibal, unable to force his elephants to pass a deep water, and being without vessels, or materials for their construction, ordered one of the most ferocious to be wounded on the ear, and that he who did it should immediately swim across the stream, and take flight: the elephant, exasperated against the author of his pain, pursued him, and the others, thus encouraged, followed his example.
3. The Carthaginian generals, in want of cordage for a fleet, employed the fine long hair of their women for that purpose.
4. The same was done at Rhodes and Marseilles.

5. M. Antony, at the retreat of Mutina, caused the bark of trees to be worn by his troops as shields.
6. Spartacus and his troops had bucklers formed of osiers covered with copper.
7. It will not be misplaced to relate here the noble action of Alexander of Macedon, when traversing the deserts of Africa, and suffering, in common with his army, excessive thirst: on a soldier presenting him with some water in a casque, he threw it away in the presence of the whole; the utility of this example of temperance was greater than if he could have given it to them to drink.

CHAP. VIII.

The Creation of Divisions among the Enemy.

1. Coriolanus, when avenging, by his war, the ignominy of his condemnation, spared the lands of the patrician families, while he ravaged those of the plebeians, that he might destroy the Roman unanimity.

2. Hannibal, as inferior to Fabius in virtue as in the art of war, in order to render him suspected and infamous, ordered that his lands should not be touched, while he ravaged the environs of Rome. But his greatness of mind soon dispelled all suspicion, by placing them in the possession of the public.

3. Fabius Maximus, the fifth time consul, when the Gauls, the Umbrians, the Hetrurians, and the Samnites, had united their forces against the Romans, and he had advanced against them beyond the Apennines in the territory of Sentinum, forth-

fied himself in his camp, while by his letters he charged Fulvius and Posthumius, who commanded in the Roman capital, to march to Clusium; the Hetrurians and the Umbrians flew to the defence of their country, and the Samnites and Gauls, abandoned, were, by Fabius and his colleague Decius, attacked and beaten.

4. Manius Curius, opposed to the Sabines, a numerous army of whom had quitted their country and encamped on one frontier, sent by bye roads a detachment to burn their small towns and destroy their fields; the Sabines retraced their steps to oppose the desolation of their country. Curius thus obtained the advantage of removing the inconveniences of war to the frontier of the enemy, to put to flight their army without fighting, and to cut to pieces after having dispersed them.

5. T. Didius, diffident of the number of his troops, endeavouring to lengthen out the war till the arrival of the legions he expected, became informed that the enemy intended to interrupt them: he therefore assembled his troops, issued preparatory orders for battle, and, at the same time, rendered the custody of his prisoners more negligent, in consequence of which many escaped, and announced, as he intended, what was doing; the expectation of a battle prevented them from separating their forces and intercepting the

legions, which without obstacle joined the army of Didius.

6. During the second Punic war some states of Italy, which on various accounts desired to quit their alliance with the Romans for that of the Carthaginians, wished, previously to breaking the alliance to withdraw the hostages they had sent to Rome; they, therefore, feigned differences among themselves, and required from Rome commissioners for their settlement, whom they retained till the return of their own.

7. The Roman ambassadors at the court of Antiochus, who had entertained Hannibal after the defeat of the Carthaginians, whose counsels rendered him hostile to the Romans, by frequent conferences took care to make him suspected by that king, who esteemed him and might otherwise have derived great service from his address and ability in war.

8. Q. Metellus, in the war against Jugurtha, gained over the ambassador of that prince, and made him promise to deliver up his master; he did the same with the second; and nearly the third; but it did not succeed, because he desired that they should place Jugurtha living in his hands. At the same time, however, it served him particularly; for, some letters which he wrote to the confidential friends of that king being intercepted, he caused

them all to be put to death, and thus left himself entirely without counsellors, it becoming almost impossible for him to obtain others.

9. C. Caesar, informed by a prisoner of war that Afranius and Petreius were to decamp on the next night, and desirous of preventing them without fatiguing his troops, ordered that as soon as the night was come they should pass the word to collect the baggage; that they should conduct several mules with noise along the camp of the enemy; and that they should continue the noise: so that they should remain in their camp under the idea that Caesar was about to move.

10. Scipio Africanus, to facilitate the raising the necessary aids, acquainted Hannibal by Marcus Thermus that he was coming himself.

11. Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, informed that a grand Carthaginian army was about to pass into Sicily to commence hostilities against him, fortified many castles in different places, with orders to the garrisons that they should deliver them up to the enemy as soon as he appeared, and return to Syracuse as quickly as they could retire. The Carthaginians were obliged to leave troops in all these castles, by which Dionysius soon saw their army reduced to the numbers which were requisite to his success, for he had collected his own, and dispersed that of the enemy.

12. Agesilaus, king of Lacedemonia, carrying the war into the states of Tissaphernus, feigned to go to Caria, as having necessarily in that mountainous country an advantage over an enemy superior in cavalry. By this apparent plan, having attracted Tissaphernus into Caria, he presented himself at once in Lydia, marched straightway to the capital, overpowered all that opposed him, and the treasures of the king fell into his possession.

CHAP. IX.

Suppression of Sedition amongst a Soldiery.

1. C. Marcius, consul, having discovered that soldiers, about to go into winter quarters, in Campania, designed to murder their hosts and possess themselves of their effects, circulated the report that they would in the winter following be sent into the same quarters. The consequence was that their plans became deranged, and, as occasion served, the most guilty were punished.

2. Lucius Sylla, when the Roman legions, infuriated, were about to excite an alarming sedition, immediately re-established a due quiet among them; he suddenly announced that the enemy was advancing; called to arms and sounded the charge: every tumult ceased, and all were united against the enemy.

3. Cn. Pompeius, fearing from his troops, who had massacred the senate of Midiolanum, a sedition if he called only for the guilty, caused them to

come intermixed with their comrades. The guilty themselves appeared with little fear on account of not having been separately called; while the innocent were attentive to take care of the guilty lest they should be implicated in their escape.

4. Cæsar, when some legions of his army had revolted, and appeared even ready to attack their general, concealed his fear, and advanced towards them; they demanded their leave, which he immediately granted with a dignified air. They then sought and obtained with some difficulty, by penitence, the pardon of their emperor, whom they served with more zeal than before.

CHAP. X.

Resistance to the Clamour of Troops for an untimely Battle.

1. L. Sertorius, who had experienced the inferiority of his forces to those of the Romans, and wishing to instruct the barbarians his allies, who were desirous of attacking the whole army, ordered to be brought to him two horses, the one vigorous and the other weak, and two young men, the one robust and the other delicate. He then ordered the first to pluck out the tail of the feeble horse altogether, and the other to tear out, one by one, the hairs of that of the strongest; which he did with ease, while the other struggled in vain, notwithstanding his strength.—“Thus,” said Sertorius, “is it with the Roman cohorts, soldiers: together they are invincible; but easily destroyed when they are separately attacked.”

2. The same, when pressed to an untimely battle by his troops, whom he found ready to mutiny if he refused, permitted a squadron of horse to attack a party of the enemy, and, when he saw it in danger, sent another to support it, with orders for both of them to retire; by which he demonstrated to the whole, at a small expense, what would have been the result of the action they desired. Future obedience was the consequence.

3. Agesilaus, the Lacedemonian, when opposed on the two banks of a river to a Theban camp, which appeared superior to his own, and desirous of checking the impatience of his troops for a general battle, told them that the responses of the gods forbade him to fight on any other than high ground; and, having left a small guard on the bank of the river, immediately took possession of a neighbouring hill. The Thebans, misinterpreting the movement, crossed the river, and, having with ease driven the guard away, and pursued the others with ardour, owing to the disadvantage of the ground, were beaten by an inferior army.

4. Scorylo, the Dacian general, although he knew that a civil war divided the Romans, forbore to attack them, because an external war would immediately have re-established concord among the citizens. He therefore set two dogs together, in presence of the army; and, while they fought

with the utmost ferocity, produced a wolf, on which, forgetting their own anger, they mutually turned to the attack. This example prevented the barbarians from impetuosity towards the Romans for the future.

CHAP. XI.

Excitement of a discontented Army to fight.

1. M. Fabius and Cn. Manlius, consuls, when opposed to the Hetrusians, perceiving sedition among their troops and a disinclination to fight, feigned a willingness to delay, till the soldiery irritated by reproaches of cowardice from the enemy, requested a battle, and swore to become victors.

2. Fulvius Nobilior, when opposed to the Samnite army, strong and proud with success, with but few troops, feigned that one of the enemy's legions, corrupted by him, was about to come over to them; and to procure faith to it, exacted from the tribunes, first ordines, and centurions, a loan of whatever money or gold and silver they had, for the purpose of paying deserters, with a promise of ample recompense after the victory: this persuasion excited such alacrity and faith in the Romans, that they obtained a signal victory in the battle which immediately took place.

3. C. Cæsar, opposed to the German force under Ariovistus, perceived in his own a degree of timidity, upon which he announced that on that day he should only employ the tenth legion. Thus distinguished, that legion was compelled to behave well; and the rest were induced to imitate it lest it should carry away from them all the glory.

4. Q. Fabius, who knew that the Romans carried their love of liberty so far as to be irritated at the slightest affront, and that nothing either just or moderate was to be expected from the Pœni, sent deputies to Carthage for conditions of peace; these were full of injustice and insolence, and the Roman troops were provoked to the fight.

5. Agesilaus, king of Lacedemonia, when encamped near Orchomenus, a city of his allies, learning that the greater part of his soldiers deposited there whatever they had most valuable, immediately prohibited it from receiving any thing that belonged to them, aware that they would fight more obstinately when they knew that they had to defend whatever they possessed.

6. Epaminondas, the Theban general, when opposed in battle to the Lacedemonians, desirous not only that his troops should fight with courage, but also with ardour, declared on assembling them, that the Lacedemonians had resolved, -if they were victorious, to put every man to the sword; to send their wives and children into

slavery; and to destroy Thebes. From this denunciation, at the first attack the Thebans put the Lacedemonians to the rout.

7. Leutychidas, the Lacedemonian general, having to fight on the same day that Xerxes succeeded with the allies, though he was ignorant of the fact, announced that the allies were victorious, to encourage his soldiers to the battle.

8. Aulus Posthumius, during a battle contended with the Latins, caused two youths on horseback to pass down the lines, and animated his troops by exclaiming, that Castor and Pollux had come to their aid, so that he recovered the battle.

9. Archidamus, the Lacedemonian, in an expedition against Arcadia, raised in the middle of his camp an altar with the arms, and ordered that, during the night, horses should be led around it; when the footmarks were seen he declared that Castor and Pollux had been there, and would of course aid them in the battle, of which the soldiers were persuaded.

10. Pericles, the Athenian general, preparing for battle, observed a neighbouring wood, from which the two armies could be seen, deep, umbrageous, and in another part sacred to the god of riches: he selected a man of tall stature, whose high buskins, purple vest, and venerable head of hair, when placed in a chariot drawn by white horses, could not fail to inspire veneration, who,

at the signal for battle, was to advance to the field, call Pericles by name and animate his army, by saying the Gods came to aid the Athenians: on which, before scarcely a single lance was thrown, the enemy took flight.

11. Sylla, to inspire his troops, pretended that the gods had revealed to him futurity. After they had prepared to quit the camp for battle, he addressed himself, in their presence, to a little statue which he had brought from Delphi, and prayed an acceleration of the victory they had promised him.

12. C. Marius carried about with him a Syriani prophetess, from whom he pretended to learn the event of his battles.

13. Q. Sertorius, whose forces were composed of barbarians, and those not being apt to reason, took with him, when commanding in Lusitania, a beautiful white hind; and, when it was necessary that they should be induced to obey his orders, as coming from heaven, assured them that the deities had dictated what he was to do.

This genus of Stratagem should not be employed but among the superstitious, where they are sure to obtain; but among those numerous cases the most useful are where the interposition of the deities can excite belief.

14. Alexander, the Macedonian, when about to sacrifice, traced with a drug on the hand of the Haruspice, which he passed over the entrails of the victim, letters signifying that he should be victor; the liver, yet warm, easily received the impression of these letters, which the king pointed out to the soldiers, with an effect on their courage, such as if some god had promised them victory.

15. The same was done by Sudines, Haruspice, when Eumenes was preparing against the Gauls.

16. Epaminondas, the Theban, opposed to the Lacedemonians, finding the aid of religion necessary to the confidence of his troops, caused in the night time their arms to be suspended in the temples, and persuaded them that the gods followed them to the battle as auxiliaries.

17. Agesilaus, the Lacedemonian, to whom some Persian prisoners surrendered, who when they were armed appeared very terrific, exposed them naked to his troops, that their forms, pale and reduced by vexation, should excite their contempt.

18. Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse, in the war against the Pœni, having taken many prisoners, selected the weakest amongst the auxiliaries, who were all very black, and made them appear naked in presence of his soldiers to excite their contempt.

19. Cyrus, king of Persia, to excite the energy

exhorted his troops to fall on the enemy while thus terrified by an idle superstition: they charged, and conquered.

4. Sertorius, when by a sudden prodigy the reins of the horses and shields of his cavalry appeared bloody, told his troops that it was the presage of victory, since in fight one is covered with the blood of the enemy.

5. Epaminondas, the Theban, finding his troops disheartened, because the wind had blown the ornament of his spear upon the tomb of a Lacedemonian, "Let nothing," said he, "soldiers, excite your fears; the Lacedemonians are about to die: they are ornamenting their sepulchres for their funerals."

6. The same, when a flaming meteor fell from heaven during the night, terrifying those who saw it, exclaimed, "The gods afford us light!"

7. The same, when, at the instant at which he was preparing for battle with the Lacedemonians, the seat on which he reposed fell under him, and impressed his soldiers as a bad omen.—"Nay," said he, "it is that I ought not to sit here."

8. C. Sulpitius Gallus, fearing that an approaching great eclipse of the moon would be deemed by his troops an unhappy prodigy, predicted it to them, and explained its nature.

9. Agathocles, the Syracusan, when, proceeding against the Poeni, in the same manner this star

was eclipsed, towards the day on which he intended to give battle, and his soldiers were in consternation at it as a prodigy, explained to them its circumstances, the order of nature, and that it had no relation to his intentions.

10. Pericles, when it thundered in his camp, and the troops were terrified, assembled them, and, striking fire from two stones, relieved them from their perturbation, by teaching them that in the same manner the attrition of the clouds produced thunder.


11. Timotheus, the Athenian, was about to commence a sea-fight with the Corcyrians, when, the moment he put his fleet in motion, the master of his ship caused the signal to be made to retire, because he heard some one sneeze!—“Wonderful,” said he, “that, among so many thousand men, one “should catch cold.”

12. Chabrias, the Athenian, was preparing for battle, when a thunderbolt fell before his ship, which was deemed by the soldiers an unhappy prodigy.—“This,” said he, “is the moment to fight, “when the chief of the gods, Jupiter, tells us that “he is to lead our fleet.”



STRATEGEMATICS,

BOOK II.



ORIGINAL
PREFATORY INTRODUCTION
TO THE
SECOND BOOK.

HAVING disposed, in the First Book, of such examples as I deemed capable of instructing a general previous to the battle, we are now to consider whatever regards its duration and what should follow it.

Of what relates to the battle these are species.

Heads

or

THE SECOND BOOK.

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CHAP. I. Choice of Time for a Battle.

II. Choice of Place of Action.

III. Formation of the Line of Battle.

IV. Embarrassing the Army of an Enemy.

V. Ambush.

VI. Suffering a powerful Enemy to retreat, whom Despair might reinforce.

VII. The Concealment of unfortunate Events.

VIII. The Re-animation of Troops by an Effort of Firmness in the General.

WE COME NOW TO WHAT IS NECESSARY AFTER BATTLE,
ACCORDING TO THE SAME OPINION.

If Affairs are prosperous.

IX. The minor Duties subsequent to Victory.

If unfortunate.

X. Remedies for an unsuccessful Battle.

XI. Means of retaining Troops who deviate from, or are doubtful in, their Fidelity.

XII. Care of a Camp, of the Troops in which the Fidelity is doubtful.

XIII. Retreat.

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THE
STRATEGEMATICS
OF
SEXTUS JULIUS FRONTINUS.

IN THREE BOOKS.

BOOK II.

APPLICATION OF STRATEGEMATICS DURING A BATTLE AND AFTER IT.

CHAPTER I.

Choice of Time for a Battle.

1. Publius Scipio, in Spain, having information that Hasdrubal, general of the Pœni, had formed his troops for battle fasting in the morning, ordered his own to continue in camp till one o'clock in the afternoon,* and to take refreshment and repose;

* It is but hardly necessary to mention, that the original has *horum septimum*. This opportunity, however, will also serve

and, when the enemy, wearied with hunger and thirst and remaining so long under arms, were about to return into their camp, he instantly drew out his troops, engaged, and conquered.

2. Metellus Pius, in Spain, opposed to Hirtuleius, when that general drew out his troops for battle at break of day, in the hottest season of the year, and approached his entrenchment, continued his own within their camp till noon, when, being fresh, they charged the fatigued enemy with ease, and conquered.

3. The same, in conjunction with Pompey, opposed to Sertorius, in Spain, having offered him battle several times, which he refused, conceiving himself unequal to their united force, observed that the troops of Sertorius became eager to fight, and brandished their lances with intrepid countenances. He then judged it prudent to avoid them during this ardour, retired into his camp, and Pompey, by his advice, did the same.

4. Posthumius, consul in Sicily, having his camp about three miles distant from that of the Pœni, and the Carthaginian commanders every day presenting themselves in order of battle, even before the Roman trenches, contented himself by making a demonstration with a handful of men: this habitual mode

to remind the reader that FRONTINUS seems almost always to use the appellation of *Pœni* for the Carthaginians, by which that people, as well as the Phœnicians, were known.—*Tr.*

becoming slighted by the Pæni, he at length held his army in readiness for battle within his camp, and, as usual, opposed the approaches of the enemy with a small number of men, who held out, however, longer than usual. When, fatigued, about the middle of the day, they began to retire, he led out his fresh troops, and put the harassed army to flight.

5. Iphicrates, the Athenian, having perceived that the enemy took their food always at the same hour, ordered his own troops to take theirs before, and then advanced in order of battle towards them, whom he kept in sight without the power either of bringing him to action or retiring. Afterwards, toward sunset, he collected his troops into camp; but kept them under arms. The enemy, distressed by hunger and fatigue, lost no time in applying to refreshment and repose. Iphicrates then led his troops against them thus disordered, and attacked them in their very camp.

6. The same, when opposed to the Lacedemonians, being encamped near them for several days, and the armies going at the same time for wood and forage, he one day sent the slaves and followers of his camp habited as soldiers, and retained his troops in the camp. When the enemy had dispersed for the same purpose, as usual, he seized their camp, and, finding little difficulty with men laden with burdens or bewildered in the tumult, easily destroyed or made them prisoners.

7. *Virginius*, consul, employed against the Volsci, perceiving them hurrying at a distance and without order, caused his own troops to remain quiet, resting on their lances, and, when the enemy was near, being thus unwearied, attacked and put them to the route.

8. *Fabius Maximus*, not ignorant that the Gauls and Samnites prevailed by the impetuosity of their first blow, while the indefatigable spirit of his own troops grew hotter as the fight continued, ordered his army to sustain the first shock, that their opponents might tire themselves before they came to close action. He then advanced his reserve, and, with his whole force, routed the enemy.

9. *Philip*, at Cheronea, considering that his troops were enured by a long acquaintance with arms, and that those of the Athenians, though really brave, were but little fitted for the fatigues of war, not continuing their force with equal ardour, industriously prolonged the battle, and, at the moment when he perceived the Athenians begin to relax, charged with increased vigour, and cut them to pieces.

10. The Lacedemonians, informed by their spies that the Messenians, being furious, were at the point of advancing to battle with their wives and children, deferred the action.

11. *C. Cæsar*, in the civil war, when, having surrounded the troops of *Afranius* and *Petreius*,

and deprived them of water, they became exasperated, destroyed every impediment, and proceeded to give him battle, withdrew his troops, considering the time too disadvantageous, while his enemies were inspired by personal anger and desperation.

12. Cn. Pompeius, when Mithridates was flying before him, desirous of bringing him to action, chose night for a battle: the means of doing it, in opposing his march. For this purpose, he prepared every thing that could obstruct him, and compelled him to engage when he least expected it. He also formed his line in such a direction that the moon, while it dazzled their eyes, served to shew clearly to his troops those of the enemy.

13. Jugurtha, who recognized the valour of the Romans, never gave them battle but at the close of day, that, if he was compelled to fly, the night might aid his flight and conceal his disgrace.

14. Lucullus, opposed to Mithridates and Tigranus, in Armenia Major, near Tigranocerta, had no more than fifteen thousand men in arms, when the enemy was innumerable, and therefore less capable of action. This he turned to his advantage, by attacking the army before it was formed; and he immediately routed it so completely that the two kings themselves destroyed their insignia, and took flight.

15. Tiberius Nero, opposed to Pannonius, finding

the barbarians prepared for battle at break of day; continued in his camp, and left the enemy to suffer the effects of a thick mist and heavy rain, so that, from being so long on foot, not merely wet but weakened, their courage abandoned them; he then gave the signal, fell on them, and conquered.

16. C. Cæsar, in Gaul, informed that Ariovistus, king of the Germans, had a custom, and that it was a sort of law with them, not to fight in the decrease of the moon, engaged them at that time, and, favoured by the powerful impediments of their religion, conquered the enemy.

17. Divus Augustus Vespasian (emperor) by attacking the Jews on a Saturday, on which they are forbidden to do any thing important, was victorious.

18. Lysander, the Lacedemonian, opposed to the Athenians near Ægospotamus, formed the plan of annoying them every day at a certain hour, and afterwards retiring. As this was repeated several days, the Athenians at length, after repelling them, quitted their vessels to procure provisions. Then it was that, availing himself of the ordinary approach and retreat, he returned, attacked those which remained, and, having destroyed them, took their whole fleet.

CHAP. II.

Choice of Place of Action.

1. Marcus Curius, perceiving that to resist the phalanx of Pyrrhus was not possible, where his ranks could preserve their proper intervals, took care to engage in a narrow position, where their formation impeded each other.
2. Cn. Pompeius, in Cappadocia, chose a height for his camp, and the declivity aiding the impetuosity of his troops, it was easy to pour down in a rapid stream upon Mithridates, and he was conquered.
3. Lucullus, opposed to Mithridates and Tigranus, in Armenia, near Tigranocerta, seized with a part of his troops a small plain which terminated a neighbouring height, from which he was enabled to fall on the enemy, taking their cavalry in flank, and overwhelming the infantry, so as in the end to obtain a most gallant victory.

4. C. Cæsar, opposed to Pharnaces, the son of Mithridates, formed his army on a hill, and obtained from it an expeditious victory. The lances thrown at the barbarians as they attempted to mount it quickly put them to flight.

5. V. Ventidius, acting against the Parthians, did not advance his troops till they were within five hundred paces; he then rapidly approached their line, so near that their arrows, which would have served them at a distance, became useless. This device, as well as the confidence evinced in their celerity, vanquished the barbarians.

6. Hannibal, near Numistra, about to engage Marcellus, found his troops in a deep and rugged pass, scarcely accessible, and by means of the natural defence of the place vanquished a famous general.

7. The same, at Cannæ, knowing that the Vulturinus caused in the morning a stronger breeze than that arising from any other river, and that it created whirlwinds of sand and dust, so posted his troops that it should be in their backs, and blow in the eyes and ears of the Romans; which so wonderfully incommoded his enemy as to gain him that memorable victory.

8. Marius, when opposed to the Cimbrians and Teutones, on the day of battle, after preparing his troops by refreshment, formed them in front of his camp, so that the enemy should be propor-

tionally weakened by the labour of march: beside this fatigue he obtained another advantage, by forming his army so as to avoid the sun, the wind, and the dust, which the barbarians received in their faces.

9. Cleomines, the Lacedemonian, to defeat Hippias, the Athenian, whose cavalry was superior, cut down the trees on the plain where they were to fight, and rendered it inaccessible to cavalry.

10. The Hiberi, in Africa, checked by a powerful and numerous army, and fearful of being surrounded, drew up his rear against a river near the spot, whose banks were remarkably high, and, thus protected, made frequent incursions upon such of the enemy as were nearest, and being superior in bravery dispersed the whole of his army.

11. Xanthippus, the Lacedemonian, solely by change of place changed the fortune of the Punic war. Having, from the desperate affairs of the Carthaginians, procured them to serve in his pay, he observed that they who must prevail with their elephants and cavalry sought the heights, while the Romans, whose chief force consisted in their infantry, kept the plain, and therefore caused the Poeni to descend into it, where by the elephants he threw the Romans into disorder, while the fugitives were pursued by the Numidian cavalry; and thus routed an army, which, till that day, had been by land and sea victorious.

12. Epaminondas, the Theban general, preparing for battle with the Lacedemonians, caused his cavalry to gallop at the head of the army, and, when he perceived that the dust had precluded the enemy from seeing what passed, and that they expected only a skirmish with the horse, marched his infantry circuitously to their rear, (in a position high and steep), where he charged unexpectedly and cut them to pieces.

13. Lacedemonians, three hundred in number, opposed to an innumerable multitude of Persians, occupied Thermopylæ, the narrowness of which pass would not admit a sufficient number of troops against them; so that, with a facility of engaging, they were equal in number to the barbarians, and, superior in bravery, destroyed a considerable part of their force; nor would they have been conquered, but for the traitor Ephialtus Trachinius, who conducted the enemy by a circuitous route, and surprised them in their rear.

14. Themistocles, general of the Athenians, seeing nothing more useful to Greece than to proceed against the immense fleet of Xerxes, in the straits of Salaminus, and unable to persuade the citizens, effected it by policy, and employed the barbarians themselves to compel the Greeks to the measure. By a simulated treason, he sent to acquaint Xerxes that his people were contemplating flight, and that it would produce considerable dif-

ficulties if he were to lay siege to a single town : by this he interrupted the repose of the barbarians, who kept watch the whole night after ; the next morning, as he intended, his countrymen bravely attacked the barbarians, weakened by their activity, and in a place where Xerxes could derive no advantage from his numerous vessels.

CHAP. III.

Formation of the Line of Battle.

1. Cneius Scipio, in Spain, opposed to Hanno, near the city of Indibilis, observed that the Punic army was formed so as that its right wing consisted of Spaniards, robust soldiers indeed, but who fought only for strangers, and the left wing of Africans, soldiers weak in person, but of firm courage; the first having caused his left wing to retire, he attacked with his right, composed of the best troops, the enemy's line obliquely. After he had routed the Africans, the Spaniards, who had kept apart as mere spectators, were easily compelled to yield.

2. Philip, king of Macedon, conducting the war with the Illyrians, as he observed that the enemy had selected the whole of his best troops for the centre, while his wings were proportionably weakened, placed his own best troops on the right,

charged the enemy on the left successfully, and threw his whole army into disorder.

3. Pammenus, the Theban, observing in the Persian army that the right wing was composed of their most vigorous troops, did the same, and ordered all his cavalry and the best of his infantry to the right, opposing only to the best troops of the enemy the weakest of his own, whom he directed on the first attack to retire into the woods and other places of difficult access; so that the right wing of the enemy was frustrated, while his own easily turned their left. He surrounded the whole army, and put it to the rout.

4. P. Cornelius Scipio, afterwards called Africanus, opposed to Hasdrubal, general of the Poeni, conducting the war in Spain, led out his troops several days so formed that the best occupied the centre; but, as the enemy always advanced in the same order, Scipio, on the day on which he proposed to fight, changed his disposition, strengthening his wings with legions, and placing his light infantry in the centre, but less advanced than the wings; then, attacking with his wings those of the enemy weakened, in the form of a crescent, they were easily put to flight.

5. Metellus, in Spain, previous to the battle in which he conquered Hirtuleius, hearing that that general had placed his most courageous cohorts in

the centre, drew back the troops which formed his own, that they might not engage till the enemy's wings were defeated, whose centre was then quickly surrounded.

6. Artaxerxes, opposed to the Greeks who had entered Persia, and being superior to them in numbers, formed his army so as to outflank that of the enemy, his cavalry in the centre, and light troops on the wings, and having purposely advanced the centre slowly, surrounded the enemy, whom he completely vanquished.

7. On the contrary, Hannibal, at Cannæ, withdrawing his wings, advanced the centre, which on the first attack repulsed ours. Afterwards, in the heat of the battle, according to the orders they had received, the wings advanced insensibly, the enemy opening his centre received our troops, and closed on both sides upon them, to which the veterans being habituated, it was perfectly accomplished. This genus of order, indeed, cannot be executed but by those well skilled, and soldiers attentive under every difficulty to the slightest signal or word of command.

8. Livius Salinator and Claudius Nero, when Hasdrubal, in the second Punic war, desirous to avoid the necessity of fighting, had ranged his army, behind the vines, on a hill rugged and inaccessible, extended their forces to his wings, leav-

ing the centre open, and attacking on both flanks at once overpowered him.

9. Hannibal, in his frequent battles with Claudius Marcellus, having been overcome, no longer encamped but near mountains, or marshes, or similar places, otherwise convenient, disposing his army as he could, so that if the Romans had the advantage he withdrew his soldiers without loss into his camp, and if they gave way, he preserved to himself the power of employing the advantage as he chose.

10. Xanthippus, the Lacedemonian, in Africa, opposed to M. Atilius Regulus, preparing for battle, formed his first line of light infantry, and retained in reserve all the power of his army: the first had orders to give way as soon as they had thrown their lances, and when they had reached their ranks to run immediately towards the wings and prepare to advance again upon the enemy, who became by these means surrounded.

11. Sertorius, in Spain, acting against Pompey, did the same.

12. Cleandrides, the Lacedemonian, opposed to the Lucanians, thickly closed the ranks of his troops in forming them for battle, so that they appeared less numerous than those of the enemy; accordingly when they supposed they had little to do, he gave orders during the fight to extend his

ranks; the enemy was surrounded and put to flight.

13. Gaston, the Lacedemonian, commanding the auxiliaries sent to the Egyptians against the Persians, knowing that the Greeks were the chief strength of his army, and that the Persians dreaded them, he made them take the arms of the Egyptians, and placed them in the first line; and as the action continued he advanced the Egyptians with the arms of the Greeks. The Persians, after having obstinately withheld the Greeks as Egyptians, gave way on the approach of a multitude of supposed Greeks, to whom they were fearful of being compelled to yield.

14. Cn. Pompeius, in Albania, where the enemy had the advantage of an innumerable cavalry, concealed his infantry in a narrow ravine, with orders to cover their arms that they might not be perceived; he then ordered his cavalry to advance to the plain, but to retire on the first attack of the enemy, and when they were near them, to the infantry to form themselves upon them. This was done; the infantry having a free passage, poured upon the enemy, who had imprudently pushed so close, mixed in battle in their ranks, and vanquished them.

15. M. Antonius, against the Parthians, observing that they covered their army with an infinite

multitude of archers, halted his own and ordered them to form the tortoise-shell,* so that the arrows fell innoxiously on their shields, and the enemy was soon exhausted.

16. Hannibal, opposed to Scipio in Africa, with an army composed of Poeni and auxiliaries, not only from various countries, but also from Italy, covered the front of his line by eighty elephants, to throw the enemy into disorder, and then formed his first line of auxiliary Gauls, Ligurians, Baleari, and Mauri: that they should not fly he placed the Poeni in their rear; and, if they should not effect any great injury to the Romans, they would serve at least to harass them; his own troops, for the purpose of attacking the fatigued Romans, and the Macedonians, formed the second line; our Italians the hindermost of all, for, having been driven out of Italy, he counted neither on their fidelity nor valour. Scipio, to oppose this disposition, formed his stout legions in three lines, according to custom, of the younger troops, the strong soldiers, and the veterans;† he did not, however, as usual, form them by cohorts, but companies, and at such distances that the elephants, propelled by

* *Testudo*; by which each rank covered the other with their shields. This, though the least applicable to modern warfare, yet affords an idea for a woody country, or one yielding cover.

† *Hastati, et Principes, et Triarii.*

the enemy, could pass without creating disorder; he also placed at the intervals light detached troops to conduct the elephants as they approached to the rear; the cavalry he divided between the wings, placing on the left the Romans, under Lædius, and on the right the Numidians, under Massinissa. It was this prudent disposition, no doubt, which produced him his victory.

17. Archelaus, preparing against L. Sylla, placed in his front, to throw the enemy into disorder, chariots drawn by four horses, armed with scythes; in his second line, the Macedonian phalanx; and he formed the third in the Roman manner of auxiliaries, among whom he intermixed Italian fugitives, in whose unyielding steadiness he greatly confided; last of all he placed light-armed troops; he sent his cavalry to the wings, with a view of surrounding the enemy. Against this position, Sylla flanked himself with deep intrenchments, defended at their heads by strong redoubts: the reason of his thus providing himself against being surrounded by the enemy arose from their superior numbers, particularly in cavalry. He then formed his infantry in three lines, leaving intervals by which his light troops and cavalry, placed in the rear, could come up as occasion required; and, after this, ordered the second line to drive before them, deeply into the earth, a number of piles, behind which, as the chariots approached, he or-

dered the first line to retire. Then he caused a universal shout to be raised ; the light and irregular troops discharged their weapons ; while their flight upon the chariots, either entangled in the palisade, or their horses, terrified by the general clamour, returned upon themselves, and broke the Macedonian ranks ; upon which Sylla pushed them, and Archelaus opposed his cavalry ; that of the Romans, however, now rushed out, defeated them, and consummated the victory.

18. C. Cæsar thus checked the scythed chariots of the Gauls, and by the same means.

19. Alexander, preparing for Arbela, when the numbers of the enemy appalled him, while he had full confidence in the valour of his troops, formed them so as to face to all sides so that if the enemy surrounded them they should in every place be firmly opposed.

20. Paulus Aemylius, when opposed to Persus, king of Macedon, who had formed his army for action in a double phalanx, surrounded by light troops, and placed his cavalry on the wings, formed his centre of three lines, in platoons, between which he could occasionally send out light troops. When he perceived that he gained nothing by this manner of fighting, he feigned to give way, in order to attract the enemy to the inaccessible places, of which he became possessed by his industry ; but as the phalanx, which suspected this movement, fol-

lowed him in good order, he commanded the cavalry of the left wing to ride in full speed along the front of the phalanx, so that with their impetuosity they could, by the force of their arms, break the spears of the enemy. Disarmed by these means, the Macedonians relinquished the battle, and took flight.

21. Pyrrhus, engaged for the Tarentines, at Asculum, according to the verse of Homer, which gives the weakest part to the centre, composed his right of Samnites and Epirotes; his left of Bruttii, Lucanians, and Salentines; placed the Tarentines in the centre; and formed his cavalry and elephants in reserve. The consuls, on the contrary, readily distributed their cavalry on the wings, and formed their centre and reserve of legions intermingled with auxiliaries. Forty thousand was the strength of either army. Pyrrhus sustained the loss of half of his troops; that of the Romans was five thousand.

22. Cn. Pompeius, preparing against C. Cæsar, at Pharsalia, formed his army in three lines, for which reason they were of considerable depth. The legions, according to the character of each, were on the flanks and in the centre; the intervals he supplied by his new levies; on the right he placed six hundred horsemen, where the banks of the Enipea, by the overflowing of that river, were inaccessible; and on the left the remainder of his

cavalry, with the whole of his auxiliaries, for the purpose of surrounding the Julian army. To oppose this disposition, Caius Cæsar also formed his army in three lines, in front of which were his legions; his left rested on a marsh and could not be turned; in the right wing he placed his cavalry, strengthened by the most active of his infantry, trained to fight among them. Six cohorts were kept in reserve for any occasion that offered; but placed obliquely toward the right, where the cavalry of the enemy were expected: nothing added more than these to the victory which Cæsar obtained: they rushed unexpectedly on the cavalry of Pompey as it advanced, repelled, and delivered them up to slaughter.

23. The Emperor Cæsar Augustus Domitian Germanicus,* perceiving that the Catti made frequent incursions with their cavalry, and then taking refuge in the woods eluded our horse, ordered the cavalry to dismount when they arrived at these obstructions and fight on foot; consequently in future no place impeded his victory.

24. Duilius, finding that the weight of his ships caused them to be eluded by the lightness of the Punic navy, and irritated that the ardent valour of his troops should be fruitless, contrived

* It cannot be forborne to notice the full pomp with which the tyrant is so scrupulously mentioned during his power.

grapnels of iron, with which they laid hold on the enemy's ships, and, throwing over a bridge, the Romans boarded and, on their own decks, cut them to pieces with a dreadful massacre.

CHAP. IV.

Embarrassing the Army of an Enemy.

1. Papirius Cursor, the son, consul, being so equally opposed in an obstinate action with the Samnites that victory remained doubtful, directed Spurius Nautius from the wing to take a small detachment of auxiliary cavalry, with the male-drivers mounted, to a transverse hill, and then to descend in a tumultuous manner, drawing after them branches of trees. When they made their appearance, he proclaimed that his colleague had been victorious, and called for all the efforts of his troops to gain the present battle: upon which the Romans, collecting fresh confidence, pressed upon the enemy; and the Samnites, deceived by the dust they had raised, took to flight.

2. F. Bullus Maximus, fourth time consul, when in Samnium, frustrated in every mode by which he had attempted to penetrate the enemy's line; with-

drew his hastati, and sent them, under Scipio his lieutenant, to take possession of a hill, from which he could fall on the rear of the enemy; which being done, the ardour of the Romans increased, and the Samnites, surprised, attempting to fly, were cut to pieces.

3. Minutius Rufus, pressed by the Scordisci and the Dacians, with unequal numbers, despatched his brother with a small body of cavalry and the trumpets, with orders that, as soon as the battle commenced, he should suddenly exhibit himself in different places, sounding a charge. The hills, resounding with the trumpets, represented multitudes to the enemy, who, struck with dread, gave themselves up to a shameful flight.

4. Acilius Glabrio, consul, opposing himself to the army of king Antiochus, when led by him in Achaia, before the pass of Thermopylæ, not only subjected himself to an unsuccessful result from the disadvantage of the place, but would have been repulsed with loss, had he not despatched Portius Cato, who, already consular, had been nominated by the people tribune to this army, by a circuitous route, to possess himself of the mountain of Callidromus, or Æta, from which he chased those that kept it, and suddenly presented himself in rear of the main body of the enemy on another part, which commanded the camp of the king.

Upon this the troops of Antiochus, terrified, and attacked in front and rear at the same time, were dispersed, and their camp destroyed.

5. C. Sulpicius Peticus, consul, preparing for battle with the Gauls, secretly sent his muleteers with their mules to the neighbouring heights, with orders to give them the appearance of horse, and, as soon as the battle commenced, to exhibit themselves ostentatiously to the conflicting armies. The Gauls, conceiving it the advance of auxiliaries to the Romans, gave way at the very moment when they were in a manner victors.

6. Marius, in the vicinity of Aquæ-Sextiæ, on the eve of his battle with the Teutones, despatched a handful of cavalry and infantry, with orders, during the night, to pass the rear of their camp; and, that they should wear the appearance of a numerous army, he added all his followers, whom he armed, and the greater part of his beasts of burthen, covered with their miserable housings, to represent cavalry. They had orders, when the battle commenced, to descend in the rear of the enemy. Their approach induced such a terror in them that, with sufficient bravery, they took to flight.

7. Licinius Crassus, in the fugitive war of Calamaca, preparing against Castus and Ganicus, generals of the Gauls, caused a dozen of cohorts, with C. Pomptinius and Q. Marius Rufus, his

lieutenants, to pass circuitously behind a hill: when the battle commenced, they threw themselves upon the rear of the army, shouting aloud, which so disordered them that they flew on every side, attempting no where to make a stand.

8. M. Marcellus, fearing that the small number of his troops might be discovered by their front, ordered his servants and all the followers of his army to join in it, so that the enemy was deterred by its apparent magnitude.

9. Valerius Laevinus, opposed to Pyrrhus, holding in his hand his sword, smoking with the blood of a soldier whom he had killed, persuaded the troops on both sides to believe he had killed Pyrrhus. The enemy, by this falsehood, believing themselves deprived of their general, were thrown into consternation, and retired to their camp, trembling.

10. Jugurtha, in Numidia, opposed to C. Marius, having acquired a competent knowledge of the Latin tongue during his former intercourse with the camp, advanced at the head of his army, and cried aloud in Latin, that he came to kill C. Marius, at which many of ours shrank away.

11. Myronides, the Athenian, in a doubtful battle with the Thebans, passing suddenly to his right wing, declared the left victorious; which recruited their spirits, and abashed those of the enemy, who were conquered.

12. Cyrus opposed his camels to the enemy's cavalry, more numerous than his own; at the new appearance and smell of which their horses became restive, and not only threw their riders, but produced disorder in the ranks of their infantry, which by those means were easily overcome.

13. Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, engaged on the side of the Tarentines against the Romans, used the same mode with his elephants to break the hostile army.

14. The Pœni against the Romans used it frequently.

15. The Volsci, being encamped in a place covered with brush, and near a wood, Camillus caused to be lighted up every thing that would burn, and carried up to their very entrenchments, which, taking fire, chased them from their camp.

16. M. Crassus, in the war of the allies, with his whole army, by the same mode, had nearly perished.

17. The Spaniards, opposed to Hamilcar, ranged in their front oxen, harnessed to chariots full of torches, tallow, and sulphur, and, when the charge was sounded, set fire to them; being pushed toward the enemy, they were thrown into consternation and disorder.

18. The Falisci and Tarquinians disguised numbers of their troops in the habits of the priesthood, who, with lighted torches and serpents in their

hands, advancing in a furious manner, threw the Roman army into disorder.

19. The same effect was produced by the Veientes and Fidentes with torches in their hands.

20. Ateas, king of the Scythians, about to engage the numerous troops of the Triballi, ordered the women and children, and all that were useless in his army, to conduct droves of asses and oxen to the rear of the enemy: he then reported that these were succours from the farthest parts of Scythia, which deceived and turned the enemy.

CHAP. V.

Ambush.

1. Romulus, after placing some troops in ambush in different places, advanced towards the Fidenates, and then, pretending flight, drew after him the imprudent enemy, incautious and disorderly, who, by that means, fell into the hands of the troops in ambush, and were cut to pieces.
2. Quintus Fabius Maximus, consul, aiding the Sutrians against the Hetrurians, drew the whole army of the enemy to engage him, and then, pretending fear, retired, as if flying, to the heights; he then rushed back upon the enemy below him, and not only overpowered them, but drove them from their camp.
3. Sempronius Gracchus, opposed to the Celitbeti, appearing to fear them, continued his troops in camp; he then sent out his light troops, who harassed and divided them in their entrenchments, then, attacking them during their disorder, he

vanquished them, and obtained possession of their camp.

4. Q. Metellus, consul, preparing to engage Hasdrubal in Sicily, finding the hostile army numerous, and strengthened by a hundred and thirty elephants, appeared diffident, and encamped under the walls of Panormus, covered by a large and deep fosse: perceiving the army of Hasdrubal advance with elephants in his first line, he despatched his hastati to dart their weapons at these animals, and immediately retire. Irritated by this, the leaders of the elephants drove them into the very fosse. At the first onset, a number of the elephants were wounded, and others retraced their steps, which threw their whole line into disorder; then Metellus, seizing the occasion, rushed out with his whole army, attacked the Poeni in flank, made dreadful havoc, compelled them to surrender at discretion, and obtained possession of their elephants.

5. Tomyris, queen of the Scythians, contending on equal terms with Cyrus, at the head of the Persians, feigned fear, and, flying, drew the enemy into a narrow pass, known to her troops, then suddenly turned upon him, and, aided by the nature of the place, conquered.

6. The Egyptians, preparing for a conflict, covered a marsh in the vicinity of the field of battle with aquatic herbs, and, during the battle, pretending to fly, led the enemy into it, who pursued with

rapidity, ignorant of the place, stuck in the mud, and were surrounded.

7. Viriathus, who from a robber became a general, feigning to fly before the Roman cavalry, led them into a marshy bottom, while he evaded it by solid parts known to him. The Romans, ignorant of the place, plunged into the swamp, and were cut to pieces.

8. Cn. Fulvius, imperator, in the Celtiberian war, encamped near the enemy, despatched his cavalry to their entrenchments, with orders to irritate the barbarians, and, as soon as they were brought out, to feign flight. Repeating this several days, he perceived that the Celtiberians pursued with avidity, leaving their camp solitary, and without defence: continuing the same custom with a part of his troops, he easily obtained with secrecy the rear of the enemy, while they were dispersed on the plain, passed the deserted trench with its useless defences, and destroyed the camp.

9. Cn. Fulvius, when a Faliscan army, more numerous than ours, encamped on our frontier, caused his soldiers to set fire to some houses at a distance from his camp, so that the Falisci, believing it to be done by their own troops, abandoned themselves to pillage: himself, in the mean time, destroyed their own camp.

10. Alexander, king of Epirus, opposed to the Illyrians, placed a part of his troops in ambuscade,

and then sent others in the habit and manner of the Illyrians to ravage his own country ; the Illyrians no sooner perceived what was passing than they began to employ themselves in the same manner, but with more security, from the country having been before explored ; having conducted them into the ambuscade, they were cut to pieces or put to flight.

11. Leptines, also, a Syracusan, opposed to the Carthaginians, in the same manner caused some of his lands to be ravaged, and forts and houses burned. The Carthaginians, conceiving it was done by some of themselves, proceeded to aid it, and falling into an ambuscade were put to flight.

12. Maharbal, on a mission of the Carthaginians against the rebellious Africans, knowing how these people were addicted to drinking, caused a great quantity of wine to be mixed with the juice of mandrake, an herb between poison and an opiate ; then engaging in a slight skirmish, he retreated by design. In the middle of the night he quitted his camp, leaving some baggage and the mixed wine ; when the barbarians occupied the camp they applied themselves to the wine with avidity, and were soon stretched on the earth as dead ; which he found them on his return, and either cut them in pieces or made them prisoners.

13. Hannibal, who knew that his own troops, as well as the Romans, were encamped in a place

deficient of wood, contrived to qu~~o~~ it, leaving in his camp several droves of oxen; when the Romans became possessed of this booty, they found themselves entirely without wood, and therefore availed themselves of the food in the unhealthy state in which it must be nearly raw. Hannibal, returning with his troops in the night, found them insecure and unwell in consequence, and considerably harassed them.

14. Tiberius Gracchus, in Spain, having ascertained that the enemy had no means of providing food and were in great want, abandoned his camp, leaving in it every kind of meat, of which when the enemy obtained possession they eat so intemperately as to be suddenly attacked with considerable disadvantage.

15. The Chii, having declared war against the Erythraeans, surprized one of their vedettes, killed him, and dressed up in his clothes one of their own soldiers, who gave the signal to the Erythraeans, and drew them into an ambuscade.

16. The Arabs, who learned that their custom had become known of announcing the approach of an enemy by smoke by day and fire by night, caused these signals to be constantly repeated only till the enemy arrived; who conceiving that they were ignorant of it, advanced inconsiderately and was entirely destroyed.

17. Alexander Macedo, when the enemy were

encamped in a height covered with wood, left in his camp a few troops, with orders to keep up the fires and all the ordinary signals, while with the remainder he passed by bye-roads to the height, fell on the enemy, and drove him from his post.

18. Memnon the Rhodian, superior in cavalry, and the enemy remaining on the heights whom he wished to draw into the plain, sent some of his soldiers to pass as deserters into the enemy's camp, to report that so general a sedition prevailed among the troops of Memnon that he would be constantly deserted by them in parties; to confirm this report he fortified within view of the enemy some small forts, as if he feared that the mutineers were about to establish themselves. Thus persuaded, they abandoned the mountains, descended on the plain, proceeded to attack the forts, and were immediately surrounded by the cavalry.

19. Arybas, king of Molossia, about to be attacked by Ardys, of Illyria, with a force more numerous than his own, despatched such of his people as he could spare to the neighbouring parts of Aetolia, to circulate a report that he intended to abandon his towns and riches to the Aetolians: he then, with as many of his troops as he could arm, retired to the mountains, leaving there and in inaccessible places several ambuscades. The Illyrians, fearing that the Aetolians

would engross to themselves the whole of the Molossian property, hastened, precipitately and without order, to pillage: thus occupied and dispersed, Arybas rushed from ambush upon them and suddenly put them to flight.

20. T. Labienus, the lieutenant of C. Cæsar, proceeding against the Gauls, before the Germans, who were coming to their aid, should join them, feigned to fear their force; and, being encamped on the opposite bank of a river to that of the enemy, ordered his troops to prepare for march on the next day. The Gauls, believing they were about to fly, commenced the passage of the river which divided them. Labienus immediately faced about his army, and, aided by the difficulties of the passage, destroyed them.

21. Hannibal, having discovered that Fulvius, general of the Romans, had done little to fortify his camp, and that he often himself engaged with temerity, despatched at break of day, and while a thick mist rendered it very dark, some cavalry to present itself to the guard in our trenches, which Fulvius perceiving he immediately drew out his troops. Hannibal, by another road, proceeding to our camp, entered it, and falling on the rear of the Romans, killed eight thousand of their best forces, and the general himself.

22. The same Hannibal, when Fabius, dictator,

and Minutius, general of the horse,* had divided the forces between them, and Fabius waited for a proper occasion, while Minutius burned with ardour to engage, formed his camp in a plain which separated those of the enemy: concealing some of his infantry in some rugged passes, he sent another body to induce the enemy to action by taking possession of a neighbouring height: to oppose this Minutius led forth his troops; when those of Hannibal in ambush suddenly rose at once, and destroyed the army of Minutius without that of Fabius being able to attempt any thing in his favour.

25. So Hannibal, when divided by the Tschis from the camp of Sempronius Longus, consul, while the winter was excessively boisterous, placed Mago and a light force in ambush; he then ordered the Numidian cavalry to tempt the audacious Sempronius to action, by passing the river and advancing to our entrenchment, instructing them on our first movement to retreat by a passage known to them. The consul imprudently attacked and followed them, while his young soldiers suffered severely from the cold in crossing; to these, afflicted with hunger as well as cold, Hannibal opposed his troops, who had been well fed, and

* *Magister equitum.*

rubbed with oil before the fire ; nor did Mago fail on his part, in good order, to take the enemy in rear and destroy them.

24. The same, at Trasymenus, leading his army round the foot of a mountain, pretended to fly by a narrow pass terminated in a plain, on which, however, he immediately encamped ; at night he posted troops on the rising ground, and about the defile ; and at day break, favoured by a mist, formed his line of battle. Flaminius proceeded against a supposed flying enemy, and engaged in a pass, not foreseeing the snare, which at once burst upon him from every side, in front and rear, to his own destruction with that of his whole army.

25. The same Hannibal, opposed to Junius, the dictator, during a tempestuous night, ordered six hundred cavalry in subdivisions by turns to menace the camp of the enemy. Thus during the night were the Romans kept under arms in a defensive position, subject to a hard rain, which never ceased, and when, distressed, they received the signal from Junius to retire, Hannibal with his fresh troops advanced, and drove him from his camp.

26. Epaminondas, the Theban, in the same manner, when the Lacedemonians were formed on the Isthmus to cover the Peloponnesians, with a small force of light troops, during a whole night annoyed the troops of the enemy ; accordingly at break of day he recalled them, and when the Lacedemo-

nians also retired, suddenly with his whole army refreshed advanced upon their lines, and being ill defended broke them.

27. Hannibal, preparing his line of battle at Cannæ, directed six hundred Numidian cavalry to go over to the other side, who, to obtain confidence, delivered up their swords and bucklers. Being placed in the rear when the armies were engaged, they drew small swords, which they had concealed, and, taking shields from the dead, dealt destruction in the army of the Romans.

28. The Jopydes, having sent to P. Licinius, proconsul, peasants, also under pretext of desertion, who received them and placed them in his last line, they attacked the Romans in rear.

29. Scipio Africanus, when opposed to two hostile camps, those of Syphax and the Carthaginians, determined to burn, during the night, that of Syphax, which was full of combustible materials, and to destroy the Numidians as they quitted their camp in terror; the Pœni also, who would not fail to come to succour their allies, were to be driven into ambuscades, already prepared: on every side was this intention executed; not only was the Numidian camp destroyed, but the Pœni, without arms, hurrying fortuitously to the fire, were dispersed and killed.

30. Mithridates, to whom the merit of Lucullus had evinced itself frequently superior, being

desirous to get rid of him by treachery, suborned Adathantus, eminent for bodily strength, to pass over, as a deserter, and, when he should obtain the confidence of the enemy, execute his wishes. The enterprize, though well conducted, was without the desired result. He was received by Lucullus into his cavalry, but not without being observed; willing not to confide too quickly in a deserter, and yet not to repel others. However, as he behaved promptly and bravely in several expeditions, which he undertook one after the other, he merited and obtained some confidence; he then chose for his purpose a time when the principal officers had concluded a council of war, the prætorium was in silence, and the whole camp enjoyed repose. Chance favoured Lucullus. Nothing, when he was not at rest, impeded access to him; but, fatigued with the occupations of the evening, he now reposed. Another attempt was made, under the idea of some important communication; but the slaves, careful of the health of their master, persisted in refusing him admittance; when, conceiving himself suspected, he mounted a horse which he had prepared before the entrance, and flew back to Mithridates disappointed.

31. Sertorius, in Spain, near the city of Lauron, in the vicinity of which the Pompeian army also was encamped, when there were but two quarters from which forage could be obtained, the one near,

and the other at a distance from them, endeavoured to render the one impracticable, by frequent incursions of his light troops, while he restricted them from appearing at the other, so that the enemy became persuaded they could avail themselves of it with safety. This being earnestly desired by the army of Pompey, Octavius Gracchus, with ten cohorts, armed in the Roman manner, and ten of Spanish light armed troops, and Tarquinius Priscus, with two thousand cavalry, proceeded to act in ambush against the foraging parties. The commanders strenuously exerted themselves. After exploring the nature of the place, they concealed themselves during the night in a neighbouring forest; the first post, nearest the plain, was given to the light armed-Spaniards, as the most apt in furtive war; the other infantry was placed farther within the forest; the cavalry still deeper, from fear that the neighing of horses might betray them. It was ordered that every one should repose in silence till nine o'clock on the next day. When, accordingly, the followers of Pompey,* in full security, not dreaming but to return laden, even those who had been posted for the security of the rest, invited by the tranquillity, abandoned themselves to forage; when in a moment poured forth first the Spaniards, with their usual velocity, falling

* Pompeiani.

on the dispersed foragers, who expected nothing less than such an attack. Before they were in a condition to offer resistance, the infantry, armed in the Roman manner, rushed from the forest, and reduced them to their ordinary consternation. The cavalry pursued the flying, and strewed with dead the road which led to the camp. Measures were taken that even none should escape, seven hundred having advanced, by various roads, at full speed, to the passes of the camp for that purpose; before which, however, the Pompeian army had been informed by the first fugitives. On this Pompeius sent a legion with D. Lælius to take the command. The cavalry, taking the right, as if to retire, returned, and charged the legion in rear, at the same time that those who pursued the flying attacked it in front, so that this legion, enclosed between two lines of the enemy, was, with the lieutenant, completely massacred. On this Pompey led out his whole army; Sertorius also exhibited his on the heights: the effect of which was, that Pompey did not advance. Thus did he suffer a double loss by the same identical stratagem, which made him a spectator of the sacrifice of his troops. This was the first affair that occurred between Sertorius and Pompey. Ten thousand six hundred of Pompey's troops were destroyed, with all the baggage, according to Livy.

32. Pompey, in Spain, disposed some troops

so as to fall on the enemy by surprize, and then, feigning fear, drew them to the scene of ambush, where they were quickly surrounded, attacked in front and both flanks, and entirely cut to pieces, with the capture also of their general, Perpenna.

33. The same, opposed to Mithridates, in Armenia, who was superior to him in numbers and in the goodness of his cavalry, concealed three thousand light troops and five hundred horse, during night, in a valley under brushwood, which was between the two camps. At break of day, he despatched his cavalry to the enemy's front, formed in such a manner that, when engaged with their troops, they could retire gradually, without breaking their ranks, to a point, when the ambuscade might charge them in rear. When this was effected, the cavalry, which seemed to give way, turned suddenly on the enemy, who, finding themselves surrounded, were paralyzed, and cut to pieces, the infantry approaching even near enough to wound the horses. By this action, the faith which the king had in his horse-soldiery was greatly diminished.

34. Crassus, during the fugitive war, entrenched himself in the vicinity of Cathena, in two camps, near those of the enemy. During the night, he moved his troops, leaving the prætorium in his largest camp, to deceive the enemy, and formed

for action at the foot of the mountain. He divided his cavalry into two bodies, and charged L. Quinctius with the one, to amuse the Spartans, while the other should allure the Gauls and Germans, under Castus and Gannicus, by skirmishes, to the spot where he had drawn up his army. The barbarians pursued the cavalry, till, retiring by wings, it suddenly disclosed the Roman line, which immediately, with a shout, charged upon them. Thirty-five thousand men, with their general, are reported by Livy to have been killed or taken, as well as five Roman eagles, twenty-six stand of colours, and many other spoils, among which were five fasces, with their axes.

35. C. Cassius, in Syria, preparing for action with the Parthians, shewed only his cavalry in front, while he drew up his infantry in the rear, on rugged and unequal ground. Accordingly, during the fight, the cavalry retired by passes known to them, led the Parthians into ambuscade, and destroyed them:

36. Ventidius, about to engage with the Parthians under Labienus, encouraged by successive victories, feigned to doubt his own strength, and to avoid them. Having thus allured them to disadvantageous ground, he charged them, and obtained such a victory as that Labienus was deserted, and the province evacuated by the Parthians.

37. The same, proceeding with a small force against Pharmapates, the Parthian, confident in the number of troops that were with him, concealed in a valley which flanked his camp eighteen cohorts, in the rear of which his cavalry was placed; then, with a small number of men, he attacked the enemy, and immediately appeared to fly on every side. The enemy, dispersing themselves in pursuit, were led to the ambuscade, whence the army rushed upon them, and precipitated the flying Parthians, of whom Pharmapates was among the dead.

38. C. Cæsar's camp, and that of Afranius, being formed on two opposite plains, and both being desirous of possessing the neighbouring heights, rendered difficult of access by the rocks, the former, as if he meant to return to Ilerda, which want of provisions rendered probable, turned his back on the enemy. By a short road, after a small circuit, he quickly turned, and prepared to occupy the hill. When this was perceived, the troops of Afranius, equally struck as if their camp had been captured, rushed precipitately to possess themselves of the same hill; when, as he had premeditated, Cæsar, having despatched his infantry to oppose them, took them by his cavalry in the rear, and threw them into disorder.

39. Antony, near Forum Gallorum, perceiving that Pansa, the consul, approached with his army, placed several ambuscades in the woods by the

Æmilian Way, from which his troops were attacked, and put them to flight, and himself received a wound, of which, a few days after, he expired.

40. King Juba, in Africa, during the civil war, annihilated Curius, by a feigned retreat, to the hope of victory, and an useless alacrity. This vain hope misled Curius to the pursuit of Saburus, prefect of that king, who appeared to fly before him till they arrived in a plain, where, surrounded by the Numidian cavalry, he lost his army and his life.

41. Melanthus, the Athenian general, defied by the hostile king, Xanthus Bestius, to single combat, preparing, exclaimed, “ I think it unfair, Xanthus, and that you act contrary to the compact, against one alone to come assisted by another.” Surprized, he looked to see who was there, when, as he turned his head, it was struck off at a single blow.

42. Iphicrates, the Athenian general, near Chersonesus, having obtained information that the Lacedemonian general conducted his army by land, disembarked all his best troops, and placed them in ambuscade. The fleet, as if it contained the whole, was nevertheless to present itself. In full security, suspecting nothing, the Lacedemonians were attacked in rear on their march, overpowered, and put to flight.

43. Liburnians, having plunged themselves in shallow water, leaving only their heads to be seen, caused the enemy to believe the sea was thus deep in that place, the galley pursuing them, being impeded by the mud, was taken.

44. Alcibiades, the Athenian, in the Hellespont, when opposed to Mindarus, the Lacedemonian general, with more troops and ships than the enemy, in the night, disembarked some of his troops, and, concealing some of his vessels behind a promontory, set sail with a small number, to induce the contempt of his enemy, and allure him to give chase. This was effected, and he led him in pursuit to the ambuscade he had prepared; where, when he attempted to disembark, he was entirely destroyed.

45. The same, preparing for a sea-fight, caused masts to be erected on a promontory, and ordered the people whom he left with them to bend the sails till the fight should be begun. This was done; and, in consequence, the enemy, believing that an auxiliary fleet had arrived, made away.

46. Memnon, the Rhodian, chasing a fleet of two hundred ships, and desirous of bringing the enemy to action, dispersed his fleet so as to raise the masts only of a few at the head, the enemy, counting the number of ships only by the masts, accepted

battle, and was vanquished by numbers much superior.

47. Timotheus, the Athenian general, preparing for the Lacedemonian fleet, detached twenty of his lightest vessels to harass them by every means, and fatigue the enemy. When he perceived that these vessels moved slowly, he advanced with his fleet, and gained an easy victory.

CHAP. VI.

Suffering a powerful Enemy to retreat, whom despair might reinforce.

1. The Gauls, after the battle gained by Camillus, wanting vessels to repass the Tiber, the senate advised them to be furnished, and also with a convoy to accompany them.
2. The same people, afterwards retreating by Pomptinum, obtained a free passage by the way called from thence Gallican.
3. L. Marcius, a Roman knight, to whom the command devolved after the death of Scipio, having enclosed the Poeni, and finding that they fought more bravely to avenge their dead, ordered some divisions to withdraw one after the other, that they might take to flight, and when he found them dispersed, with less danger to his own troops, destroyed them.
4. C. Cæsar inclosed the Germans, and when, from desperation, they fought more vigorously,

suffered them to escape, and then charged them in their flight.

5. Hannibal, when, at Thrasymenus, he had enclosed the Romans, and found them fight desperately, opened his ranks to let them pass, and then on their retreat, without loss, destroyed them.

6. Antigonis, king of Macedonia, when besieging the Aetolians, who, pressed by famine, determined on a sortie, suffered them to pass; and, when they had recovered themselves, charging their rear, defeated them.

7. Agesilaus, the Lacedemonian, about to engage the Thebans, and perceiving that, enclosed by the nature of the ground, the enemy fought desperately, cleared a passage for them; and, when the Thebans were on the road to escape, rallied his army, and, without loss, destroyed them by the rear.

8. Cn. Manlius, consul, on his return from a battle, found the Hetrurians had possessed themselves of his camp; he immediately despatched troops to every avenue, when, being enclosed, the enemy fought with such fury that himself was killed in the battle; when this was observed by his lieutenants they removed the troops from one station, and the Hetrurians immediately flew in disorder, when they were again attacked by the other consul, Fabius, and destroyed.

9. Themistocles, after the defeat of Xerxes, prevented his bridge from being broken, deeming it better that he should be driven from Europe than compelled in despair to fight; he caused, at the same time, his danger to be indicated to him, if he did not expedite his flight.

10. Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, having made himself master of a town, closed the gates; but, perceiving that the inhabitants, thus reduced to the last necessity, fought courageously, he left them opportunity of retreat.

11. The same, among other memorable precepts which he gave to generals, said:—"Do not be "obstinate in the pursuit of an enemy who flies; "not only lest necessity should make him more "strongly resist, but that afterwards also he may "be induced more easily to give way, from knowing that in flight he will not be destructively "pursued by the victor."

CHAP. VII.

The Concealment of Unfortunate Events.

1. Tullius Hostilius, king of the Romans, in battle, when the Albane troops deserted the Roman army and retired to the neighbouring heights, perceiving it affected ours, cried aloud,—The Albans only obey my orders; they go to surround the enemy. This spread terror over the Veians, and gave new confidence to the Romans, which restored to them the inclination of victory.

2. L. Sylla, when his prefect, with a number of horse, in the onset of battle went over to the enemy, declared it was by his order: by this not only did he prevent disorder among his troops, but also impressed them with the advantage with which the deception would be followed.

3. The same, having sent his auxiliary troops where the enemy surrounded and cut them to pieces, and fearing that it would intimidate his army, de-

clared that, the auxiliaries having designed to abandon him, he had purposely sent them there to get rid of them. This manifest loss thereby passed for a just vengeance, and the spirit of the soldiery was restored.

4. Scipio, when the ambassadors of Syphax announced in the name of their king that he was not to depend upon his alliance on passing from Sicily to Africa, fearing that it would depress the minds of his troops to lose this advantageous aid, promptly dismissed the ambassadors, and then circulated the report that Syphax pressed him to come.

5. Q. Sertorius, when, during a battle, a barbarian came to tell him that Hirtuleius was killed, stabbed him, lest he should communicate it to others, and his soldiers be discouraged.

6. Alcibiades, the Athenian, when pressed in a battle by the Abydeni, suddenly perceiving in full speed, a messenger, whose visage betokened bad news, prohibited him from speaking publicly; accordingly, examining him in secret, he heard that Pharnabazes, prefect of the king [of Persia], had attacked his fleet; and, concealing it from the enemy and his troops, concluded the battle; he then bore away to the succour of the fleet with his whole army.

7. Hannibal, on entering Italy, was immediately

abandoned, by three thousand Carpetans: that the example should not move others, he asserted that he had sent them away, and, in support of the fact, he gave leave to a few others, from whose he expected but little.

8. L. Lucullus, understanding that the Macedonian cavalry, which were amongst his auxiliaries, had suddenly agreed upon going over to the enemy, sounded a charge, and ordered a few squadrons to follow them. The enemy, conceiving it the commencement of an action, hurled their darts at the deserters. The Macedonians, being themselves thus repulsed, by the enemy, and pressed by those whom they had deserted, necessarily turned to the regular war, and engaged the enemy.

9. Datames, the Persian general, opposed to Autophradates, in Cappadocia, when a part of his cavalry had prepared to go over to the enemy, took with him the remainder, followed, and, having come up with them, praised them for having advanced with so much alacrity, and exhorted them also to attack the enemy with courage. Shame caused them to repent of their intention to desert, and, conceiving that it was yet known only to themselves, made them change it.

10. T. Quinctius Capitolinus, consul, perceiving the Romans give way, told them the other

wing of the enemy was flying : this re-animated them, and they gained the victory.

11. Cn. Manlius, opposed to the Hetrurians, being wounded, and the wing which he commanded giving way, believing their consul dead, his colleague, Fabius, who led the left wing, with some cavalry, rode up, and crying that his colleague lived, and that with the left wing himself was victorious, this firmness re-animated the troops, and they conquered.

12. Marius, opposed to the Cimbrians and Teutones, by the imprudence of those whom he had charged with tracing the camp, having suffered the barbarians to be masters of the water, and his troops urgently requiring it, pointed to the enemy's camp,—“There,” said he, “take it.” This incentive was understood, and the barbarians immediately chased from their camp.

13. T. Labienus, after the battle of Pharsalia, flew with the remains of his army to Dyrrachium, and, mixing the true with the false, did not conceal the issue of the battle ; fortune, however, was equal in two respects, for Cæsar was mortally wounded. This feint renewed the confidence of the followers of Pompey.

14. M. Cato, when at Ambracia, at the time that the Ætolians attacked the fleet of our allies, having imprudently trusted himself in a pinnace

without any guard, made signals by his voice and gestures as if he saw his own ships following him; this simulation terrified the enemy in the idea that the ships could not be far off. The Ætolians, not chusing to risk being overpowered by the Romans, relinquished their attack.

CHAP. VIII.

The Re-animation of Troops by an Effort of Firmness in the General.

1. Servius Tullus, yet in the prime of youth, in the battle fought by Tarquin with the Sabines, seeing the head of the army fight weakly, took a banner and rushed with it into the ranks of the enemy: this received the acknowledgement of the Romans, in an ardent struggle for their ensign and victory.

2. Furrius Agrippa, consul, perceiving his wing give way, snatched a banner from the ensign, and threw himself into the ranks of the Hernici and Equi: this action restored the battle; with the utmost alacrity the Romans rushed on to recover their ensign.

3. T. Quinctius Cincinnatus, consul, threw a banner among the hostile Volsci, ordering the soldiers to bring it back.

4. Salvius Pelignus, in the Persian war, did the same.

5. M. Furius Camillus, military tribune with the consular power, perceiving his soldiers dallied, snatched an ensign, and signified as if he was to throw himself among the Volsci and Latini: the others shame compelled to follow.

6. The same Furius, when his troops turned their backs on the enemy, declared to them he should receive none but victors into the camp: they returned to the charge, and were victorious.

7. Scipio, at Numantia, when he perceived his soldiers fly, pronounced that he should treat as enemies any of them who returned to the camp.

8. Servilius Priscus, dictator, having ordered his legions to charge the horse, and perceiving an ensign who hesitated, killed him; which example deterred others, and they threw themselves upon the enemy.

9. Tarquinius, when against the Sabines, perceiving his cavalry delay, unbridled their horses, and, pushing them to speed, broke the ranks of the enemy.

10. Cossus Cornelius, general of the horse, opposed to Fidenates, did the same.

11. M. Atilius, consul, in the Samnite war, when some troops were about to take refuge in the camp, opposed them with his reserve, declaring they must either fight their general and fellow citizens or the enemy. This consideration returned them all to the fight.

12. L. Sylla, when his legions relaxed before the army of Mithridates, commanded by Archelaus, ran, sword in hand, to the front rank, and, addressing the soldiers, said, "If any shall ask where "you left your general, answer, 'Fighting in "Bœotia.'" This shamed them, and the whole immediately followed him.

13. *Divus Julius* (Cæsar), at Munda, seeing his troops give way, caused his horse to be led out of the view of the army, and flew on foot to the front rank. The soldiers blushed to abandon their general, and returned to the charge.

14. Philip, doubting that his troops could sustain the impetuosity of the Scythians, placed in the rear his most faithful cavalry, with orders that none should be suffered to fly, and that those who persisted should be destroyed. This order, given loudly, made the weakest prefer being killed by the enemy than their own comrades, and they acquired the victory.

CHAP. IX.

IF VICTORIOUS.

The Minor Duties subsequent to Victory.

1. C. Marius, having succeeded in a battle with the Teutones, when night intervened, enclosed those which remained, kept them in terror, and prevented their repose, by the occasional shouts of a few soldiers. Thus, on the following day, he had the advantage over them from their fatigue, and easily subdued them.
2. Claudio Nero, victor over the Poeni, whom Hasdrubal brought from Spain into Italy, caused Hasdrubal's head to be thrown into the camp of Hannibal. This was to afflict Hannibal with the loss of his brother, and his troops with despair of the approaching succours.
3. L. Sylla, when besieging Præneste, fixed on

pikes the heads of its generals slain in battle, and by that means overcame its obstinacy.

4. Arminius, the German general, in the same manner, caused his soldiers to carry the heads of those they had killed toward the entrenchments of the enemy.

5. Domitius Corbulo, when he besieged Tigranocerta, and the Armenians appeared determined on an obstinate defence, killed Vaduadus, one of their principal people, and threw his head from a ballista into the town. It fell by chance in the midst of a council of the barbarians, which threw them into consternation: they regarded it as a prodigy, and surrendered.

6. Hermocrates, of Syracuse, after a victory over the Athenians, fearing that his prisoners would not be sufficiently guarded, because the event of the battle might induce the victors to release them, feigned to expect an attack from the enemy's cavalry on the approaching night, and therefore more vigilantly guarded them.

7. The same, after a fortunate event, perceiving his people fall into negligence, giving themselves up to enjoyment and repose, and fearing a surprise from the enemy, sent to their camp a deserter, who told them that he had stolen away to acquaint them that the Syracusans had placed ambuscades everywhere. The fear of these retained them in

their camp. At break of day, when the Syracusans had slept away their surfeit, they intercepted the fords and bridges, and gave chase to the enemy, who were cut down in their trenches, and vanquished.

CHAP. X.

IF DEFEATED.

Remedies for an unsuccessful Battle.

1. T. Didius, in Spain, after an obstinate battle, which night interrupted, and in which great numbers had been destroyed on both sides, buried, during the night, a great part of his dead. The Spaniards, on the next day, coming to perform the same duties, and finding theirs so much more numerous than those of the Romans, concluded the victory to have been on their side, and therefore acceded to the conditions of their general.

2. L. Marcius, the Roman knight, who, after the death of the two Scipios, took the command of what remained of their armies, having in his vicinity two camps of the Poeni, a few miles distant from each other, heartened up his soldiers to attack the nearest during a tempestuous night. The enemy, confident from victory, were attacked in disorder, and put

to the sword, without leaving one to tell it: and, after giving his soldiers a short rest, on the same night, before this affair should become known, proceeded to take the other camp by assault. Thus doubly successful, he destroyed on both sides the Poeni, and restored Spain to the Roman people.

CHAP. XI.

Means of retaining Troops who deviate from, or are doubtful in, their Fidelity.

1. P. Valerius, in Epidaurus, apprehending, from the small number of his troops, that the inhabitants would betray him, caused gymnastic sports to be prepared at a distance from the city. When they had crowded in multitudes to the spectacle, he shut the gates, and suffered no Epidaurian to enter till he had received hostages from among the principal people.

2. Cn. Pompeius, having suspicions of the people of Catina, and doubting that they would receive his troops, begged them to permit his sick to recover among them. Accordingly he sent them his strongest troops, in an apparently languishing state, who occupied the city, and secured it.

3. Alexander, after having subdued Thrace, passing into Asia, and doubting that the people only waited for his departure to resume their arms,

took with him their king, generals, and all who could be supposed to have most at heart their lost liberty, by way of doing them honour. The government he left in the hands of obscure persons and the lower orders. By attaching to himself the great by benefits, he left them not the will for innovation; and the people had not the power, deprived of chiefs.

4. Antipater appeared to the Tetrachoritan troops, who, on hearing of the death of Alexander, had come to ravage his states, to be ignorant of their real intentions: he thanked them for having thus assembled themselves in aid of Alexander against the Lacedemonians, and added that he should report it to the king. He afterwards acquainted them that, for the present, their succours were not necessary, and begged them, therefore, to return to their homes. This expedient dissipated the dangers which were thus threatened by the new order of things.

5. Scipio Africanus, in Spain, when, among other captives, there was brought to him a marriageable girl, of such an exquisite form, so lovely, that all eyes were fixed upon her, ordered that she should receive the highest care; and, as she had been named as the bride of Allucius, restored her to him: in addition, the gold which her parents had sent to redeem her from captivity was given by Scipio as a marriage-present. These instances of

magnificence induced the whole nation to submit to the imperial Roman people.

6. Alexander, the Macedonian, also, it is reported, when he had captured the person of a beautiful virgin, to whom the prince of a neighbouring country was betrothed, carried abstinence to that height that he would not even look at her. When, as quickly as possible, he sent her back to her lover, the whole people, by that act, were conciliated in his favour.

7. Imperator Cæsar Augustus Germanicus [Demian], in the war in which the victory over the enemy earned for him the surname of Germanicus, having erected some forts within the bounds of the Usipii, ordered the proprietors to be remunerated for the ground which they occupied; so that, by his reputation for justice, the fidelity of this people was assured.

CHAP. XII.

Care of a Camp, of the Troops in which the Fidelity is doubtful.

1. T. Quintius, consul, when the Volsci advanced to attack his camp, placed a single cohort on guard, leaving the rest of his troops to repose. He directed the trumpeters to secrete themselves around the camp, and sound in succession. This appearance of readiness kept the enemy at bay during the night, not daring to advance; and, at break of day, rushing upon them, they were easily overpowered.

2. Q. Sertorius, in Spain, having a numerous cavalry, which, from excessive confidence, were continually insulting the enemy in their very trenches, caused, during the night, some ditches to be dug in front of his line; and, when some squadrons were desirous to go out, announced to them to be careful of the ambuscades which the enemy had formed, and desired them not to separate from their standard. That which was a mere

subtilty of discipline was, however, of service; for, having fallen into a real ambuscade, from his prediction, they remained undaunted.

3. Chares, the Athenian general, waiting for succours, and fearing that the enemy, disdaining the smallness of his force, would attack him in his camp, ordered the greater part of his troops to march by night to a spot where they could be best seen by the enemy, that they might conceive new forces had arrived; so that this expedient served him till his auxiliaries arrived.

4. Iphicrates, the Athenian, when encamped in a plain, informed that the Thracians, posted on a hill, accessible only in one place, intended, during the night, to raise their camp, led his army secretly to both sides of the road through which the Thracians must pass, and distributed them there; the enemy rushed from the hill toward his camp, in which many fires, conducted by a few people, led them to suppose his whole army remained, he attacked from his concealment, and overpowered them.

CHAP. XIII.

Retreat.

1. The Gauls, about to fight with Attalus, placed their gold and silver in the custody of certain persons, to whom they gave directions, if they should be defeated, to spread it about, that the enemy being occupied in the collecting it might remove any impediment to their flight.
2. Tryphon, king of Syria, defeated everywhere and flying, scattered his money: while it was collecting by the cavalry of Antiochus he escaped.
3. Q. Sertorius, repulsed by Q. Metellus Pius, not knowing how he could safely retreat with his whole army, ordered his troops to disperse themselves, after appointing a place at which they should reassemble.
4. Viriathus, general of the Lusitanians, withdrew them from a disadvantageous situation and the pursuit of our army, by the same means as

Sertorius, dispersing his troops, to reassemble them afterwards.

5. Horatius Cocles, urged by the troops of Porsenna, caused his own to re-enter Rome by a bridge which he ordered to be broken, lest the enemy should follow in their steps. Till they had effected it, he stopped at the entrance those who pursued him. He heard the crack of the disparting bridge, threw himself into the flood, and, covered no less with wounds than arms, swam over.

6. Afranius, in Spain, near Ilerda, closely pursued by Cæsar, chose ground to encamp: when Cæsar did the same, and sent out parties to forage, he instantly made signal to recommence the march.

7. Antonius, when, retreating from the Parthians, who were close upon him, he marched at break of day, found his troops always infested by the arrows of the barbarians; he therefore continued them in camp till eleven o'clock, appearing to take up his station. This persuasion induced the Parthians to retire, and, for the remainder of the day, he was uninterrupted on his march.

8. Philip, vanquished in Epirus, and fearing to retreat before the Romans, obtained a suspension of arms for burying the dead, and, during remission of observation, escaped.

9. P. Claudius, overpowered in a naval battle by the Poeni, and unable to escape but within reach of the ports occupied by the enemy, rigged and armed

his remaining twenty vessels, as if he had been victorious, and, proceeding, intimidated the Pœni into a belief that the victory was on our side.

10. The Pœnian fleet, overpowered, and desirous to escape from the Romans, feigned to have struck on a sand-bank, imitating the labour of those who are run a-ground; so that the victor, fearing a similar accident, kept at a distance, and enabled them to escape.

11. Commius Atrebas, defeated by *Divus Julius* [Cæsar], and flying from Gaul into Britain, arrived at the coast when the wind was sufficiently favourable, but the tide retiring. Though his vessels were dry on shore, he ordered the sails to be bent. When it was perceived by Cæsar, who followed, from afar, that they swelled and were filled by the wind, conceiving that a prosperous voyage had snatched them from him, he returned.

END OF THE SECOND BOOK.



STRATEGEMATICS.

BOOK III.



ORIGINAL

PREFATORY INTRODUCTION

TO THE

THIRD BOOK.

IF the preceding Books have answered to their titles, and the reader has been carried thus far with attention, I now proceed to Stratagems which concern the attack and defence of places; nor delaying by any preface, I shall state immediately those in use in the besieging of towns, and afterwards such instructions as besiegers possess; laying aside, however, works and machines, of which the invention has long since ceased; nothing do I perceive beyond them in the materials of art.* Proceed to the species of Stratagem suitable to the attack.

* What would Frontinus have said of modern fortification, the improved theory of projectiles, or the invention of gunpowder? —We too are wise in our generation!

heads
of
THE THIRD BOOK.

CHAP. I. Surprising a Town.

- II. Deceiving the Besieged.
- III. To excite and conduct Treasons in a Place.
- IV. Distressing an Enemy.
- V. To impress an Idea that a Siege will not be raised.
- VI. The Destruction or weakening of the Garrison of an Enemy.
- VII. Diverting the Current, or corrupting the Supply, of Water of a Place.
- VIII. To produce Consternation in the Besieged.
- IX. Attacking whenever it is unexpected.
- X. Drawing the Besieged into an Ambuscade.
- XI. Feigning to retire.

On the contrary, proceed to the Defence of the Besieged.

- XII. The Excitement of Vigilance.
- XIII. The Emission and Reception of Intelligence.
- XIV. Introduction of Succours and Convoys.
- XV. Representation of Abundance in Necessity,
- XVI. Prevention of Treason and Desertion.
- XVII. Sorties.
- XVIII. Of Constancy and Firmness in the Besieged.

THE
STRATEGEMATICS
OF
SEXTUS JULIUS FRONTINUS.
IN THREE BOOKS.

BOOK III.

APPLICATION OF STRATEGEMATICS TO THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE
OF PLACES.

CHAPTER I.

Surprising a Town.

1. T. Quinctius, consul, vanquishing in a battle the *Æqui* and *Volsci*, and designing that the city of Antium should be attacked, assembled his troops, and, addressing them, represented how necessary it was, and how easy it would be, if not deferred;

From the ardour which his exhortation inspired, they immediately attacked the city.

2. Marcus Cato, in Spain, observed that he could obtain possession of a town, if unexpectedly attacked. He made four days march in two, by roads rugged and deserted, and overwhelmed the terrified enemy. The victors themselves afterwards inquiring the cause of this easy result, he said, that the ~~victory was obtained when they learned so quickly~~ how to make a four days' march in two.

CHAP. II.

Deceiving the Besieged.

1. Domitius Calvinus, when besieging Luna, a town of Siguria, defended not only by its situation and works, but also by the excellency of the troops within it, caused his forces frequently to make the tour of the walls, and then return to the camp. This induced the besieged to believe it was merely an exercise of the Romans, and when nothing was expected he turned the promenade into a sudden attack, and gained possession of the works and the town.

2. C. Duilius, consul, exercising his soldiers and towers from time to time in rowing his galleys within sight of a town defended by the Carthaginians, lulled them into security, and then suddenly advancing with his fleet possessed himself of the walls.

3. Hannibal, in Italy, possessed himself of

many towns, by sending into them before him persons in the Roman habits, and who, during the long war, had acquired the use of the Latin tongue.

4. The Arcades, besieging a fort of the Messenians, caused to be made arms similar to those of the enemy, and when the succours were expected, presented themselves at the gates armed in the same manner as the auxiliaries, and, being erroneously admitted as allies, obtained possession of the place and destroyed the enemy.

5. Cisnon, general of the Athenians, to surprise the town of Caria, suddenly set fire in the night time to a temple of Diana, situated in a wood without the walls, and regarded with great devotion: the inhabitants rushed in crowds to oppose the flames, and, in the absence of its defenders, he took possession of the town.

6. Alcibiades, the Athenian general, when about to besiege the well-fortified town of Catina, solicited a council of the inhabitants, who, according to the Grecian manner, met in the theatre; while he thus speciously occupied the multitude, the Athenians, whom he prepared for the purpose, took the city thus left unguarded.

7. Epaminondas, the Theban, in Arcadia, perceiving on a holiday the women of a hostile city betake themselves without the walls, dressed up

his soldiers as women, who, mingling with them, were thus introduced to the town in the evening, opened the gates, and delivered it up.

8. Aristippus, the Lacedemonian, on a Tegean festival, when all the people were employed in the rites of Minerva, loaded six beasts of burden with corn sacks filled with straw, and sent them into Tegea, conducted by his soldiers, who, under the appearance of merchants, entered the town, and delivered it up to their own army.

9. Antiochus, in Cappadocia, besieging the fort of Suenda, seized the beasts sent out for provisions, killed their conductors, dressed his soldiers in their clothes, and sent them as returning with corn. This deceived the guard, who admitted them into the fort, which was thus delivered up to the troops of Antiochus.

10. The Thebans having no means of obtaining possession of the fort of Sicyon, filled a vessel with armed soldiers, and covered the deck with merchandize, to represent a merchant vessel; they then concealed behind the walls farthest distant from the port, some men who pretended to pick a quarrel with others who, unarmed, quitted the vessel. The Scythians collected in this quarter to suppress the fray, and the Theban vessel occupied the fort and city.

11. Timarchus, the Ætolian, having killed

Charmadus, the prefect of king Ptolemy, put on the hat and cloak of the deceased, and dressed himself in the Macedonian manner: by this deceit he was admitted as Charmadus into Samo, and obtained possession of it.

CHAP. III.

To excite and conduct Treasons in a Place.

1. Papirius Cursor, consul, at Tarentum, promised Milone, who commanded a garrison of Epirotians, to save himself and the people if he gave up the town. Seduced by this offer he persuaded the Tarentines to send him on a mission to the consul, from whom, having made his compact, he returned so full of promises as to induce the townsmen to relax its security ; immediately that the place became ill guarded, it was betrayed to Cursor.

2. M. Marcellus, at Syracuse, having gained Sosystratus, an inhabitant, learned from him that on a certain holiday the care of the place would be relaxed, inasmuch as Epicydes gave the people a great banquet, with profusion of wine. In the moment of hilarity, when they thought not of defence, he mounted the ramparts, cut down the sentries,

and marched the Roman army into this town, celebrated for illustrious victories.

3. Tarquinius Superbus, unable to force the town of Gabio to surrender, caused his son Sextus to be beaten with the rods, and sent him to the enemy. In declaring against the cruelty of his father, he persuaded the Gabii to profit by his resentment and elect him their general; when he betrayed the town of Gabio.

4. Darius, king of Persia, purposely maimed the countenance of his courtier, Zephyrus, who was in his confidence, and then sent him to the enemy; they readily, on the faith of the marks he bore, conceived him an irreconcilable enemy of Darius, which he confirmed by advancing at the head of the army whenever it fought, and even throwing some darts at him; they confided to him therefore the city of Babylon, and he betrayed it to Darius.

5. Philip, excluded from the town of Sanior, corrupted its governor, Appollonius, and persuaded him to encumber the gate with a waggon loaded with free-stone; which, when done, he sounded a charge, and, as the inhabitants became embarrassed by it, destroyed them.

6. Hannibal, before the city of Tarentum, at that time garrisoned by the Romans, under Livius, held in his interest Cononeus, a Tarentine, with

whose assistance he deceived the enemy, by his going out of the town during the night, under pretence of the chace, which he could not enjoy in the day time, on account of the enemy. When he went out, the Poeni furnished him with boars, which, on his return, he offered to Livius as of his capture. As these chaces became often repeated they produced less observation, so that Hannibal one night intermingled in his suite some of the Poeni, who, habited as hunters and loaded with game, were received into the town, and killed the guards; then the gates being broken, Hannibal, with his army, was admitted, who destroyed all the Romans, except such as sought refuge in the citadel.

7. Lysimachus, king of Macedonia, when besieging Ephesus, and having for his auxiliary a pirate chief, named Mandronus, whom, often entering the port with his booty, he engaged to betray the Ephesians, sent in his vessels the most brave of the Macedonians to be introduced into Ephesus chained as captives; these afterwards seized arms in the citadel, and delivered up the town to Lysimachus.

CHAP. IV.

Distressing an Enemy.

1. Fabius Maximus, after having ravaged the lands of Campania, to remove every confidence in the power of sustaining a siege, retired at seed time, that they might employ what corn remained in sowing their lands; when the seed began to shoot out, he returned and trod it under foot.

2. Antigonus, opposed to the Athenians, did the same, and reduced them by famine.

3. Dionysius, after the capture of several towns, desirous of attacking that of Rheggio, which was garrisoned by troops in great numbers, feigned peace with its government, and requested provision for his army; this being granted, and the city exhausted of corn, he attacked, and, in consequence of the want of food, overpowered it.

4. The same is reported to have been done against the town of Himerus.

5. Alexander, about to besiege Leucadia, which

was well stored with provisions, obtained possession of the castle and environs, and permitted every one to take refuge in the town, so that by increased multitudes the provisions were soon consumed.

6. Phalaris Agrigentinus, opposed in Sicily by the strength of the fortifications, formed a feigned alliance with some places, and deposited in them what grain he had; he took care, however, afterwards to have the roofs of the granaries so injured that it became spoiled by the rain; and when, in consequence of this store, they had consumed their own, by the commencement of summer, he unexpectedly returned, attacked, and reduced them by famine.

CHAP. V.

To impress an Idea that a Siege will not be raised:

1. Clearchus, the Lacedemonian, informed that the Thracians had carried off with them their provisions and every other necessary to the mountains, and confided in the idea that want of them would force him to retire, during an interview with their deputies, ordered one of their prisoners to be killed, and his members to be apparently distributed among the messes of the soldiers as aliment. The Thracians believing that nothing could subdue the perseverance of those who could enjoy such a detestable feast, submitted themselves.

2. Tiberius Gracchus, when the Lusitanians told him that they had provisions for ten years, and that therefore they were not frightened at a siege,—“On the *eleventh* year,” said he, “I shall ‘take you.’” This answer surprised the Lusitanians so much that, notwithstanding their

abundance of provisions. they immediately submitted.

3. A. Torquatus, besieging a city of Greece, was informed that the young men continually exercised themselves with the pike and the bow:—"The "more valuable, then," said he, "I shall speedily "sell them."*

* The point of this answer would seem to be, that he should sell them into slavery;—it partakes, however, of the obscurity which has before excited complaint in more important instances of translation from the antients.

CHAP. VI.

*The Destruction or Weakening of the Garrison of
an Enemy.*

1. Scipio, on the return of Hannibal to Africa, desirous of reducing several places, in which he had strong garrisons, sent detachments constantly to annoy them; and then, advancing himself, as if to reinforce, suddenly retired, as if afraid. Hannibal, believing that he had taken the alarm, recalled all his garrisons, with intention to promote a general action, and to pursue him. This was what Scipio wanted: he attacked the defenceless towns, by Masinissa with his Numidians, and reduced them.

2. P. Cornelius Scipio, finding it difficult to reduce Delminium, on account of the troops combined to defend that town, attacked several other places: the troops dividing to protect their own districts, left Delminium without its auxiliaries, and it submitted.

3. Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, opposed to the Illyrians, and desirous of rendering himself master of the capital, but despairing of success, attacked and reduced several of the towns. In consequence, the enemy, depending on the fortifications of their city, stole away to the assistance of the others; on this, he collected his army, proceeded against it, in the absence of its defenders, and reduced it.

4. Cornelius Rufinus, consul, having been frustrated in the siege of Crotona, which had been rendered impregnable by the assistance of a garrison of Lucanians, feigned to raise it: having gained, by a considerable bribe, a prisoner of war, he sent him into Crotona, who, representing himself as having escaped, persuaded them that the Romans had retired. On this, the Crotonians decided on dismissing their auxiliaries, left their works without defence, and unexpectedly, notwithstanding their strength, were reduced.

5. Mago, the Carthaginian general, having defeated Cn. Piso, and enclosed him in a fort, suspecting that he was about to receive some succours, sent a feigned deserter to them, as they advanced, to persuade them that Piso was taken. This report deterred them, and he consummated his remaining victory.

6. Alcibiades, in Sicily, wishing to seize Syracuse, chose, at Catina, where he was with his army, a diligent spy, and sent him secretly to

Syracuse. Being introduced into the public council, he persuaded them that the people of Catina hated the Athenians, and that, if the Syracusans would assist, it would be easy to surprise Alcibiades and his army. Influenced by this, the Syracusans proceeded with all their men to Catina, leaving their own city without defence; when Alcibiades, by another route, took and pillaged it, as he had hoped.

7. Cleonimus, besieging Troezen, held by the troops of Craterus, shot within the walls some arrows, bearing an inscription that he came to deliver their republic; and, at the same time sent in some prisoners he had taken, who represented him favourably, and detracted from Craterus. By these means, a sedition was excited in the place, he advanced his troops, and obtained possession of the city.

CHAP. VII.

Diverting the Current, or corrupting the Supply, of Water of a Place.

1. Publius Servilius, by turning the course of the river which supplied the town of Isaurus, compelled its inhabitants to surrender.
2. C. Cæsar, in Gallia, although the town of Caduci was surrounded by a river, and had fountains in abundance, deprived it of water: by mines he turned the sources of the fountains, and the use of the river he precluded by his archers.
3. Metellus, in Nether Spain, poured down upon the enemy's camp, placed in a bottom, a river, whose course he turned from a higher ground; the terror, of the sudden inundation subjected them to ambuscades he had placed, and he cut them to pieces.
4. Alexander, before Babylon, which is divided by the river Euphrates, ordered a fosse to be dug, of the earth of which he formed an entrenchment, so that the enemy believed this was its only pur-

pose. Afterwards, however, he suddenly turned the river into it, which becoming dry yielded him a passage into the city.

5. Semiramis, proceeding against the same Babylon, it is said, in a similar manner, turned the Euphrates, with the same effect.

6. Clistenes Sicyonius cut off the aqueduct of the town of Crissa. Some time after he restored the water, but corrupted with hellebore, the use of which caused the flux. It was surprized and reduced.

CHAP. VIII.

To produce Consternation in the Besieged.

1. Philip, unable by any means to take the castle of Prinassus, caused the earth to be heaped up against its walls as if he was about to form a mine. The besieged, fearing the destruction of their walls, surrendered.

2. Pelopidas, the Theban, in Magnesia, about to besiege two small towns at no great distance from each other, ordered that, at the time he proceeded against the one, four horsemen crowned should approach with extraordinary cheerfulness, as if to announce victory from the other. In aid of this device, he caused a wood between them to be set on fire, to induce belief that it was the other town in flames; and, farther, he ordered some soldiers, with the semblance of captives, to be brought. These appearances so astonished the besieged that they believed themselves in part already vanquished, and surrendered.

3. Cyrus, king of Persia, enclosing Croesus in Sardis, caused to be elevated on that side of the mountain on which the city was built, that was inaccessible, masts of a height equal to it, to which were attached representations of armed men, in the Persian habit, and, during the night, moved them near to the walls. At break of day, he attacked the walls on the other side. When the sun, just risen, reflected the arms of these figures, the besieged believed they had been taken by the rear, and, dispersing themselves by flight, conceded the victory to the enemy.

CHAP. IX.

Attacking whenever it is unexpected.

1. Scipio, before Carthago-Nova, at the ebb of the tide, following a god, as he said, for a general, approached the walls of the town; and, as it was about to retire, when least expected, made the assault.

2. Fabius Maximus, son of the temporiser, before the town of Arpas, occupied by the garrison of Hannibal, despatched six hundred men on a dark night, then scaled the strongest side, and therefore least guarded, and forced the gate. They executed their orders under favour of a waterfall, the sound of which concealed his operations; himself, having given the signal, entered the gate, and took the town.

3. C. Marius, in the Jugurthian war, near the river Mulucha, besieged a small castle on a rock, to which a single narrow path led the way; the

other part (as if it were designed) hung on a precipice. A Ligurian soldier among the auxiliaries, when employed to bring water, mentioned that he had been to the top of the rock, amusing himself in gathering shell-fish, and that one could there climb up even to the summit of the place. He then sent a few centurions, with a small number of active troops, and his best trumpets, bare footed and bare headed, to prevent their being seen, and enable them to keep their feet on the rock. Their shields and swords were fastened to their backs. Thus, conducted by the Ligurian, with the assistance of leather straps and hooks, (*loris et clavis.*) forming a sort of balustrade, they ascended in rear of the castle, which was undefended on that side. The trumpeters, according to order, instantly sounded, and the soldiers gave a general shout. At that moment, Marius, exhorting his troops to firmness, attacked the castle with success; forced the garrison, that appeared to repulse him, and the feeble multitude, recalling their troops from the pursuit, believing that they were also taken in the rear, the castle was taken.

4. L. Cornelius, consul, took a number of Sardinian towns, by disembarking at night some of his best troops, with orders to conceal themselves till, their vessels being arrived at the shore, they could make their descent, and, while the enemy

hastily collected themselves on the coast to repel the invasion, appearing to fly at a distance, and precipitating themselves upon the vacant towns.

5. Pericles, the Athenian general, besieging a town well defended in every part, during the night, on the side of the walls next the sea, ordered his trumpets to sound a charge. The enemy, imagining a general attack on that side, left the charge of their gates, by which Pericles forced a passage.

6. Alcibiades, general of the Athenians, about to besiege Cyzicium, during the night, suddenly appeared before the walls, ordering the trumpets to sound in another part. They (the Cyziceni) were sufficiently strong to defend the walls; but, as they collected themselves on the side where they expected the only attack, while there was none to oppose him, he scaled the walls.

7. Thrasybulus, the Milesian general, to occupy the port of Sycion, suddenly attracted the townspeople to an affair by land, and, while collected to it, caused his fleet unexpectedly to enter the port, and take possession.

8. Philip, at the siege of a maritime town, out of sight, attached together two vessels, covered with planks, on which were raised towers. Afterwards he attacked the place with other towers by land, and, while the enemy defended themselves on that side, the towered vessels approached by sea, and, without resistance, the walls were submitted.

9. Pericles, besieging a Peloponnesian castle, cut into a fosse one of the roads that led to the place, and fortified the other. The garrison, believing itself secure on the other side, provided only against that which they saw so guarded. Pericles, having prepared bridges through them over the fosse, and, by means which were unheeded, subdued the castle.

10. Antiochus, proceeding against Ephesus, charged the Rhodians, his auxiliaries, at night to attack the gate, with loud shouts. To this part the whole multitude ran in disorder, leaving their fortifications naked without defenders; which he attacked on another side, and reduced the city.

CHAP. X.

Drawing the Besieged into an Ambuscade.

1. Cato concealed his troops from Lacetania while he besieged it, and made the assault by some Suessiones, an unwarlike people, whom he had mixed with his auxiliaries. These the Lacetani, having made a sortie, easily put to flight, and he, with the cohorts he had concealed, took the town.

2. L. Scipio, in Sardinia, raised in disorder the siege of a town, and appeared to fly ; the besieged imprudently pursued him, and some troops, which he had placed in ambush, took the town.

3. Hannibal, when besieging the city of Himerus, purposely yielded his camp, ordering the Pœni to retire, as if unable to cope with the enemy ; deceived by this event, the Himerians, transported with joy, quitted their town and hurried to the Punic camp ; Hannibal, finding, as he expected, the town vacant, with some troops whom he had previously placed in ambush, took possession.

4. The same, to attract the Segestani without the walls, attacked only with a small number of troops, who, at the first sortie, appeared to fly; he then interposed his troops, and, inclosing this body of the enemy, it was cut to pieces.

5. Himilco, the Carthaginian, before Agrigentum, concealed near the walls a part of his troops, with orders when the besieged should quit it to light up fires of damp wood; accordingly with the other part of his troops, at break of day, he induced the enemy to come out, and, feigning to fly, attracted him as far as he could. The troops in ambush immediately lighted their fires of green wood, and the Agrigentini, perceiving the smoke, conceived it arose from their city on fire; prevented by the troops in ambush under their walls, and instantly attacked in rear by those which pursued them, between them they were cut to pieces.

6. Viriathus, having concealed his troops, sent a few soldiers to rouse those of the Segobrigians; these hastened in a body to pursue the intruders, who, feigning to fly, led them into an ambuscade where they were destroyed.

7. The Scordiscan cavalry, when Heraclea was defended by Lucullus with his troops, and the inhabitants together advanced to provoke a sortie, they then, by a pretended flight, led Lucullus, who followed them into an ambuscade, where, with eight hundred men, he perished.

8. Chares, the Athenian general, desirous of attacking a town, concealed his fleet behind a promontory, and caused a fast-sailing vessel to pass within sight of the enemy; when perceived all the vessels which protected the port set sail in pursuit, and Chares, conducting his fleet into the port, thus defenceless, also obtained possession of the town.

9. Barca, general of the Pœni, in Sicily, when we were besieging Lilybœum both by land and sea, presented in the offing a part of his fleet ready for battle; ours proceeded to attack him, when with the remainder, which he had concealed, he took possession of the port of Lilybœum.

CHAP. XI.

Feigning to Retire.

1. Phormio, general of the Athenians, having ravaged the lands of Chalcideca, deputies were sent to him to know the cause, who answered them benignantly: the night on which they were to be dismissed, he feigned to have received letters which compelled him to return, and when at a certain distance dismissed the deputies. On this they reported that there was nothing to fear, that Phormio had retired; and the Chalcideans, in confidence of his humane expressions and the withdrawing of his troops, became remiss in the security of their town: Phormio quickly returned and found them not in a state to repel him.

2. Agesilaus, the Lacedemonian, when besieging the Phocenses, perceiving that those who defended the town began to relax from the fatigues of war, proceeded to a small distance as if to attack other places, and gave him an opportunity to retire.

Not long after he re-conducted his troops, and, finding Phocis abandoned, reduced it.

3. Alcibiades prepared ambuscades against the Byzantines, whom he shut up in their town, and then, feigning to retire, while they were incautious, overpowered them.

4. Viriathus, after a three days' march, retraced it in one, and, surprising the Segobrigians, who were occupied in a sacrifice, overpowered them.

5. Epaminondas proceeding to Mantinia, and finding the Lacedemonians had arrived to its assistance, conceived that he could by concealing his departure occupy Lacedemonia itself, and on the night, to conceal his march he ordered fires to be lighted in his camp. Being, however, betrayed by a deserter, and followed by the Lacedemonian troops, he changed the road which led to Sparta and returned to his first design against the Mantinienses: he left fires also in his last camp, which persuaded the Lacedemonians that he remained, and by a route of forty miles returned to Mantinia, which, no longer reinforced, submitted.

CHAP. XII.

DEFENCE.

The Excitement of Vigilance.

1. Alcibiades, when the city of Athens was besieged by the Lacedemonians, fearing negligence in the guards, ordered that those at the different ports should attend to the light displayed from the citadel, and each display a similar one, inflicting a penalty on those who should neglect it. The attention necessary to the expected signal of the general induced vigilance among the whole, and also on a suspicious night avoided danger.

2. Iphicrates, general of the Athenians, when in garrison at Corinth, after the arrival of the enemy, observed the same vigilance, and finding a sentinel asleep transfixed him with his spear. This

action being spoken of as too cruel:—"As I found
" him," said he, " so he remains."

3. Epaminondas, the Theban, it is said, did the
same.

CHAP. XIII.

The Emission and Reception of Intelligence.

1. The Romans, besieged in the capital, sent Pontius Cominius to implore the succour of Camillus, who, to avoid the Gallic station, descended along the Tarpeian rock, swam across the Tiber, arrived at Veia, performed his mission, and, in the same manner, returned.

2. The Campani, when closely besieged by the Romans, who practised every vigilance, sent out one suborned as a deserter, with a letter concealed in his sword-belt, which as soon as he found occasion he transmitted to the Poeni.

3. Some have sewed letters written on parchment in game, and the bodies of other animals.

4. Others, having concealed letters in the most secret parts of their animals, have passed them through the stations.

5. A little has been written within the scabbard of a sword.

6. L. Lucullus, when Cyzicum was besieged by Mithridates, and his troops occupied the only road which conducted into the place, a narrow bridge that joined the island to the continent, desirous of acquainting the besieged with his arrival, ordered a soldier, who swam well and was a good sailor, to make a passage of seven miles upon two inflated leathern bottles, in which he had enclosed letters, and which he had attached by the bottom to two cross pieces of timber placed at a distance from one another; this was effected with ease, his legs hanging down into the water served him for oars, and the troops, who saw him at a distance from their several stations, conceived him to be a species of marine monster.

7. Hirtius, consul, wrote to Decimus Brutus, while besieged in Mutina, by Antony, on plates of lead, which were attached to the arms of soldiers, who swam with them to the town across the Scultenna.

8. The same was done with pigeons kept inclosed in darkness and without food, having letters attached to the neck with a horsehair, and let loose as near the walls as possible. Desirous of light and nourishment, they flew to the tops of the highest houses, from whence Brutus had them taken; by

which mode he was faithfully acquainted with every thing; also afterwards they were kept in certain places to feed, by which means they were taught to fly back again.*

* On this subject, the translator cannot refrain from introducing the following instance of ancient heroism and fidelity united in the person of a modern British soldier, which will bear comparison with the military spirit of any age or country:

A corporal of the 17th dragoons, named O'Lavery, and serving under the then Lord Rawdon, in South-Carolina, being appointed to escort an important despatch through a country possessed by the enemy, was, a short time after their departure, wounded in the side by a shot, which laid his companion dead at his feet. Insensible to every thing but duty, he seized the despatch, and continued his route, till he sunk from loss of blood. Unable to proceed farther, and yet anxious for his charge, to which he knew death would be no security against the enemy, he *thrust the papers into his wound*, and thus calmly awaited his fate. A British patrol discovered him on the following day, before life was quite extinct: he pointed out to his comrades the dreadful depository he had chosen, and then satisfactorily breathed his last. The Earl of Moira, it is believed, has erected a monument to the hero in the church of his native parish; and General Sir John Doyle consecrated his merit in a speech, of the most powerful eloquence, on behalf of an establishment for invalids in Ireland.

This, and some other anecdotes of a tendency equally respectable, have induced the writer, if the present translation should in any degree merit public favour, to contemplate a small selection, on a similar plan, under the title of the *The British Frontis.*

CHAP. XIV.

Introduction of Succours and Convoys.

1. In the civil war, when Ateguia, a town in Spain, in the interest of Pompey, was besieged, Munatius, for the time king, representing himself as an officer under a tribune of Cæsar (*cornicularius*), obtained the watchword, and deceived several sentinels, and avoided others; and, persevering, led through the middle of Cæsar's troops succours to the garrison of Pompey.

2. Hannibal, besieging Casilinum, threw into the Vulturnus barrels of flour, which, carried by the current of the river, were taken up by the besieged; when prevented by a chain that Hannibal placed across from one bank to the other, they spread nuts, which the stream carried towards the town, and by that means the wants of their allies were supplied.

3. Hirtius, when Mutina, besieged by Antony, was in great want, even of salt, sent several

barrels into the city by throwing them into the Scultenna.

4. The same, by placing sheep in the current, supplied them with the necessary means of sustenance.

CHAP. XV.

Representation of Abundance in Necessity.

1. The Romans, when the Gauls besieged the Capitol, reduced almost to the extreme of famine, threw some loaves to the enemy, and, thus making them believe they had abundance of provisions, they dragged on the siege, till Camillus arrived to their aid.
2. The Athenians, opposed to the Lacedemonians, it is said, did the same.
3. So, when Hannibal besieged the Casilini, and they were supposed to be reduced to the extremity of famine, Hannibal having deprived them even of the nourishment of herbs, by ploughing several times over the ground between their camp and the walls, they sowed grain, to induce belief that they had enough to sustain them till the harvest.
4. The remains of the army of Varus, when besieged, being believed to be in want of corn, carried, during the whole of one night, their prisoners

to their granaries, and then dismissed them, after having cut off their hands.

5. The Thracians, besieged on a high mountain, where the enemy could not attack them, contributed each a little grain, with which they fed some lambs, and afterwards drove them to the enemy's guard, who took and killed them ; when, on finding the remains of grain in their entrails, it was conceived that the Thracians had yet abundance, since they could give it to their beasts, and the enemy retired.

6. Thrasybulus, general of the Milesians, perceiving his troops wearied of their long siege by Alyattus, who hoped to reduce them by famine, while Alyattus's deputies were attending him, ordered all the corn of the town to be brought into the forum, and preparing, at the same time, in every quarter, public banquets for the people, so that they could not fail to be impressed with their ability to sustain a long siege.

CHAP. XVI.

Prevention of Treason and Desertion.

1. Cl. Marcellus, being acquainted that Bantius, the Nolan, strove to corrupt and induce to defection the people, for the gratification of Hannibal,—who, when he was found wounded among the dead at the battle of Cannæ, had caused him to be cured, and remitted his ransom,—but, afraid to take his life, lest his punishment should irritate the Nolans, he sent for him, and addressed him: “ That he was a very brave soldier, of which he was before ignorant; exhorted him to remain among his troops; and, in addition to these honourable expressions, gave him also a horse.” This benignity not only gained his fidelity, but also that of the people, which depended upon it, and were attached to him.

2. Hamilcar, general of the Poeni, finding that desertion from his Gallic auxiliaries to the Romans was frequent, and that they were accustomed to

receive them as allies, suborned some of the most faithful of those that remained to pretend to desert, by whom a body of Romans, who advanced to meet them, was cut to pieces. This deception produced not only the immediate advantage to Hamilcar, but was afterwards the cause that the Romans suspected even real deserters.

3. Hanno, general of the Carthaginian army in Sicily, learned that of the Gauls in his pay, four thousand, had conspired to desert to the Romans, because they had not received some months pay; and as, in fear of revolt, he did not dare to punish the whole, he promised them that his liberality should compensate any injury; for which he received the thanks of the Gauls. During the time he had taken for the execution of his promises, he sent his treasurer, whose fidelity he knew, to Octacilius, the consul, when, feigning desertion, from the disorder of his accounts, he announced that, on the following night, four thousand of predatory Gauls might be destroyed. Octacilius, not hesitating to believe the deserter, nor believing that his information was to be despised, placed in ambuscade a few of his light troops. This attack of the Gauls doubly satisfied the intention of Hanno, for a party of the Romans were cut in pieces, and themselves entirely perished.

4. Hannibal, by an artifice of the same kind, was revenged on deserters; for, informed that some

soldiers had deserted the night before, and not ignorant that the enemy had spies in his camp, he loudly desired his troops " Not to consider as " deserters soldiers of address, who, by his order, " were observing the designs of the enemy." Hearing what was said, the spies returned to their army. Being reported to the Romans, they seized the deserters, and, having cut off their hands, sent them back.

5. Diodorus, when defending Amphipolis, and suspecting that two thousand Thracians under him intended to sack the town, pretended that a small hostile fleet had arrived, which could be easily pillaged. This hope stimulated the Thracians to go, when he closed the gates, and would not again receive them.

CHAP. XVII.

Sorties.

1. The Romans, in garrison at Panorma, when Hasdrubal approached to besiege it, purposely presented but a small force to defend the ramparts: this induced Hasdrubal incautiously to approach the walls, when they made a sortie, and cut his army to pieces.
2. Æmilius Paullus, when the whole Ligurian army advanced to destroy his camp, appeared timid, and long withheld his troops; but, when the enemy became fatigued, he made sorties at his four avenues, and conquered every way the Ligurians.
3. Livius, præfect of the Roman army, besieged in Tarentum, sent to Hasdrubal to demand if he might retire safe and sound. This deception induced the enemy to security: he made a sortie, and destroyed them.
4. Cn. Pompeius, shut up in his camp near Dyrrhachium, not only disengaged himself by a

sortie which he made, after chusing the time and place, but even inclosed in every part Cæsar, who hastily threw himself into his interior camp, fortified by a double inclosure, so that he was obliged at the same time to oppose those whom he attacked and those who inclosed him, nor withdrawing himself from danger without considerable loss.

5. Flavius Fimbria, in Asia, near Rhyndacum, opposed to a son of Mithridates, covered with new fosses the inclosures of his camp, in which he kept his troops reposed till the cavalry of the enemy was engaged in the narrow intervals of his fortifications. He then made a sortie, and killed six thousand men.

6. Cæsar, in Gallia, secretly informed that Ambiorigus, king of the Titurii, after having defeated the troops under the lieutenants Sabinus and Cotta, was himself, according to Q. Cicero, besieged in his camp, marched to his relief with two legions; when the enemy, quitting their attack, prepared to oppose him: he feigned fear, and continued his troops in his camp, to which he gave more extent than ordinary. The Gauls, who were already certain of victory, advanced, as if to pillage, plunged into the ditches, broke down the palisades, and were about to destroy the whole camp: when they were least disposed to fight, Cæsar made a sortie from all parts, and cut them to pieces.

7. Titurius Sabinus, opposed to a numerous army of Gauls, retained his army in camp, and excited suspicions of fear: to aid this, he caused it to be reported by a pretended deserter that the Roman army, reduced to despair, contemplated flight. The barbarians, thus incited to the hope of victory, loaded themselves with wood and the loppings of trees to fill up the fosses, and prepared to attack our camp, situated on a hill: then Titurius poured forth his troops upon them; the Gauls were destroyed in numbers, and the rest compelled to surrender.

8. The Asculani, besieged by Pompey, left on their ramparts only some old men and sick, made a sudden sortie, and put the Romans, lulled into security by the appearance of the ramparts guarded, to flight.


9. The Numantines did not even furnish their fortifications, and kept so close that Papilius Lanatus had confidence to scale the walls. When he found no resistance, he began to fear an ambuscade, and to recall his troops: they then poured upon him, while one part was retiring, and another descending from the walls.

CHAP. XVIII.


Of Constancy and Firmness in the Besieged.

1. The Romans, while Hannibal was encamped under their walls, to shew their confidence, collected troops to reinforce the army in Spain, and marched them out by another gate.
2. The same, when the proprietor of the field on which Hannibal encamped was dead, kept the price of the land as high as it was before the war.
3. They also, while Hannibal besieged themselves, formed the siege of Capua, and decreed, that, until it was taken, they should not recal the troops.

THE END OF THE THIRD AND LAST BOOK OF
STRATEGEMATICON.



STRATEGECON.



ORIGINAL
PREFATORY INTRODUCTION
TO
THIS BOOK.

MUCH reading and research has been used to collect and scrupulously digest the Strategemetics, to fulfil the promise of the three Books: if it has been fulfilled, I am to exhibit in this such sketches as could not be subjected to the former, being rather examples of military characteristics than Strategemetics. These will clearly shew their nature and its difference; and I give them apart because, if met fortuitously, deceiving by similarity, it might be imagined I had passed over them. I am as it were discharging arrears, in which I shall endeavour, as before, to arrange them under their proper species.

heads
or
THIS BOOK,

CHAP. I. Of Discipline.
II. The Effects of Discipline.
III. Of Continence, chiefly as applied to Temperance
and Disinterestedness.
IV. Justice.
V. Of Constancy, (including Courage).
VI. Of Tenderness and Amenity.
VII. Various expedients, Remarkable Actions and Ex-
pressions.

THE
STRATEGICON
OF
SEXTUS JULIUS FRONTINUS.
IN ONE BOOK.

CHAP. I.

Of Discipline.

1. Publius Scipio, at Numantia, corrected the discipline which had been corrupted by the generals who preceeded him; he dismissed great numbers of sutlers and followers of the army; and brought back the soldiery to their duty by exercising them every day; by enjoining them frequent marches, in which he compelled them to carry provisions for several days; by accustoming them to cold and rain; in making the recruits ford rivers on foot; in imperiously reproofing them

with their sluggishness and timidity ; and destroying every thing that contributed to delicacy, and was incompatible with the expedition of a march. What was most remarkable was in respect to C. Memmius, to whom Scipio is reported to have said, “ To me, and to the republic in a short time, and “ to yourself always, you will be good for no- “ thing.”

2. Q. Metellus, in the war of Jugurtha, in the same way restored a laxity of discipline by severity ; he also prohibited the soldiers from any other food than that which was roughly cooked by themselves.

3. Pyrrhus said to his recruiting officer,—“ See “ lect large men, I shall render them stout.”

4. L. Flacco and C. Varone, when consuls, exacted, for the first time, the oath from every soldier ; before, the oath was taken together, at the requisition of the tribunes ; they were, in addition, accustomed to swear among themselves that they should not fly, that they would not quit their ranks, except to recover their arms, to kill an enemy, or to save a citizen.

5. Scipio Africanus, when he saw a shield elegantly ornamented, said to him who wore it,—“ He “ did not wonder at his care in ornamenting that “ in which he had so much more confidence than in “ his sword.”

6. Philip, in the first army which he constituted,

interdicted the use of chariots, permitted only a single servant to each knight, and in the infantry allowed one to ten. When going into summer station he ordered that each should carry on his shoulders flour for thirty days.

7. C. Marius, to relieve himself from the impediments which greatly affected his march, attached provisions and utensils in packs to each soldier; the burthen was thus easily carried, and they reposed with facility. From this is taken the proverb,—*Mules of Marius.*

8. Theagines, the Athenian, when leading his army to Megara, and the soldiers requiring the arrangement of ranks, he postponed it till his arrival; he then secretly despatched his horse in advance, with orders to present themselves to their own army with the appearance of an enemy at the moment when least expected. This being done, he ordered his troops to prepare to sustain the attack, and permitted them to form as they chose: as the least active retired to the rear and the bravest ran to the front, according to the divisions in which they were found he arranged the ranks of his soldiers.

9. Lysander, the Lacedemonian, chastised one who had quitted the line of march; and, on his excusing himself, that he had not done it with any view of plunder, answered,—“ You must not even “ appear to have the inclination.”

10. Antigonus, hearing that the person in whose house his son lodged had three daughters of remarkable beauty :—“ I hear, my son,” said he, “ that you are too much straitened in a house inhabited by many masters; procure a lodging where you will be more at ease:” he caused him to remove; and then issued orders that none who were under fifty years of age should lodge with the mother of a family.

11. Q. Metellus, consul, whom no law prevented from having his son always with him, preferred that he should live among the private soldiers.

12. P. Rutilius, consul, though according to law he might have kept his son with him in his own quarters, entered him as a soldier in a legion.

13. M. Scaurus, whose son had given way before the enemy in the wood of Tridente, prohibited him from appearing in his presence. The young man, overpowered by shame at this ignominious treatment, killed himself.

14. The ancient camps of the Romans, and also other nations, were formed by bodies of cohorts; in a sort of huts, they knew no other mode of inclosing themselves antiquity but in walled towns. Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, was the first who inclosed a whole army in a continuous entrenchment. The Romans afterwards, when they had vanquished him in the plain of Arusini, near the

city of Maluentum, having taken possession of his camp, and remarking the order, they came by degrees to the manner of encamping which is now in use.

15. P. Nasica, in winter, although a fleet was not necessary to him, fearing that his soldiers might be corrupted, or that a licentious indolence might produce insult to their allies, employed them in building vessels.

16. M. Cato has handed down on record, that they cut off the right hand of soldiers who stole any thing from their comrades; where the punishment was intended to be less severe they were publicly let blood.

17. Clearchus, general of the Lacedemonians, said to his soldiers,—“Your general is more to be “feared than the enemy;” signifying that those who in battle feared a doubtful death, would, if they fled from the enemy, receive a certain one.

18. Appius Claudius, having advised it, the senate degraded those whom Pyrrhus, king of the Epirotes, had captured and afterwards remitted:—the horse were reduced to foot; the foot to light [irregular] troops; all were ordered to remain without the entrenchments till it could be reported that one should have despoiled two enemies.

19. Otacilius Crassus, consul, ordered those whom Hannibal had passed under the yoke to be kept out of the camp, so that, not being able to

avail themselves of any cover, they might become accustomed to peril, and more bold against the enemy.

20. P. Cornelius Nasica and D. Junius, being consuls, those who shrank from action were condemned, beaten with rods, and publicly sold.

21. Domitius Corbulo, in Armenia, when two corps from the wings (*duas alas*, perhaps cavalry,) and three cohorts, who, at a small fort under Pac-
tius, ceded to the enemy, ordered that they should remain without the entrenchment, till, by diligent labour and prosperous excursions, they should re-
deem their ignominy.

22. Aurelius Cotta, consul, having ordered the knights to assist in a military work of cogent necessity, and the greater part having disobeyed the order, it was reported to the cursors, who recog-
nized it. From the senate (*patribus*) afterwards he obtained that the pay of former services should not proceed. The tribunes of the people, also, carried the matter to the people; all consented to the establishment of discipline.

23. Q. Metellus Macedonicus, in Spain, when five cohorts yielded a port to the enemy, or-
dered his soldiers to make their wills, and des-
patched them to retake it, threatening, if they did not return victorious, he would not receive them.

24. P. Valerius, consul, was ordered by the se-
nate to conduct the army which had suffered itself

to be beaten at Siris, to encamp and pass the winter under tents; and, as the flight of these soldiers was shameful, the senate decreed, that they should not be assisted even privately, unless they captured and vanquished an enemy.

25. There were legions which, in the Punic war, retracted from service, and were as exiles in Sicily, for seven years, fed on barley. *This is given from the act of the senate.*

26. L. Piso, consul, condemned C. Titius, commander of a cohort which had given way, to have his sash cut, to stand every day barefooted and without tunic before the general's tent, till the hour of the first guard at night; with a prohibition from social intercourse and the use of the bath.

27. Sylla condemned a cohort and his centurions, whose post had been forced by the enemy, to remain the whole day without casque or girdle before his tent.

28. Domitius Corbulo, in Armenia, when Δ emilius Rufus, a commandant of horse, had succumbed to the enemy, and his troop was found badly armed, caused his habits to be torn by a lieutenant, and ordered him to stand barefooted before the general's tent till every one was dismissed.

29. Atilius Regulus, when leading his army from

Satanius into Luceria, his soldiers turned their backs upon the enemy, ordered a cohort to oppose the flying, and, as deserters, to put them to the sword.

30. Cotta, consul, in Sicily, caused Valerius, a noble tribune of the army, and of the house of Valeria, to be beaten with the rods.

31. The same, having left to his relation, P. Aurelius, to sustain the siege of Lipari, while himself passed over to Messina to bring back the auspices, and finding that he suffered his palisades to be burnt and his camp forced, he had him beaten with the rods, reduced him to the lowest rank of the infantry, and ordered him to perform every duty of a private soldier.

32. Fulvius Flaccus, censor, when his brother Fulvius dismissed the legion in which he was military tribune, without the orders of the consul, caused him to be removed from the senate.

33. M. Cato, departing from an enemy's coast, where he had been some days, after having made signal three times, a soldier who had remained on shore solicited by his gestures and cries to be taken on board; he returned with his whole fleet, seized the soldier, and put him to death; which, while it prevented the ignominy of his being killed by the enemy, afforded a useful example.

34. Appius Claudius, when they took flight, decimated his soldiers, and caused those on whom the lot fell to be beaten to death with rods.

35. Fabius Rullus, consul, when two legions gave way, took twenty soldiers fortuitously from each, and beheaded them in presence of the army.

36. Aquirius beheaded three from each of the companies, whose post the enemy had forced.

37. M. Antonius, when the enemy fired his entrenchment, decimated the two legions who were then on guard, and put to death a centurion from each; cashiered with ignominy the general commanding (*legatus*); and ordered the remainder of the legion to receive only barley.

38. Of the legion which pillaged the town of Rhegium without the orders of their general, many suffered death, and four thousand were imprisoned. By an act of the senate also they were prohibited either burial or mourning.

39. L. Papirius Cursor, dictator, ordered Fabius Rullus, general of the horse,* for having fought, although successfully, against his orders, to be beaten with the rods; nor could the efforts or prayers of the army induce a relaxation of the chastisement; when he flew to Rome for sanctuary he was followed. Nor was the punishment remitted,

* *Magister equitum* :—the reader may be reminded that this officer was next in command to himself.—Tr.

till on their knees Fabius and his father threw themselves at his feet, and the senate and people, in a parliamentary manner, required it.*

41. Manlius, afterwards surnamed the imperious, when his son, in contradiction to his father's orders, fought the enemy, although victorious, had him beaten with the rods in presence of the army, and beheaded.

41. Manlius, the son, perceiving among the soldiery a sedition in his favour against his father, represented to them that no person of whatever consideration should dare to break the rules of discipline, and obtained that they should suffer him to be punished.

42. Q. Fabius Maximus cut off the right hand of deserters.

43. M. Curius, consul, in the Dardanian war, near Dyrrhachium, when of five legions one became seditious and refused to obey orders, unwilling, as they said, to follow a rash general in expeditions so difficult and desperate, marched out of the camp four legions, and ordered them to form in order of battle; afterwards the mutinous legion was brought out without belts, and compelled, in the presence of the whole, to collect litter for the horses. On the next day, in the same manner, they were employed to dig a fosse. No intreaty

* *Senatus ac populus rogarent.*

could induce him not to disband it, and to distribute the soldiers into other legions.

44. Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius were consuls, when the soldiers, whom, after the battle of Cannæ, the senate had banished to Sicily, beseeched the proconsul, Marcellus, to procure them to be sent on service: he consulted the senate; the senate objected the inexpediency of committing the public care to those who resigned it; Marcellus, at the same time, was permitted to act as he saw occasion, on condition that they should not be exempt from any service, receive no pay nor recompense, nor return to Italy till the Pœni quitted it.

45. M. Salinator, a consular person, was condemned by the people for not having divided the spoils equally amongst the soldiery.

46. When, in a battle with the Ligurians, Q. Petilius, consul, was killed, the senate decreed, that the legion, at the head of which the consul fought, should be disbanded; that the whole of those who returned should serve a year without pay, and give up their arrears.

CHAP. II.

The Effects of Discipline.

1. The armies of Brutus and Cassius, during the civil war, marching by one route, that of Brutus arrived first on the banks of a river, over which it was necessary to construct a bridge; the troops of Cassius, nevertheless, formed their bridge first and passed the river. This vigour was the effect of discipline, and not only in those operations, but also in every department of war, the troops of Cassius surpassed those of Brutus.

2. C. Marius, having the choice of two armies, that under Rutilius, or the one commanded by Metellus, with which he had himself served, preferred that of Rutilius, though the smallest, because he found it most regularly disciplined.

3. Domitius Corbulo, with two legions, and a few auxiliaries correctly disciplined, sustained the Parthians.

4. Alexander Macedo, with forty thousand men,

whom Philip, his father, had laboriously disciplined, undertook the conquest of the universe, and beat innumerable armies.

5. Pyrrhus, in the war against the Spartans, with fourteen thousand men, overcame immense difficulties.

6. Epaminondas, the Theban general, with four thousand men, of which ~~four~~ hundred formed the whole of his cavalry, defeated a Lacedemonian army of twenty-four thousand infantry and sixteen hundred horse.

7. Fourteen thousand Grecian auxiliaries of Cyrus, against Artaxerxes, put to flight a hundred thousand barbarians. Afterwards, when in battle the same fourteen thousand Greeks had lost their generals, they applied to take the charge of their retreat to one of their own body, Xenophon, the Athenian, who, by unknown and dangerous roads, re-conducted them in perfect safety.

8. Xerxes, harassed by three hundred Lacedemonians, at Thermopylae, of whom he had much difficulty to rid himself, affirmed that he had been deceived;—that he had a sufficient number of men, but, of men formed by discipline, (soldiers,) none.

CHAP. III.

*Of Continence, chiefly as applied to Temperance
and Disinterestedness.*

1. M. Cato was contented with the same wine as his rowers, according to tradition.
2. Fabricius, when Cineas, the Epirotian ambassador, presented him with a great quantity of gold, would not accept it, saying;—"He had "rather command those who had it, than possess "it."
3. Atilius Regulus, who had conducted the highest affairs, was so poor as that for the provision of himself and family he had only the produce of a small piece of ground, cultivated by a single slave; of whose death when he heard, he wrote to the senate for a successor, since, his affairs being deranged by the death of his servant, his presence would be necessary to them.
4. Cn. Scipio, after his successes in Spain, died

in such extreme poverty that he left not sufficient money to portion his daughters, which, on account of their necessity, was done from the public by the senate.

5. The same was done by the Athenians for the daughters of Aristides, who, after having the administration of public affairs, died in the depth of poverty.

6. Epaminondas, the Theban general, followed such abstinence as that his household furniture consisted of a single kettle and a spit.

7. Hannibal was wont to rise before day, and not to repose till night; at twilight he was called to supper; nor had he more than two couches at his table.*

8. The same, when he served under the general Hasdrubal, oftentimes wrapped in a cloak took his sleep on the bare moist earth.

9. Æmilianus Scipio, it is recorded, on a march was accustomed to live on bread, which he took while walking with his friends.

10. The same is said of Alexander of Macedon.

11. Masinissa, at ninety years of age, was wont to take his food, at noon, walking or standing before his tent.

* Amounting, of course, from the number ordinarily incumbent on each, to six or eight covers.—*Tr.*

12. **Marcus Curius**, after having vanquished the **Sabines**, from an act of the senate, receiving a larger portion of land than is given to veterans, contented himself with taking the ordinary portion of the private soldiers:—“He were ‘a bad citizen,’ said he, ‘who would not have ‘enough in the same with which others are sa- ‘tisfied.’”

13. A whole army sometimes exhibits remarkable instances of continence, such as that under **M. Scaurus**: for, in his **Memoir**, it is handed down by **Scaurus**, that, a tree loaded with fruit being within the circumference of a camp, which they were to leave the next day, the troops quitted it leaving the fruit untouched.

14. Under the auspices of the emperor, **Cæsar Domitian Augustus Germanicus**, in the war which **Julius Civilis** promoted in Gaul, **Lingonum**, an opulent and magnificent city, which had revolted to **Civilis** on the advance of **Cæsar’s** troops, apprehended being spoiled and pillaged; but, contrary to expectation, it remained inviolate, nothing in the least of its substance was destroyed: it returned to obedience, and yielded me seventy thousand men in arms.

15. **L. Mummius**, who, by the capture of **Corinth**, embellished not only **Italy** but also the provinces with pictures and statues, was so far

from converting any part of such noble spoils to his own use, that his daughter, being in want, received from the public, through the senate, her marriage-portion.

CHAP. IV.

Justice.

1. Camillus besieging Falisco, a schoolmaster led out the children of the Falisci, as if to walk, carried them without the walls, and betrayed them, saying, "Retain these, and the city will find it necessary to submit to the general." Camillus not only scorned the perfidy, but he tied behind him the hands of the master, and sent him, conducted by the boys, to the rods of their parents. The acquisition of this pious and beneficent victory was greater than could have been hoped from fraud; and the Falisci, from this act of justice spontaneously surrendered.

2. To Fabricius, the Roman general, the physician of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, presented himself with a free offer, and promised to poison Pyrrhus, if he would make him a present or recompense proportioned to the service. As Fabricius did not conceive his victory to be governed by such objects,

he discovered to the king the bad intentions of his physician: so that this good faith merited, and compelled Pyrrhus to seek, the friendship of the Romans.

CHAP. V.

Of Constancy, (including Courage).

1. Cn. Pompeius, when the troops threatened to pillage the treasures which should be carried at his triumph, and Servilius and Glaucia advised them to be divided, to prevent revolt, declared, that he should not triumph, but that he should die before he succumbed to the licentiousness of the soldiery. Having censured them in a solemn oration, he presented to them the laureated fasces, and told them to commence their pillage there. The invidiousness of the thing reduced them to moderation.

2. C. Cæsar, in the tumult of the civil war, when one of his legions mutinied, broke it, and, while their minds were still heated, beheaded the leaders. Some time afterwards, when those who had been disbanded prayed to be rescued from this ignominy, he restored them, and they formed his best troops.

3. Posthumius, of the consular dignity, when exhorting his troops, they inquired what he required of them, said, "To imitate him;" and, snatching an ensign, charged the enemy: they followed, and gained a victory.

4. L. Marcellus, when, by imprudence, he had fallen into the hands of the Gauls, in order to observe the country, and see if he had any means of escape, took a few turns with his horse; but, when he saw himself inclosed on every side, he addressed himself to the gods, and plunged into the midst of the enemy; which unexpected audacity disconcerted them, and he killed their general with his own sword; thus, where they could scarcely hope to have saved themselves, they carried off an abundance of plunder.

5. L. Paullus, after the loss of the army at Cannæ, when Lentulus offered him a horse, to make his escape, refused it, not chusing to survive the event, though not incurred by himself: he sat himself down on a stome, against which his wounds had compelled him to lean, and waited till the enemy in their progress should destroy him.

6. Varro, his colleague, evinced still greater constancy in surviving the same discomfiture, and was thanked by an act of the senate and people for not having despaired of the public affairs; nor was it an undue attachment to life, but love for the republic, that induced him to survive, as was proved

by the remaining period which he lived. He suffered his beard and hair to grow, and never after reclined at table: the honours also which were offered to him by the people he refused, saying, “ The republic is in want of more fortunate “ magistrates.”

7. Sempronius Tuditanus and Cn. Octavius, military tribunes, proposed to those who were inclosed with them in the lesser camp to make their way sword in hand through the enemy’s guard, affirming also that it was their intention, even if no one should be brave enough to follow. Of those who hesitated upon it twelve horsemen and fifty foot were the whole who supported them: they put themselves at their head, and arrived safe at Canusium.

8. T. Fonteius Crassus, &c.—Book I. Chap. v. 12.

9. P. Decius, military tribune, &c.—Book I. Chap. v. 14.

10. The same was effected under Atilius, &c.—Book I. Chap. v. 15.

11. C. Cæsar, opposed to the German force, &c.—Book I. Chap. xi. 3.

12. The Lacedemonians, threatened by Philip with great penalties and prohibitions, if they did not deliver up their city, inquired,—“ Whether “ they were prohibited from dying for their “ country?”

13. Leonidas, the Lacedemonian, to those who said the Persians formed clouds by the multitude of their arrows, immediately returned,—“So much the better; we shall fight in the shade.”*

14. L. Ælius, præfect of the city, while dispensing justice, had a small bird light on his head, on which it was decided by the haruspices, that, if he put it away, the enemy would be victorious; that, if he killed it, the Roman people would overcome, but—that Ælius with his family would perish. He did not hesitate to kill the bird. In a battle, in which our army was victorious, himself and fourteen others named Ælius, of the same family, were left dead in the field of battle. Some will have this to be Lælius, not Ælius, and believe the loss to arise in the family of Lælia.

15. P. Decius, the father first, and afterwards the son, in their magistracy, devoted themselves to the public safety, pushed their horses into the midst of the enemy, and met their death in rendering their country victorious.

16. Crassus, when conducting the war against Aristonicus, in Asia, between Elea and Myrina, being led into an ambuscade of the enemy, and conceiving, as he was taken prisoner, how dreadful it was in a Roman consul to be reduced to

* Latiné, *umbra*; the pun on which gives more force to the answer.—Of a custom defended by Cicero, and used by all, such an employment as this may surely be allowed.

slavery, by the stroke of a horse-whip, cut out one of the eyes of the Thracian soldier who conducted him, so that, irritated by the blow, he passed his sword through him, and thus relieved him from the horrors of slavery.

17. M. Cato, son of the censor, having fallen, during battle, by a slip of his horse, perceived that his sword had slid from the scabbard: the fear of ignominy induced him to rush again among the enemy; he recovered his sword, with some wounds, and returned to his own army.

18. The Petilini, besieged by the Pœni, and being in want of provisions, sent away their wives and children: with leather soled and broiled, the leaves of trees, and all sorts of animals, they supported life for eleven months, and thus sustained the siege.

19. In Spain, the Arabricenses suffered the same; nor could Hirtuleius induce their town to surrender.

20. The Casilini, besieged by Hannibal, suffered such extreme want as that a hundred denarii* were produced by the sale of a rat,—as is reported in the Memoirs;—the seller of which perished of hunger, and the purchaser preserved his life. They persevered still in favour of the Romans.

21. When Cyzicium was besieged by Mithridates,

* About £3 : 2 : 6.

the inhabitants of the town were shewn their prisoners prepared for death, with the view of inducing them to surrender. They exhorted them to die with patience and fortitude, and persevered in obedience to the Romans.

22. The Segovienses, when Viriathus, in their presence, killed their wives and children, chose rather to behold the sacrifice of all which was dear to them than to revolt against the Romans.

23. The Numantini, not to disgrace themselves, died of famine, preferring to shut themselves up in their houses than to incur reproach.

CHAP. VI.

Of Tenderness and Amenity.

1. Q. Fabius, exhorted by his son, with small loss, to take a rich place, frowning, said, " Will "you go?—You will be that small loss."
2. Xenophon, when on horseback, giving an order to his infantry to occupy the summit of a hill, a soldier, murmuring, said, it was easy, well seated, to give such laborious orders: he dismounted, placed the soldier in his seat, and ran on foot to the destined hill. This circumstance excited the shame of the soldier, and, ridiculed by his comrades, he descended. Xenophon was, however, with difficulty, induced, by the universal wish, to resume his place, and reserve himself for the labours appropriate to a general.
3. Alexander, during a march in winter, reposing by a fire, while observing his troops pass, he saw a soldier exanimate with the cold, and immediately ordered him to take his place, saying, " If you had

“ been born in Persia, to sit in the seat of the king
“ would have been a capital crime:—born in Mace-
“ donia, it is allowed.”

4. The sacred Augustus Vespasianus, understanding that a young man, honourably born, but unfit for a military career, was, from the straitened circumstances of his family, with difficulty bred as an officer, appointed him a provision, and relieved him from all military services, with the honourable mission.

CHAP. VII.

Various Expedients, (including Remarkable Actions and Expressions).

1. Cæsar said, that he followed the same system against the enemy which most physicians did against the diseased body: he operated by hunger rather than steel.
2. Domitius Corbulo used to say, “The chip-“axe;” that is, vanquish the enemy by little and little.
3. L. Paullus said, that the manners of an old man were necessary to a general; signifying that he should follow moderate councils.
4. Scipio Africanus is reported to have said, when told that fighting but ill became him, “My mother “made me a general, not a warrior.”
5. C. Marius; being provoked by a Teuton to combat, answered, “If you have a great desire to “die, a cord will deprive you of life.” And, when pressed, he presented a gladiator, of contemptible

stature, and aged. This being objected to, he said, " If you overcome him, I shall fight the "victor."

6. Q. Sertorius, who had experienced, &c.—
Book I. Chap. x. 1.

7. Valerius Lævinus, consul, when the spy of an enemy was apprehended in his camp, confident in the valour of his troops, ordered that he should be led round his camp, and, to the astonishment of the enemy, added, that, whenever they wished to know the state of his army, he should permit their spies to do the same.

8. Catidius Primopilarius, who, after the defeat of Varus, commanded the remainder of our troops besieged in Germany, being afraid that, as the barbarians had collected much wood, it might be employed to fire his camp, feigned to want it, and sent out people to every quarter to collect it; so that the enemy removed it to a distance.

9. Cn. Scipio, in a naval war, caused a sort of pitchers to be filled with pitch and tallow, and thrown into the enemy's vessels, when, being broken by their weight, they spread the combustibles about, to serve as aliment for fire.

10. Hannibal advised the king of Antioch to throw into the enemy's vessels vases filled with vipers, that the soldiers, disgusted, might shrink from the fight, and the seamen be impeded in their manœuvres.

11. The same was done, when his fleet began to retire, by Prusias.

12. Marcus Portius Cato, leaping into a vessel of the enemy, drove off the Poeni, and, distributing their arms and ensigns among his own men, passed through the enemy's fleet, as one of themselves, and run down several of their vessels.

13. The Athenians, when subject to be infested by the Lacedemonians on a holiday, which was sacred to Minerva, went out of town, as usual, to celebrate it, with all its usual provision, but armed beneath their habits. Having accomplished their rites, they did not return to Athens, but hastened to Lacedemon, where, nothing being apprehended, they ravaged the lands of their enemies, who had amply pillaged themselves, and wasted them to the utmost.

14. Cassius set fire to transport-vessels that were of no great use to him, and an opportune wind drove them among the enemy's fleet, which, taking fire, was entirely destroyed.

15. M. Livius, when he had routed Hasdrubal, being exhorted to pursue the enemy, and put the whole to the sword, answered, "Some must survive, to announce our victory to the enemy."

16. Scipio Africanus was wont to say, the enemy should not only have retreat open, but it should be secured to him.

17. Paches, the Athenian, affirmed, that he would grant safety to the enemy, if they laid down their iron. They obeyed the condition; but he ordered all who had iron clasps to their clokes to be put to the sword.

18. Hasdrubal, passing the frontier of the Numidians, with intention to attack them, but finding them ready, affirmed that he only came to take elephants, which is common in Numidia. As, to permit him, they required their security to be assured, he promised it to them; and when, on his persuasion, they had dispersed, he reduced them under his power.

19. Alectas, the Lacedemonian, considering how to attack with most facility a convoy of the Thebans, kept his own fleet concealed apart, and, as if he had but a single vessel, exercised his rowers by turns. Accordingly, when the Thebans were about to pass, he fell on them with his whole fleet, and took possession of the convoy.

20. Ptolemæus, opposed to the troops of Perdices, with an inferior force, collected all kinds of animals, attached to them branches of trees, and caused them to be conducted by a few cavalry. He preceded them with his troops, and the dust created by the whole made it appear as if a great army followed; which terrified the enemy, and they were vanquished.

21. Myronides, the Athenian, about to fight the

Thebans, whose cavalry was superior, declared, in his camp, that to make a firm stand would give them some hopes of safety; but, on the contrary, to give way would be highly dangerous. This speech fortified the soldiery, and victory was the consequence.

22. L. Pinarius, in Sicily, commanding the garrison of Enna, being asked for the keys of the gates, of which he had kept possession, by the magistrates of the Ennenses, whom he suspected of a design to revolt to the Pœni, took the space of a night to consider. Warning his troops of the perfidy of the Greeks, he ordered them to be in readiness at the least signal on the following day: he appeared ready to deliver up the keys, provided, he observed, that all the Ennenses evinced the same opinion. The people were immediately convoked in the theatre, and, earnestly expressing the same desire, manifested to him their inclination to revolt: he gave the signal to his troops, and the whole of the Ennenses were cut to pieces.

23. Iphicrates, the Athenian general, equipping his fleet in the same manner as the enemy, and presenting himself before a town of which he doubted the fidelity, the readiness with which they came out to meet him demonstrated their perfidy; and the town was plundered.

24. T. Gracchus, having declared that, of the slaves who served as volunteers in his army, he

should set at liberty those who behaved well, and put to death those who failed; four thousand of those who had been inactive retired to a strong hill, in fear of the penalty; when he sent to inform them that it appeared to him all his volunteers had done their part, since the enemy was put to flight; so that, dispensing with his threat, and dissipating their fear, they returned.

25. Hannibal, after the battle at Trasimenus, in which the Romans suffered so severely, when six thousand men capitulated to him, sent back all the allies of the Roman name, with the utmost benignity, telling them that he made war only to give liberty to Italy: this operated on them so favourably that they induced others of the people to submit to him.

26. Mago, when Locris was besieged by Cincius, commanding our fleet, circulated in the Roman camp a rumour that Hannibal, having defeated Marcellus, was coming to raise the siege of Locris; he then ordered his cavalry secretly to reach the neighbouring hills, and shew themselves. This had such an effect, that Cincius, believing Hannibal was there, re-embarked his troops, and departed.

27. Scipio *Æ*Emilianus, at Numantia, placed every where, not only among the cohorts, but the centuries, archers and slingers.

28. Pelopidas, the Theban, put to flight by the Thessalonians, constructed in haste on the bank of a river a bridge, by which he escaped; and fearing that the enemy should follow him by the same means, he ordered his rear guard to burn the bridge.

29. The Romans being in no respect equal to the Campanian horse, Q. Nævius, a centurion in the army of Fulvius Flacchus, proconsul, contrived to select from his whole troops those which were most active and of middle stature; these, armed with little unornamented bucklers, small casques, swords, and singular pikes of about four feet; he placed behind the cavalry, who carried them close to the walls, where, being left, they mingled with the cavalry of the enemy; these they vehemently attacked, considerably afflicted the Campanians, and more their horses, which, throwing them into disorder, the victory was ours.

30. P. Scipio, in Lydia, observing that day and night the rain distressed the army of Antiochus, and not only rendered the men and horses ineffectual, but also wetted the bowstrings so as to render them useless, exhorted his troops on the next day, although an unlucky one, to give them battle, which being done they were victorious.

31. Cato, devastating Spain, deputies of the Ilergetes, who were allied to the people, came to

request some aid. Not to discontent them by refusal, and yet not to weaken, by dividing, his force, he ordered that a third part of the army, after being supplied by victuals, should embark, but, at the same time, charged them to return under pretence of contrary winds. The rumour, however, of auxiliaries preceded them in the interim, raised the spirits of the Ilergetes, and the enemy's projects were disconcerted.

32. C. Cæsar, remarking on the part of Pompey a great number of Roman knights, who, by their dexterity in the use of arms, did great execution, ordered his soldiers to aim at the face and eyes, which forced them to turn short and retire.

33. The Vaccæi, when urged by Sempronius Gracchus, collected their whole troops, within an inclosure, formed of chariots filled with their bravest men, habited as women. Sempronius, as if having only women to oppose, proceeded incautiously to surround them, but those in the chariots fell upon his troops and put them to flight.

34. Eumenes Cardianus, one of the successors of Alexander, besieged in a castle so small that he could not exercise his horse, caused them every day, at a certain hour, to be suspended, so as to be supported on their hind feet, while the fore legs were elevated, so that by struggling to regain their natural posture they threw themselves into a sweat.

35. M. Cato, having been offered by the barbarians to furnish him with guides and succours if he would promise them a great reward, found no difficulty in promising it to them; because, if they were victorious with him he could pay them out of the spoils of the enemy, and if they perished he would be acquitted of his promise.

36. Q. Maximus, when Statilius, a knight eminent for his noble services, was preparing to desert to the enemy, ordered him to be called to him; he excused himself, that, from the envy of his comrades, he had been ignorant of his virtues till that time. Then presenting him with a horse and a sum of money, he contrived that he, whose conscience had brought him trembling before him, should be dismissed with joy; and, from wavering, to render him not less faithful than brave, as became a knight.

37. Philip learned that Pytheas, a good warrior, was alienating himself, because with three daughters, he was struggling with want, and received no assistance from the king: to those who were advising him to provide against him,—“How,” says he, “if a part of my body happens to be diseased, ‘am I to cut it off rather than cure it?’” He afterwards secretly sent for Pytheas, familiarly learned from him his difficulties and domestic necessities, assisted him with money, and rendered him more faithful than he had been before he offended.

38. T. Quintcius Crispinus, after the unhappy conflict with the Pœni, when his colleague, Marcellus lost his life, being informed that his ring was in the hands of Hannibal, circulated letters to all the towns of Italy to give no credence to any letter they might receive sealed with the ring of Marcellus. In consequence of which precaution Hannibal was frustrated in obtaining possession of Salapia and other towns.

39. After the battle of Cannæ, such was the consternation produced on the minds of the Romans, that a great part of the rest of the army, induced by the example of the nobles, formed the design of quitting Italy: Publius Scipio, yet young, came to the assembly when it was agitated, and pronounced that he would kill, with his own hand, whoever should not swear they had no intention to abandon the republic; he first took the obligation of the oath himself, then drawing his sword, he threatened with death the one next to him unless he took the soldier's oath: he acceded from fear, and the rest followed his example.

40. The Volscii encamped, &c. See Book II. Chap. iv. 15.

41. P. Crassus, in the war of the allies, &c. Book II. Chap. iv. 16.

42. Q. Metellus, in Spain, wishing to remove his camp, and perceiving that his soldiers

43. —— continuing his troops within his camp, Hermocrates kept them at bay; on the next day, with more strength, he attacked, and gained the battle.


44. Miltiades, when he had put the numerous army of Persians at Marathon to the rout, forced the Athenians, who surrounded him with congratulations, to march to the defence of their town, about to be attacked by a Persian fleet. As he hastened himself to post the soldiers on the ramparts, the Persians conceived that there were numbers of Athenian and other troops from the fight of Marathon; they quitted the wall, and immediately changed their course toward Asia.

45. Pisistratus, the Athenian, when the fleet of Megara by night cast anchor at Eleuses, for the purpose of carrying off the Athenian women, who were assisting in a sacrifice to Ceres, surprised the troops which they had disembarked, with great courage, manned with Athenians their vessels, and exhibited in a conspicuous place some matrons, in the habit of captives. This appearance deceived the Megarenses, who, as they approached, believing them to be their own forces returned with success, came to meet them unarmed and in disorder, and were a second time overpowered.

46. Cimon, the Athenian general, having defeated the Persian fleet, near the isle of Cyprus, made the soldiers adapt the habits and arms of the

prisoners, and, in the same barbarian vessels, set sail for Pamphilia, where the enemy was stationed on the river Eurymedonta. The Persians, who recognised the vessels and the habits of those who appeared, suspected nothing. They suddenly fell upon them ; and, on the same day, both by land and sea, were, by the same general, vanquished.

THE END OF STRATEGECON.



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
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





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